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Abstract
The probabilistic safety assessment of engineering systems involving high-consequence
low-probability events is stochastic in nature due to uncertainties inherent in time
to an event. The event could be a failure, repair, maintenance or degradation as-
sociated with system ageing. Accurate reliability prediction accounting for these
uncertainties is a precursor to considerably good risk assessment model.
Stochastic Markov reliability models have been constructed to quantify basic
events in a static fault tree analysis as part of the safety assessment process. The
models assume that a system transits through various states and that the time
spent in a state is statistically random. The system failure probability estimates
of these models assuming constant transition rate are extensively utilized in the
industry to obtain failure frequency of catastrophic events. An example is core
damage frequency in a nuclear power plant where the initiating event is loss of
cooling system. However, the assumption of constant state transition rates for
analysis of safety critical systems is debatable due to the fact that these rates do
not properly account for variability in the time to an event. An ill-consequence
of such an assumption is conservative reliability prediction leading to addition of
unnecessary redundancies in modified versions of prototype designs, excess spare
inventory and an expensive maintenance policy with shorter maintenance intervals.
The reason for this discrepancy is that a constant transition rate is always associated
with an exponential distribution for the time spent in a state.
The subject matter of this thesis is to develop sophisticated mathematical mod-
els to improve predictive capabilities that accurately represent reliability of an en-
gineering system. The generalization of the Markov process called the semi-Markov
process is a well known stochastic process, yet it is not well explored in the relia-
bility analysis of nuclear power plant systems. The continuous-time, discrete-state
semi-Markov process model is a stochastic process model that describes the state
transitions through a system of integral equations which can be solved using the
trapezoidal rule. The primary objective is to determine the probability of being in
each state. This process model ensures that time spent in the states can be rep-
resented by a suitable non-exponential distribution thus capturing the variability
in the time to event. When exponential distribution is assumed for all the state
transitions, the model reduces to the standard Markov model. The exponential
distribution is characterized by memoryless property and hence is not able to dis-
tinguish between a newly installed system and a system that has already been in
service. The primary rationale to move to semi-Markov process model is the ability
to address this shortcoming in the Markov process model.
This thesis illustrates the proposed concepts using basic examples and then
develops advanced case studies for nuclear cooling systems, piping systems, digital
instrumentation and control (I&C) systems, fire modelling and system maintenance.
The first case study on nuclear component cooling water system (NCCW) shows
that the proposed technique can be used to solve a fault tree involving redundant
repairable components to yield initiating event probability quantifying the loss of
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cooling system. The time-to-failure of the pump train is assumed to be a Weibull
distribution and the resulting system failure probability is validated using a Monte
Carlo simulation of the corresponding reliability block diagram. The main con-
tribution showcased in this application is the ability to solve a multi-state system
composed of repairable and non-repairable binary state components assuming non-
exponential failure times. The only other closest tool that can handle this config-
uration is Monte Carlo simulation which requires intensive iterations and variance
reduction techniques.
Nuclear piping systems develop flaws, leaks and ruptures due to various un-
derlying damage mechanisms. This thesis presents a general model for evaluating
rupture frequencies of such repairable piping systems. The proposed model is able
to incorporate the effect of ageing related degradation of piping systems. Time de-
pendent rupture frequencies are computed and the influence of inspection intervals
on the piping rupture probability is investigated. The Markov process model is
unable to assume non-exponential profile for flaw growth and probabilistic fracture
mechanics (PFM) depend on intensive simulations. Hence, semi-Markov process is
shown to be better suitable in the context of modelling piping system failures.
There is an increasing interest worldwide in the installation of digital instru-
mentation and control systems in nuclear power plants. The main feedwater valve
(MFV) controller system is used for regulating the water level in a steam generator.
An existing Markov model in the literature is extended to a semi-Markov model to
accurately predict the controller system reliability. The proposed model considers
variability in the time to output from the computer to the controller with intrinsic
software and mechanical failures. Safety critical systems are passive systems in the
sense that these are called on demand for a short mission time to mitigate catastro-
phes. Hence mission unreliability is a prominent reliability index to be determined
in order to evaluate the safety effectiveness of these systems. The mission unre-
liability measure is different from system failure probability in that it takes in to
consideration how long the system has already been in service before the system is
susceptible to failure with in the mission time. It is proved in this case study that
semi-Markov process model is able to effectively differentiate both the indices while
Markov process model fails to do so due to memoryless property of exponential
distributions.
State-of-the-art time-to-flashover fire models used in the nuclear industry are
either based on conservative analytical equations or computationally intensive simu-
lation models. The proposed semi-Markov based case study describes an innovative
fire growth model that allows prediction of fire development and containment in-
cluding time to flashover. The model considers variability in time when transiting
from one stage of the fire to the other. The proposed model is a reusable framework
that can be of importance to product design engineers and fire safety regulators.
Operational unavailability is at risk of being over-estimated because of assuming
a constant degradation rate in a slowly ageing system. In the last case study, it is
justified that variability in time to degradation has a remarkable effect on the choice
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of an effective maintenance policy. The proposed model is able to accurately predict
the optimal maintenance interval assuming a non-exponential time to degradation.
Further, the model reduces to a binary state Markov model equivalent to a classic
probabilistic risk assessment model if the degradation and maintenance states are
eliminated.
In summary, variability in time to an event is not properly captured in ex-
isting Markov type reliability models though they are stochastic and account for
uncertainties. Secondly, the memoryless property of exponential distribution is a
hindrance in modelling failure of ageing systems. The proposed semi-Markov pro-
cess models are easy to implement, faster than intensive simulations and accurately
model the reliability of engineering systems.
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1.1 Engineering Reliability and Nuclear Power
Applications
A key objective of Life Cycle Management (LCM) is the development of a complete
life cycle approach for the maintenance and ageing management of systems, struc-
tures, and components (SSCs) important to plant operation and safety. To reduce
the probability of system failures that can render a safety system unavailable, plant
operators often take the approach of periodic inspections and repair if anything is
found wrong.
The Canadian nuclear regulator states that though nuclear power plants were
highly reliable in the early years, they had to be increasingly taken offline later to
counter the effects of degradation and subsequently had to be shut down for refur-
bishment five to fifteen years earlier than the expected design life (Blahoianu et al.,
2011). Calling for frequent inspections that require the system to be taken offline is
clearly not an optimal approach from a cost viewpoint, especially if predictions of
failure can be improved. As a result, there is an increasing interest in probabilistic
methods to model several forms of material degradation such as flow-accelerated
corrosion, delayed-hydride cracking and stress-corrosion cracking for optimizing in-
service inspection programs (Fleming, 2004; Blahoianu et al., 2011).
The wide acceptance of risk-informed decision making approaches for manag-
ing safety critical infrastructure (Kafka, 2008) coupled with the availability of in-
service operating experience in the form of databases is resourceful in advancing
the sophistication of probabilistic models to accurately predict system reliability.
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Many authors have expressed the need to go beyond conservative approaches and
develop advanced models to account for dynamic behaviour (account for time de-
pendence) and complex interactions (e.g., hardware-software) among system com-
ponents (Aldemir et al., 2007; Boudali et al., 2007; Rao et al., 2009; Distefano and
Puliafito, 2009; Brissaud et al., 2011). Though there has been introduction of new
formalisms to represent dynamic dependence through dynamic fault trees (DFT),
dynamic reliability block diagrams (DRBD), binary decision diagrams (BDD), dy-
namic flowgraph methodology (DFM) and stochastic petri nets, the primary way
of quantifying the models has been simulation(Rao et al., 2009; Ibáñez-Llano et al.,
2010; Chiacchio et al., 2011; Al-Dabbagh and Lu, 2010; Škňouřilová and Brǐs, 2008).
The key objective of this thesis is to develop advanced stochastic models that by-
pass the need for simulation and improve time-dependent reliability of engineering
systems while taking in to account the susceptible nature of systems to ageing re-
lated damage mechanisms. With this motivation, the next section gives an overview
of stochastic processes.
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(e) The system reliability analysis is to analyze the events that could cause a failure of 
the equipment etc. used as the branch point of the ET, and to assess the failure 
probability (non-reliability) as a system using parameters, such as an equipment failure 
rate, which are obtained from operating experience database etc. 
(f) The development of the database is to accumulate the data on failure, trouble, scram 
event, etc. obtained from operating experiences as database and to derive parameters 
used by PSA based on the database, such as initiating events frequencies and equipment 
failure rates. 
(g) The human-reliability analysis is to identify human errors to be taken into 
consideration by analyzing operation and maintenance activities related to safety 
functions, and to assess their probabilities. 
(h) The quantification of accident sequences is to assess the frequency of occurrence of 
each core damage accident sequence and the core damage frequency (CDF) as their sum 
by inputting the frequencies of initiating events and the results of syste  reliability 
analysis or HRA etc. as the branch probabilities of ET. 
(i) The uncertainty analysis and sensitivity analysis is to study the factors and 
magnitude of uncertainties accompanying the model and data used for the PSA, and 
based on the results, to assess quantitatively the uncertainties accompanying the 
information on CDFs, frequencies of occurrence of accident sequences and contributors 
etc. obtained as the PSA results and to analyze their dominant factors. 
(j) The documentation is to compile procedures, models, data, results of assessment, etc. 
used by the PSA in a report etc. in order to use them for review, application, updating, 
quality assurance etc. of the PSA. 
 
Figure 8 Workflow of level 1 PSA  
Examination of plant configuration and characteristics  
Selection of initiating events and 
assessment of their frequencies 
Quantification of accident sequences  
Uncertainty analysis and 








Establishment of success criteria  
Analysis of accident sequences  
Figure 1.1: System reliability analysis in PSA Level 1 Workflow(JNES, 2011)
The Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) is a comprehensive methodology to
(a) identify event combinations that could potentially lead to severe accidents (b)
determine the probability of occurrence of each event combination and (c) assess the
consequences. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) initially coined
and continues to use the term Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) whereas the
term PSA is used in the international nuclear community. In other fields Quanti-
tative Risk Assessment (QRA) is in widespread use (Garrick and Christie, 2008).
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Level 1 PSA analyzes contribution of system reliability to frequency of core dam-
age (Figure 1.1), Level 2 PSA determines the frequency of radioactive release and
Level 3 PSA estimates risk to public and the environment. The terms reliabil-
ity, availability and safety should not be confused. Safety deals with consequences
of system failure. A reliable system may not be safe and a safe system may not
be reliable (Leveson, 2011). Reliability is used in the context of non-repairable
systems or systems whose first failure after installation or repair completion is of
importance whereas availability is defined for repairable systems. When there is no
repair involved in the system, availability reduces to reliability and the steady-state
availability represents the long-run performance of a repairable system.
1.2 Introduction to Stochastic Processes
The states of a system are characterized by a continuous-time stochastic process
denoted by {X(t), t ≥ 0}, a sequence of random variables which take a set of values
in a set S, called the state space of the stochastic process. For example, X(t) may
represent one of the states S={working=3, minor repair=2, major repair=1} of
a repairable system at time t. The aim of the study of stochastic processes is to
characterize the statistical behaviour of the system and hence to predict the future
of the system. A sample path is a record of how a process evolved in one particular
instance. A typical sample path of a continuous-time, discrete space stochastic
process is shown in Figure 1.2. The set of all possible sample paths of a stochastic











S0 S1 S2 S3 
t 
X(t) 
Figure 1.2: A typical sample path of a continuous-time, discrete space stochastic
process
most common and important stochastic processes:
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1. Markov Processes Consider the time points 0 ≤ t0 < t1 < ... < tn <
tn+1 and the corresponding states i0, i1, ...in+1 the process was in. Then, the
Markov property is given by:
P (X(tn+1) = in+1|X(tn) = in, X(tn−1) = in−1, ..., X(t0) = i0)
= P (X(tn+1) = in+1|X(tn) = in) (1.1)
i.e. the conditional transition probability distribution of future states of the
process, given the present state and all past states, depends only upon the
present state and not on any past states. Such a stochastic process X(t)
satisfying the Markov property is said to be a Markov process. If these tran-
sition probabilities do not change over time, then the process is the time-
homogeneous Markov process:
Pr{X(t+ s) = j|X(s) = i} = P{X(t) = j|X(0) = i} (1.2)
Markov process model is a stochastic state-space based approach to solv-
ing system reliability problems(Dhillon and Yang, March 1997; Xing et al.,
1996). This technique takes all possible system dynamics in to consideration
and also offers flexibility of evaluating system reliability as well as availability
of repairable systems. However, it suffers from state explosion i.e., as the
number of system components and their failure modes increase, there is an
exponential increase in system states, making the resulting reliability model
more difficult to analyze (Pukite and Pukite, 1998). For example, if the sys-
tem consists of n different components, then the resulting number of system
states is 2n. Thus, even for a relatively simple system, the resulting Markov
model may contain an extremely large number of states. Researchers sought
approximation methods like state merging and lumping to contain the prob-
lem(Xing et al., 1996). The Markov process model assumes that failure and
repair time distributions always follow an exponential distribution which is
associated with constant state transition rates. The method has found a class
of applications that model ageing related degradation phenomena to support
risk-informed decision making programs(Fleming, 2004; Vesely, 1993).
2. Poisson Processes The stochastic process N(t) = N(0, t) representing the
number of events in the interval (0,t) having a Poisson distribution with
parameter λ as the mean occurrence rate of the events is called a Poisson
4
process. Poisson process is a point process given by:




For example, N(t) may represent the number of failed machines at time t.
3. Renewal Processes If the interval between the point events (example: two
failure events) are independent and identically distributed random variables,
the process formed by the sequence of these random variables X(t) = {x =
t1, x = t2 − t1, ...} is called a renewal process. The name renewal process
is motivated by the fact that every time there is an occurrence the process
starts all over again. This kind of process can be used to model a sequence
of failures of a machine in continuous time.
An alternating renewal process consists of two types of independent and iden-
tically distributed random variables alternating with each other. This process
is proved to be amenable to repairable systems, with one distribution for suc-
cessful operation and the other for periods of repair. Since the process does
not restrict itself to one particular distribution, this process is a generalization
of the Poisson process.
A complex engineering system composed of components can be graphically
represented as a Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) and quantitatively eval-
uated based on probability rules. When all the components are repairable,
the alternating renewal process (Birolini, 2007) emerged as a powerful tool
in dealing with system risk and reliability analysis. Its application to infras-
tructure asset management was explored by Pandey et al. (2008). In this
stochastic method, each component is assumed to alternate between failures
and repairs. Time-to-failure and time-to-repair are treated as independent
random variables following arbitrary distributions. Availability results of the
components based on this theory are integrated at the system level using
probability rules. Since each component is individually assessed, this method
does not take in to consideration all the collective dynamics that a system
undergoes during its life-span. Apart from alternating between failures and
repairs, a component may go through gradual degradation. It may not fail
only due to sudden random occurrence. In such a case other state-space based
process models are preferred.
4. Semi-Markov Processes A sequence of bivariate random variables {(Yn, Sn), n ≥
5
0} is called a Markov renewal sequence (Kulkarni, 1995) if:
(a) S0 = 0, Sn+1 ≥ Sn;Yn ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...}, and
(b) for all n ≥ 0,
P{Yn+1 = j, Sn+1 − Sn ≤ x|Yn = i, Sn, Yn−1, Sn−1, ..., Y0, S0}
= P{Yn+1 = j, Sn+1 − Sn ≤ x|Yn = i}
= P{Y1 = j, S1 ≤ x|Y0 = i} (1.4)
where the system is being observed at times S0 = 0, S1, S2, ... etc. and
Yn is the observation (state) at time Sn.
In addition to the time-homogeneous Markov property, the Markov renewal
sequence also emphasizes on the time spent in the state.
A continuous-time stochastic process {X(t), t ≥ 0} with countable state-space
S is said to be a semi-Markov process if
(a) it has piecewise constant, right continuous sample paths, and
(b) {(Yn, Sn), n ≥ 0} is a Markov renewal sequence, where Yn = X(Sn+)
A semi-Markov process reduces to an alternating renewal process when the
number of states is limited to two and reduces to a renewal process when there
is only one state in the semi-Markov model. Semi-Markov process model is
based on Markov Renewal theory and brings together the features of renewal
theory and Markov chains i.e., this technique derives the possibility of as-
suming arbitrary distributions for transition time from renewal theory and
the ability to think beyond binary states from Markov process model. This
method also inherits the penalties of both the parent techniques. Renewal
method is based on solving a system of integral equations involving computa-
tionally resource intensive convolution operations. From the Markov process
model, the semi-Markov approach inherits the state explosion problem.
5. Markov Renewal Processes The Markov renewal processes (MRP) are
equivalent to semi-Markov process (SMP) (Nakagawa and Osaki, 1976) al-
lowing finitely many states in the model with arbitrary waiting time distri-
butions. While the objective of the latter is to determine the probability of
being in a state, the former yields the expected number of visits to a state
6
(Birolini, 2007):
Ni(t) = number of transitions in state Zi during (0, t] (1.5)
An application of this process model is to determine the expected number of
visits to the system failure state in a repairable system(Nakagawa and Osaki,
1975a).
1.3 Research objectives
The objectives of the thesis are:
1. Formulate Markov and semi-Markov process models for system reliability
analysis
2. Compare the Markov process model with fault tree method for system relia-
bility analysis
3. Develop the idea of modularized semi-Markov models to eliminate state ex-
plosion using generating function and simple probability rules.
4. Validate results of the proposed semi-Markov process models using Monte-
Carlo reliability block diagram and process simulations whichever appropriate
in the context.
5. Apply the previously developed ideas to practical case studies.
1.4 Thesis organization
The thesis is divided in to seven chapters including the present chapter. Chapter
2 reviews the Markov process model to obtain time-dependent and steady state
system reliability. Techniques to determine transition rates using event data and
Bayesian techniques is discussed. Further, the Markov reward model is reviewed
to derive mean number of failures and the mean time to failure. This chapter
introduces the Nuclear Component Cooling Water (NCCW) system and models its
shutdown initiating event frequency using fault tree analysis. This chapter analyzes
the NCCW problem from a Markovian perspective.
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In chapter 3, semi-Markov process model is presented as an extension to Markov
process model. After literature review specific to this chapter, semi-Markov process
is compared to the Markov process. This is followed by model formulation and
computation of the reliability indices. Partial closed form solutions are derived
when holding time is assumed to be Weibull distributed. While appreciating the
idea of non-exponential holding times, practical difficulties in dealing with multiple
failures and large systems is discussed. Methods of finding steady state solution and
simulation of the process are discussed. For downsizing the models, state reduction
technique is introduced. In quest for faster computational techniques, discrete time
version of the semi-Markov process model is explored.
Case studies on various systems are dealt in Chapter 4.
Chapter 5 on Monte-Carlo simulation of reliability block diagrams aids as a tool
for validating semi-Markov process models. Detailed pseudo-codes are presented to
deal with repairable and non-repairable systems. A typical block diagram and the
NCCW system reliability models are revisited to validate the models developed in
the earlier chapter. Practical difficulties in using simulation techniques for multi-
state systems are discussed.
Chapter 6 describes Universal Generating Function (UGF) method. UGF is
considered in this thesis as a rescue tool to work around the well known ‘state
explosion’ problem associated with Markov and semi-Markov processes. An ex-
ample allows the reader to appreciate its flexibility and ease of use. The chapter
ends with comments on the use of this technique for general multi-state systems
as compared to the network reliability method. The semi-Markov and UGF tool
is applied to the Heat Transport System (HTS) in a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP)
to highlight the fact that this combination is instrumental in modeling practical
reliability problems.
Chapter 7 concludes with a summary of research contributions and recommen-
dations for future studies.
Appendix A covers a trapezoidal rule based algorithm to solve the system of
integral equations to compute the interval transition probabilities discussed in chap-
ter 3. Appendix B tabulates the relation between the coefficient of variation and
the Weibull shape parameter. The appendix includes a glossary of technical terms





The two main concepts in the Markov process model are system states and state
transitions. The state of a system represents a specific combination of system
parameters that describe the system at any given instant of time. The state transi-
tions govern the changes of a state that occur within a system. As time passes and
failures occur, the system goes from one state to another until one of the absorbing
states (usually the system failure states, if any) is reached. The state transitions
are characterized by parameters such as failure rates and repair rates. Solving a
Markov model consists of solving a set of differential equations, typically using
Laplace transform or numerically using a variable step Runge-Kutta method. The
solution includes the probability of the system being in each state and the system
unreliability can be calculated by adding the probability of being in each failure
state.
2.2 Literature Review
The class of Markov chains with a denumerable number of states modelled as an
infinite system of stochastic differential equations called the Kolmogorov differential
equations was first considered by Kolmogoroff (1931) in his fundamental paper on
this subject. Feller (1937) formulated the more general integro-differential equa-
tions also called the forward and backward equations describing the Markov pro-
cesses in continuous time and discrete space. The time-homogeneous or stationary
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properties of the Markov transition probabilities were laid out by Lévy (1951). A
comprehensive discussion of the analytical properties of the transition probabilities
can be found in Kolmogorov (1951); Austin (1956); Kendall (1955).
Billinton and Bollinger (1968) discussed and illustrated the basic concepts of sta-
tionary Markov processes and particularly their application to transmission system
reliability evaluation. Transmission components were assumed to operate within
a 2-state fluctuating environment described by normal and stormy weather condi-
tions.
A Markov process model for the growth of maximum pit depth in oil and gas
pipelines was discussed by Provan and Rodriguez (1989). Xing et al. (1996) made
comparison between Markov and fault tree models for determining support system
failure initiating event frequency in a nuclear power plant, for both power and
shutdown conditions. Further, they developed a correlation to estimate the ratio
between initiator frequencies through both approaches for a two parallel component
system. Bharucha-Reid (1997) gave a formal nonmeasure-theoretic treatment to
Markov processes with main emphasis on applications.
Bloch-Mercier (2001) considered a repairable Markov system such that different
completeness degrees are possible for the repair (or corrective maintenance) that go
from a minimal up to a complete repair. They observed that the optimal restarting
distribution is generally random and does not correspond to a new start in a fixed
up-state. Vinod et al. (2003) incorporated the effects of degradation mechanism
and maintenance activities by a Markov model as an efficient method for realistic
analysis. Ajah et al. (2006) developed a multi-state reliability model of a proton
exchange membrane (PEM) fuel cell power plant via Markov process. Cho and
Jiang (2008) developed a Markov process model to study the effect of test interval
in the shutdown system number one (SDS1) of a CANDU plant. Representing the
state transitions in the SDS1 by a time-homogeneous Markov process, their model
can be used to quantify the effect of surveillance test durations and interval on the
unavailability and the spurious trip probability.
2.3 Formulation of the Markov process
Consider a system whose states i=1,2,...k are observed at times t ≥ 0. The system
stays in state i for a random amount of time that is exponentially distributed with
a parameter aij called the transition intensity and then moves to state j. The time
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spent in state i and the jump to next state depend only on the state i and not
on the history of the system prior to time t. The Markov process is based on this
fundamental property called the ”‘Markov property”’ as defined in (1.1)
While (1.1) represents a conditional probability, let pi(t) be the unconditional
probability of the process being in state i. pi(t) is called the state probability of
X(t) at time t :




pi(t) = 1 (2.2)
2.4 Determining state probabilities
The goal of Markov process is to determine the state probabilities of a stochastic
process following the Markov property. The rate of change of any state probability
of an arbitrary state j is equal to sum of the state probabilities of incoming tran-
sitions in to state j multiplied by the corresponding transition intensities minus
the state probability of state j multiplied by the sum of transition intensities of all












It is assumed that the system starts in the best state k and therefore, the initial
conditions are pk(0) = 1, pk−1(0) = pk−2(0) = ...p1(0) = 0. If the state transitions
are caused due to failures and repairs of the system, then the transition intensities
are given by the corresponding failure and repair rates.
Compactly, the system of linear differential equations (2.3) can be written in









a11 a12 ... a1k
a21 a22 ... a2k
...









P(t) = [p1(t), p2(t), ..., pk(t)]
2.4.1 Solutions of the system of differential equations
The system (2.3) can be solved numerically using an algorithm like variable step
Rungekutta method or can be solved analytically using the Laplace-Stieljes trans-
form. An example is given below to illustrate the solution method.
Consider a two state non-repairable system with a constant failure rate λ. As-
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Figure 2.1: 2-state non-repairable system with a constant failure rate λ=0.5












p1(t) + p2(t) = 1 and
p1(0) = 0, p2(0) = 1
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The Laplace transform is given as:
























Figure 2.2: System failure probability of 2-state non-repairable system with λ = 0.5
sp̃1(s)− p1(0) = λp̃2(s)














The inverse Laplace transform gives:
p1(t) = 1− exp(−λt) (2.6)
p2(t) = exp(−λt) (2.7)
p1(t) corresponds to system failure probability given that the system initially started
in state 2, the functioning state. p2(t) represents systems reliability.
2.5 Asymptotic solution
Theoretically, the steady-state probabilities are the state probabilities as time ap-
proaches infinity. The sum of all steady-state probabilities corresponding to the
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working states represents steady-state availability or long-run availability. Note
that it is inappropriate to term steady state reliability, because a non-repairable
system is never reliable in a long run.
A Markov process is said to be irreducible if every state of the process can be
reached from any other state (Ross, 1992). It is always possible to compute the
steady state probabilities for an irreducible Markov process.




pj(t) = pj (2.8)
Alternatively, a definite value is reached when the derivative of pj(t) is zero as
t→∞. This definition can be used to rewrite Equation (2.4):
0 = PA (2.9)




Note that there are k+1 system of equations along with the constraint and there
are k unknowns. Hence, any k of these equations with the constraint included is
sufficient to solve this system to obtain all the steady state probabilities.
2.6 Transition rate estimation
Transition rates of a Markov model can be estimated based on failure data available
at hand. This section discusses three different ways for this task.
2.6.1 Point estimate
This method is valid when count of failure events is available. The estimate λ̂ is







Table 2.1: Sample data for transition rate estimation
Event Type Inspected Event Count
Flaws from normal state 2000 8
Leaks from flaw state 3000 4
Ruptures from leak state 5500 3
For example, consider a piping model with four states - normal, flaw, leak and
rupture. Table 2.1 shows sample event count data gathered over 10 years. The first
row gives the count of flaws observed in the pipe given that the pipe was in normal
state when earlier observed i.e., 2000 normal pipe elements were inspected and 8 of
them were found to develop flaws. Therefore, an estimate of flaw occurrence rate
is λ̂ = 8/(2000 ∗ 10) = 4e− 3 per year. Hence in the context of Markov modelling,
the analyst needs conditional failure data.
The estimate thus found reflects quality of the sample population only. The
sample might be from a particular plant site. Given the rarity of the events and
inadequate data collection, these estimates could often be misleading.
2.6.2 Estimation using Bayesian method
In Bayesian inference (Kelly and Smith, 2009), plant specific failure data from the
above section is combined with known failure rates from other sources. These ex-
ternal failure rates from world-wide plants could be averaged and used as prior
knowledge. The source could also be based on engineering judgment or expert
opinion. Advantage of this approach is that uncertainty factor can be introduced
by considering the failure rate as a random variable following a valid statistical
distribution. This distribution π(λ) is called “prior distribution” in Bayes’ termi-
nology because it reflects prior knowledge of the failure rates. For example, failure
rate of a component pooled from other plants could follow a gamma distribution
corresponding to a mean failure rate of 10−6 and standard deviation of 0.0001.
It can be assumed that the plant specific data are likely to occur from a different
distribution having the failure rate as a distribution parameter. This is represented
by the ‘likelihood function’ f(x|λ) and it can take in to account complete, interval,
left and right censored data. Note that this ‘failure rate’ is the random variable in
the prior distribution.
The normalized product of likelihood function and the prior distribution yields
an updated failure rate in the form of a distribution. This is called the “posterior
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The denominator in Equation 2.11 is a normalizing constant and is called the
marginal or unconditional distribution of x often denoted by f(x).
For example, let the following failure rates per year be observed from different
plants: 3e − 3, 6e − 4, 5e − 5. Mean and standard deviation of this data are µ =
1.22e − 3 per year and σ = 1.57e − 3 respectively. The corresponding gamma
distribution parameters are α = 0.604 and β = 495 component years by assuming
the following characteristics for the gamma distribution:












If Poisson data is supplied, α represents the number of failure events and β repre-
sents the period of time over which these failures were observed.
Let the observed plant data be x = 8 failures out of 200 components inspected
over 10 years i.e., t = (200)(10) = 2000 component-years. The likelihood function
for this data assuming a Poisson distribution is:




In this context, the denominator of Equation 2.11 denotes the probability of ob-
serving x failures independent of the failure rate λ.




i.e., the posterior distribution is also a gamma distribution such that
αpost = x+ αprior
βpost = t+ βprior (2.17)
In the example considered, αpost = 8 + 0.604 = 8.604 and βpost = 2000 + 495 =
2495 i.e., based on the plant data, failure rate of the component can be updated as
Γ(8.604, 2494) which represents a mean failure rate of 3.44e-3 while the prior failure
rate was 1.22e-3.
The failure rate thus obtained can be utilized as a transition rate in a Markov
model. The failure frequency (hazard rate) obtained from Markov model can be
used in a fault tree as part of a Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA).
A gamma prior and Poisson likelihood results in a gamma posterior. Hence
gamma distribution is called a ‘conjugate prior’ for the Poisson distribution. If
the resultant posterior distribution is not one of the standard known distributions,
then the posterior characteristics can be determined through numerical treatment.
The difficulty lies in calculating the marginal in the denominator of Equation 2.11.
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method is a preferred tool to find the marginal
in such circumstances. Metropolis-Hastings (or its special case Gibbs sampling) and
Splice sampling are well known MCMC algorithms.
WinBUGS (Lunn et al., 2000) and its open source version OpenBUGS are widely
used software tools for Bayesian inference.
2.6.3 Estimation using Time-to-Failure data
A time-to-failure database can be developed by maintaining a list of similar com-
ponents and their respective failure times. For a multi-state system, the data must
be classified as the time-to-event data between given two states. An exponential
distribution can be fit to this data by assuming that the time-to-event is a random
variable. The mean of this dataset can be considered as the distribution parameter,
which is also the transition rate for a Markov transition. However, such a database
is exhaustive and requires more effort and maintenance when compared to that of
Poisson data. The Offshore REliability DAta (OREDA), for example is a database
sponsored by eight international oil and gas organizations. The main purpose of
this database is to act as a data bank of reliability and maintenance data. Consid-
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erable time and effort has been put to gather time-to-failure data in to the OREDA
repository.
2.7 Markov reward model
The Markov reward model was initially developed keeping cost and financial models
in mind. Later Volik et al. (1988) proved that this model can be used to obtain
reliability indices such as the mean time to failure and mean number of failures. An
example in the case of a multi-state repairable component was cited by Lisnianski
and Levitin (2003).
The continuous-time Markov chain and the Markov transition rate matrix form
the basis for this model. Additionally, each state transition and stay in a state is
associated with a reward. This reward can be positive when it fetches profit or
negative when it signifies losses. For developing a cost model, reward can be the
associated loss due to a failure or the cost incurred on a repair or profit due to a sale.
These rewards are arranged in a separate matrix which is similar in dimension to the
transition rate matrix. Given these as the input along with the initial conditions,












• Vi(t) is the total expected reward accumulated up to time t with i as the
initial state of the process at time 0,
• rii is the reward per unit time for staying in state i,
• rij is the reward for the transition from state i to state j,
• aij is the (i, j)th element of the transition rate matrix,
• K is the number of states in the model.
Equation 2.18 can be written in a matrix form as:
d
dt
V (t) = u+ aV (t) (2.19)
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where,




2.7.1 Mean number of failures
Consider a repairable system. The mean number of failures in the time interval
(0, t) can be obtained by setting the reward rij to 1 for all transitions from an
operating state i to a non-operating state j and solving the system of differential
equations in (2.18). This essentially sets up a counter to zero and increments it
for every failure encountered. Hence the total expected accumulated reward in this
case corresponds to the mean number of failures.
2.7.2 Mean time to failure
Consider a Markov state space with an absorbing state denoting system failure.
Then, the mean time to failure can be obtained by setting the reward rii to 1 for
staying in each of the operating states and finding the stationary solution of the
system of differential equations in (2.18):




Note that r00 = rij = 0 for all i 6= j. In this case the total expected accumulated
reward corresponds to mean time to failure of the system.
2.8 Multi-state system reliability
Assessment of reliability of a system from its basic elements is one of the most
important aspects of reliability analysis. A system is a collection of elements (sub-
systems, components etc.) whose proper, coordinated operation leads to the proper
functioning of the system (Modarres et al., 1999). Consider such a multi-state sys-
tem composed of n elements, each element j having kj different states denoted by
the set {1,2,...,kj }. Suppose that Markov processes for each of these elements is
independent of one another. Further, assume that there can only be one transition
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across the entire system i.e., there can only be one failure or one repair in the
system at any time instant t (Lisnianski and Levitin, 2003). The first step would
be to develop a state-space diagram for the entire system and then subsequently
evaluate the reliability or availability of the system. For a large system with many
components, each having multiple states, a pictorial state-space representation is
not feasible. It would be more convenient to represent the model in terms of the
system transition intensity matrix generated by composing the element transitions
together.
Let E denote the set of ordered n-tuples representing all possible combinations
of the states of the n elements.
E = {1, 2, ...k1} × {1, 2, ...k2} × ...× {1, 2, ...kn} (2.22)






Let each element of E be denoted by unique number from the set S={1,2,...,K}.
The order of this enumeration has no formal rule. For convenience, let the first
combination denote perfect working state of the system and the last one be the
total failure.
Consider a system transition. Then, it has to be a change in state of the system
from e1 ∈ E to e2 ∈ E. As per the assumption, these two n-tuples are identical
except for one position in the n-tuple. The corresponding transition rate of this
positional change is filled up in the system matrix. If this assumption is violated,
the corresponding transition rate is zero. The diagonal elements of the system
matrix satisfy the condition of a transition matrix of a single element as stated in
(2.5).
For example, let e1 = (1, 2, 3), e2 = (2, 1, 3). Since element 1 has transited from
state 1 to state 2 and element 2 has transited from state 2 to state 1, there have
been two transitions which is a violation of the assumption. Hence, the entry at
the intersection of e1 and e2 of the system transition matrix is zero.
Let e1 = (1, 1, 3), e2 = (1, 1, 2). Since only element 3 has a state change, the
corresponding transition rate of element 3 (µ
(3)
3,2 ) is entered in the system transition
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matrix at the intersection of e1 and e2.
2.8.1 Example
Consider a system with two elements in series with constant failure rate of λ1, λ2
and repair rates µ1, µ2 respectively. The state space diagram for the entire system
is given in Figure 2.3. The shaded state is the state of fully functional system while
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Figure 2.3: Muti-state system with two elements
the other states represent system failure du to series connection of the elements.
The transition intensity matrices a1 and a2 respectively for each of these ele-











The system transition intensity matrix a as described in section (2.8) is:
State (2,2) (1,2) (2,1) (1,1)
Combinations State# 1 2 3 4


































































2,1p3(t)− (µ(2)1,2 + µ(1)1,2)p4(t)
p1(t) + p2(t) + p3(t) + p4(t) = 1 and
p1(0) = 1, p2(0) = p3(0) = p4(0) = 0
The Laplace transforms for the above system of differential equations are:
sp̃1(s)− p1(0) = µ(1)1,2p̃2(s) + µ(2)1,2p̃3(s)− (λ(1)2,1 + λ(2)2,1)p̃1(s)
sp̃2(s)− p2(0) = λ(1)2,1p̃1(s) + µ(2)1,2p̃4(s)− (µ(1)1,2 + λ(2)2,1)p̃2(s)
sp̃3(s)− p3(0) = λ(2)2,1p̃1(s) + µ(1)1,2p̃4(s)− (µ(2)1,2 + λ(1)2,1)p̃3(s)
sp̃4(s)− p4(0) = λ(2)2,1p̃2(s) + λ(1)2,1p̃3(s)− (µ(2)1,2 + µ(1)1,2)p̃4(s)
Substituting λ = 0.5 and µ = 1, then algebraically solving for p̃1(s):
p̃1(s) =
2 + 3.5s+ s2










Applying inverse Laplace transform on p̃1(s), p1(t) is found:
p1(t) = 0.444 + 0.111e
−1.5t + 0.444e−3t
Since the system considered is a series system, states 2,3 and 4 lead to system
failure. Hence availability of the system is given by p1(t) whose plot is shown in




This asymptotic limit represents the fact that failure frequency of both the compo-
nents have survived their infant mortality phase.
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Figure 2.4: System availability of 4-state repairable system with λ1 = λ2 = 0.5;µ1 =
µ2 = 1





















2,1p3 − (µ(2)1,2 + µ(1)1,2)p4
Ignoring the last equation and considering the constraint p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 = 1,















−(λ(1)2,1 + λ(2)2,1) λ(1)2,1 λ(2)2,1 1
µ
(1)
1,2 −(µ(1)1,2 + λ(2)2,1) 0 1
µ
(2)








Solving this system the steady state probabilities are obtained as
[
0.4444 0.2222 0.2222 0.1111
]
0.4444 represents availability of the series system in this example and is the same
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as the result obtained through the Laplace method.















































































0 0.5000 0.5000 0
0.6667 0 0 0.3333
0.6667 0 0 0.3333
0 0.5000 0.5000 0


From Figure 2.4, since λ12,1 = λ
2
2,1, it is seen that p12 = p13. It is also observed that
p21 > p24 because repair rate µ1 of component 1 is greater than the failure rate λ2
of component 2.
In order to calculate the expected number of failures, the reward matrix elements




0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0


The system of integral equations (2.18) to be solved to yield the mean number
of failures with λ = 0.5 and µ = 1 are:
d
dt
V1(t) = 1− V1(t) + 0.5V2(t) + 0.5V3(t)
d
dt
V2(t) = V1(t)− (3/2)V2(t) + 0.5V4(t)
d
dt
V3(t) = V1(t)− (3/2)V3(t) + 0.5V4(t)
d
dt
V4(t) = V2(t) + V3(t)− 2V4(t)
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V1(0) = 1, V2(0) = 0, V3(0) = 0, V4(0) = 0
In this system, V1(0) = 1 represents the fact that the system starts its operation in
state 1 i.e., the perfectly operating state. The mean number of failures varies with
the initial state of operation as seen in Figure 2.5. If the system starts from the






































Figure 2.5: Expected number of failures of 4-state repairable series system with
λ1 = λ2 = 0.5;µ1 = µ2 = 1
failure state 4, it takes some time to return to operating state and hence experiences
relatively lesser failures. As a result, we see that V4(t) is lesser for all t than other
cases. If system begins with state 2 or state 3, it is more likely to be repaired
and hence returns to state 1. Since some time is spent in this process, the system
encounters lesser number of failures than the case when system starts from state 1.
2.9 Case Study: Nuclear Component Cooling Wa-
ter (NCCW) System
In nuclear power plants, Nuclear Component Cooling Water (NCCW) systems are
typically used for removing heat (cooling) systems containing potentially radioac-
tive fluids. These systems are in turn cooled by the ultimate cooling system -
river, lake, sea, or ocean water. An event that creates a disturbance in these plants
having the potential to lead to core damage, depending on the successful opera-
25
tion of required mitigating systems in the plant is called an initiating event.The
number of such events occurring in a unit time is called the initiating event fre-
quency. Xing et al. (1996) compared Markov and fault tree models for determining
support system failure initiating event frequency in the Probabilistic Safety As-
sessment (PSA) of nuclear power plant for both power and shutdown conditions.
They studied two-train systems with common failure/repair characteristics. The
NCCW system consists of two parallel pump trains connected in series with a heat
exchanger train. Both pump trains have 5 components each connected in series
- pump, pump suction manual valve, pump suction filter, pump discharge check
valve and pump discharge manual valve. The heat exchanger train consists of the
following: heat exchanger, heat exchanger inlet check valve, heat exchanger cooling
water inlet valve, heat exchanger cooling filter valve and heat exchanger cooling
water outlet valve. The task is to evaluate the initiating event frequency during
the outage time of approximately τm = 80 hours. The success criterion is any one
of the two pump trains running and the heat exchanger train operating. The fault
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Figure 2.6: Fault tree for the NCCW train system.
The data for component failure rate and repair time are listed in Table 2.2.
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Table 2.2: Reliability data for NCCW System
Pump train
TDTF1R (hr−1) Pump fails during operation 5.44 x 10−6
TSHOVT (hr−1) Manual valve transfers open/closed 4.20 x 10−8
TNSC2P (hr−1) Filter plugs fail during operation 2.19 x 10−6
TSCOVP (hr−1) Check valve transfers open/closed 1.03 x 10−8
BDTF1R β-factor for common cause failure 2.70 x 10−2
τr (Hours) Pump train repair time 1.94 x 10
1
Heat exchanger
TBHX1B (hr−1) Heat exchanger rupture/leak rate 1.14 x 10−6
There are two cases considered here: base case and sensitivity case. Base case
represents a strong presence of a common cause failure as opposed to the sensitivity
case. The failure rate λ1 of the pump train, λH of the heat exchanger and the
common cause failure rate λc are computed from Table 2.2 and listed in Table
2.3 for the base case as computed by Xing et al. (1996). For the sensitivity case
the independent failure rate of the pump TDTF1R is steeply increased to 2.0 x
10−3(hr−1) and β-factor is decreased to 1.0 x 10−3.




Applying the rules in (C.1) and (C.1), the probability of the loss of NCCW
initiating event can be computed as:
fFT = (λ1τr + λcτr)λ1τm + (λ1τr + λcτr)λ1τm + λHτm + λcτm
= 2(λ1τr + λcτr)λ1τm + (λH + λc)τm
≈ 2λ21τrτm + (λH + λc)τm (2.24)
The evaluated event frequencies for both the base and sensitivity cases are tabulated
in Table 2.4. It is seen that the system failure probability is higher in the presence
of bigger common cause failure rate since for a parallel system failure of both the
pump trains leads to a definite failure of the entire system.
A basic assumption in the fault tree analysis is that all system failures are binary
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Table 2.4: NCCW train failure probability evaluated from the fault tree
Case Failure Probability (fFT )
Base 2.8516 x 10−4
Sensitivity 1.2821 x 10−2
in nature, i.e. a system either performs successfully or fails completely. It is also
assumed that the system is capable of performing its task if all sub-components or
sub-systems are operating. But, in the real world, a system could pass through a
number of states before it completely fails i.e. a fault tree does not treat degradation
of a system or its components over a period of time. Moreover, fault tree analysis
addresses only instantaneous failures.
The NCCW problem can be analyzed in a more rigorous time-dependent manner
using the Markov process model. With three components in the system and given
that each component could be in one of the two possible states: functioning or
failed, the system as a whole can have 23=8 possible states. Instead, the state
space diagram is reduced to three states: (a) two pumps and the heat exchanger
running, (b) one pump and the heat exchanger running and (c) system failure.
Since that any one of the pumps can fail in no particular order, the failure rate
for the transition from two pumps running to one pump running is taken as twice
the failure rate λ1 of a single pump train. If single pump fails, it can be repaired
with a constant repair rate of µ. The system fails if either both the pump trains
fail or the heat exchanger train fails. This state of system failure is considered as
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Figure 2.7: Markov state-space diagram for NCCW train 10 System.
such failures can occur when either two components are operating or when only
one is operating. Such a failure could cause the entire system to fail with failure
rate of λc (hr
−1). CCF is dealt on a sensitivity basis. The absence of a CCF is
represented by setting λc to zero and increasing the independent failure rate λ1 of
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the pump trains.
The reduced state space diagram in shown in Figure 2.7 and a reliability block
diagram corresponding to the same is shown in Figure 2.8 The transition intensity
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Figure 2.8: Reliability Block Diagram of the NCCW train system.





λ1 + λc + λH −(λ1 + λc + λH + µ) µ
λc + λH 2λ1 −(λc + λH + 2λ1)


The system of differential equations follows from the intensity matrix
dp1(t)
dt
= (λ1 + λc + λH)p2(t) + (λc + λH)p3(t)
dp2(t)
dt
= 2λ1p3(t)−(λ1 + λc + λH + µ)p2(t)
dp3(t)
dt
= µp2(t)−(λc + λH + 2λ1)p3(t)
with the initial conditions p1(0) = p2(0) = 0, p3(0) = 1
The values for the failure and repair rates are taken from Table 2.3. Solving for
p1(t), gives the time-dependent system failure probability. p1(t) is plotted in Figure
(2.9) for both the base and sensitivity cases.
2.9.1 Comparison of the Markov model and Fault Tree Anal-
ysis
Even those systems that are entirely composed of non-ageing elements (with a
constant failure rate) will deteriorate (fail more often) with age, if these systems
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Figure 2.9: System failure probability for the 3-state NCCW Markov System
are redundant in irreplaceable components. Hence ageing is a direct consequence
of systems redundancy Gavrilov and Gavrilova (2003).
The system hazard rate of the NCCW system is non-constant and the expected





















Mission Time: 79.8 hrs





Figure 2.10: Comparison of Markov and fault tree results for NCCW System(Xing
et al., 1996).
Figure 2.10 shows a plot of the ratio of the initiator frequencies computed by
Markov and fault tree methods. On the x-axis, the ratio of the mission time
τm to the repair time is considered. When the repair time is comparable (closer
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to mission time), results of fault tree and Markov model agree with each other.
However, when repair time is much smaller than the mission time, fault tree yields
conservative results. Xing et al.(1996) argued that for systems configuration in
which mission time is short and the independent failure (common-cause failure is
negligible) dominates the failure mode, the effect of repair is more important so
that fault tree approach yields conservative results.
2.10 Conclusion
In this chapter, Markov model has been shown as a more rigorous time-dependent
alternative to the time-independent fault tree model. A system is allowed to transit
through multiple states in its lifetime with specified constant failure and repair
rates to yield failure probability over its mission time. However, Markov model
has the significant disadvantage that its size grows exponentially as the size of
the system increases. This rapid growth of the number of states may lead to
intractable models. In addition, Markov model assumes exponential time-to-failure
distribution. While the reliability and failure probabilities computed using the
Markov model are time-dependent, a more generic time-dependent model would
have the failure and repair rates also as a function of time. The next chapter
on semi-Markov models attempts to improvise on the Markov model by allowing





The hazard rate function λs(t) for a system is the probability that the system will
fail given that it was reliable until time t. It forms a good measure of the ageing
phenomenon for a complex engineering system.
A Markov process model assumes exponential failure or repair times. Asymp-
totically, this model shows a constant hazard rate and thus does not account for
the increasing hazard. A semi-Markov process model, on the other hand, assumes
arbitrary distributions for time spent during state transitions and hence, is able
to deviate from the conventional ideas of reliability analysis based on exponential
distributions.
If various components of the same type were observed and their time-to-failure
were tabulated, then these values are unlikely to be the same in all the cases.
Assuming a constant failure rate leads to the usage of exponential distribution as
the basis of Markov analysis. However, the failure rate function of an ageing system
is non-constant and hence a Markov process model is likely to yield not so accurate
reliability estimates.
The reliability of many engineering components can be described by a ‘bathtub’
curve which has one of its zones representing the component’s wear out period.
The Weibull distribution is capable of describing the lifetime of such components.
Its probability density function (pdf), cumulative distribution function (cdf) and
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reliability function are respectively given by:
fT (t|γ, λ) = (λγ)(λt)γ−1e−(λt)
γ
(3.1)
FT (t|γ, λ) = 1− e−(λt)
γ
(3.2)
RT (t|γ, λ) = e−(λt)
γ
(3.3)
where λ is the scale parameter and γ is the shape parameter. The scale parameter
centers around the mean life of the component and the shape factor is a function of
variation in the observed mean life. When γ = 1 the Weibull distribution reduces
to the exponential distribution: fT (t|λ) = λe−(λt) where 1/λ is the mean time to
failure and λ is the failure rate. Further, for γ around 3.4, Weibull distribution
reduces to normal distribution.
The coefficient of variation (cov) is the ratio of the standard deviation of the set
of observed time-to-failure life to its mean. The Weibull shape and scale parameters
corresponding to this combination of mean life and cov can be back calculated
from the following formulas for Weibull mean, standard deviation and coefficient of
variation:













The semi-Markov process (SMP) like a Markov process also has a set of states
and the transitions between them are governed by a transition probability matrix.
The fact that the transition time between any two states is distributed exponentially
limits the use of Markov processes to many practical problems. However, in a semi-
Markov process, the time spent in any state after entering it is a random variable
which can be described by a non-exponential distribution as well. This feature
would be useful in cases where the lifetime and repair times are not exponential.
The distributions for the time spent between various states are represented in a
matrix form called the ‘kernel matrix’ of the process. The kernel matrix and the
initial state occupied by the process completely define the stochastic behavior of
the semi-Markov process. Given these as the input, the statistical time behavior of
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the process is described by a system of linear integral equations. The main problem
then is to find the solution of this system of equations yielding the probability of
being in any state given that the process started in an initial state.
3.2 Literature Review
The idea of semi-Markov process model was proposed almost simultaneously by
Lévy (1954) and Smith (1958). The foundations of semi-Markov processes can
be found in Ross (1992), Gihman and Skohorod (1974), Cinlar (1975), Silverstov
(1980), Korolyuk and Swishchuk (1995). This thesis follows the general formulation
of the semi-Markov process as developed in Howard (1964, 1971). For the first
passage distribution of general semi-Markov process, Pyke (1961a, 1961b) suggested
a Laplace-Stieljes transform approach. Ciardo et al. (1990) proposed a method of
computing the distribution of performability in a Markov reward process. For
finite mission times Iyer et al. (1986) obtained the double Laplace transform of
performability for systems that may be modeled by semi-Markov processes. White
and Palumbo (1990) proposed a method called trimming for reducing the number
of states in a semi-Markov reliability model, and derived an error bound. The
interval reliability for a repairable semi-Markov system which alternates between
working and repair periods was studied by Csenki (1995). The author applied
the results to a two-unit system with sequential preventive maintenance.A two-
point trapezoidal rule was used to numerically solve the resulting system of integral
equations. Kovalenko et al. (1997) concentrate on aspects of semi-Markov models
as a basis for mathematical theory of reliability of time dependent systems.
Ouhbi and Limnios (2003) presented a modern overall view of semi-Markov pro-
cesses and its applications in reliability. A bootstrap simulation method using a
saddlepoint approximation was proposed by Butler and Bronson (2002). Lisnianski
and Levitin (2003) systematically describe the tools for multi-state system relia-
bility assessment and optimization with applications to different fields. Ouhbi and
Limnios (2002) derived the estimators of reliability and availability of semi-Markov
systems.They studied the asymptotic properties of these estimators and constructed
the non-parametric confidence intervals for the point availability. Maximum likeli-
hood and Bayes estimates of the parameters included in a three state semi-Markov
reliability model were presented by El-Gohary (2004).
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D’Amico et al. (2006) considered the credit risk problem as a semi-Markov re-
liability problem.They applied their model to compute the default probability of a
company going into debt. özekici and Soyer (2006) considered a Poisson process in
which arrival rate at any time depends on the state of a semi-Markov process. Toma-
sevicz and Asgarpoor (2006) presented a continuous-time semi-Markov process to
determine the amount of preventive maintenance to be performed on an equipment
in order to maximize availability. They assumed that an equipment could fail due
to both deterioration and random occurrences of failures. Lisnianski (2007) ex-
tended the classical reliability block diagram method to a repairable multi-state
system.The suggested method is based on the combined random processes and the
universal generating function technique and drastically reduces the number of states
in the multi-state model. Koutras and Platis (2008) modelled preventive mainte-
nance technique (software rejuvenation) to prevent failures in continuously running
systems that experience software ageing. Rejuvenation is modelled in a redundant
computer system via a semi-Markov process in order to counteract software ageing.
Gámiz and Román (2008) proposed a smooth estimation of the availability based
on semi-Markov kernel estimator of the cumulative distribution functions (CDF)
of the failure and repair times, for which the bandwidth parameters were obtained
by bootstrap procedures.
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Corollary 1 comes from theorem 1. 
Corollary 1. For YO = i, 
jEG'  
The proof is in appendix A.2. 
Compute the limits of the average unavailability as t 
increases. Appendix A.3 treats the special case where 
the holding-time distribution depends only on the present 
state, The formula can be derived from [4]; a short, simple 
derivation is given here. 
Derivation 
Eq (7) for transition probabilities is used for Weibull 
holding-times. Since the Weibull distribution does not 
have a simple Laplace transform, the kernel R(t)  cannot 
be computed analytically. For computation, the Weibull 
distribution is replaced by an appropriate discrete distri- 
bution (see section 3). 
For discrete holding-times that take only values in the 
lattice { k  . h : IC > 0}, (7) becomes: 
prz{yk ,h = j }  = 
k 
[R2,J(Z. h)- Rz,J((Z - 1).  h)] . H ( ( k  - 1 + 1). h ) .  (11) 
z=o 
Because R,,J is a jump function for any i , j ,  the integral 
becomes a sum. 
Let Rz,J(-h) = 0. R(t)  can be computed recursively: 
00 
R,,j(t) = E , { Z  qxn = j )  * Z(Tn E [O,tl) 
n=O 
00 
= E , { E i { C Z ( X ,  = j )  .x(Tn E [O,t])ITi,Xi}} 
n=O 
00 
= & , J  +Ez{CZ(Xn =j).Z(Tn E [O,t])lTl,X1} 
n=l 
The last line of the equations follows from the preced- 
ing one by the semi-Markov property of the sequence 
{ (Xn ,Tn)  : n 2 0). For an alternative approach see [8] 
where integral equations for the transition probabilities 
can be obtained using the case where the set of up states 
contains only one state, and point availabilities rather than 
interval availabilities are considered. However, a, different 
set of integral equations would have to be solved for each 
PZJ (t).  
R,ewrite (12) for discrete holding-times on the lattice: 
R ( m . h )  = 
m 
I + C [ Q ( l  . h)  - Q ( ( I  - 1) . h)] x R ( (m - I )  h )  , (13) 
1=1 
R(0) = I; 
I E identity matrix = c & , ~ ) .  
This recursi n is used in section 3 to approximate 
transition probabilities when the holding-times have the 
Weibull distribution. The continuous Weibull distribution 
is replaced by a discrete lattice distribution which closely 
resembles it. 4 
3. WEIBULL HOLDING-TIMES2 
This section presents a model for PP operation with 6 
states and Weibull holding-times. The transition proba- 
bilities are computed with ( l l ) ,  and the parameters for 
the Weibull distribution and the transition probabilities 
for the embedded Markov chain have been estimated from 
real operating data. 
3.1 Model Assumptions for This Example 
Figure 1. PP Model with Possible Transitions 
A. The system states and the possible transitions be- 
B. The 6 system states are [9, IO]: 
tween them are in figure l. 
#I. Operating state (up). 
#a. Stoppage due to low power-demand (up). 
#3. Boiler failure (down). 
#4, Turbine failure (down), 
#5. 
(down). 
#6. Refitting (down). 
C. The only transitions from down states, with the ex- 
ception of the transition from state #3 to #2, are into 
state 1. (This simplification is chosen on the basis of the 
operating data, ie, other transitions rarely occur.) How- 
ever, the formulas from section 2 do apply to arbitrary 
transit ions. 
Stoppage due to states other than #2 - #4 
2The  number of significant figures is not intended to imply any ac- 
curacy in the estimates, but t o  illustrate the arithmetic. The Pascal 
code used for numerical computations is available from the authors. 
Figure 3.1: Power plant reliability model. Source: Perman et al. (1997)
Perman et al. (1997) applied semi-Markov process model to power plant relia-
bility analysis. The model consisted of six states as in Figure 3.1 with failure states
dedicated to major components in the plant. These include the boiler and tur-
bine. The failure times were Weibull distributed ith par meters estimated from
real operating data using maximum likelihood method. It was assumed that the
observations of the holding-times in a given state are independent and identically-
distributed (i.i.d). However, the reliability estimates were a result of direct numer-
ical computations by discretizing the integrals. In this thesis, the use of Weibull
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distribution is further explored leading to some closed form solutions and techniques
to reduce states in a model.
A CONTINUOUS-TIME APPLICATION
A simple stochastic process will now be discussed. Also, the equations developed
in the preceding section will be applied to produce the numerical solution of the probabil-
istic time behaviour of the process. The numerical solution will then be compared with
the analytic solution.
The problem to be considered is of an aircraft searching for a submerged submarine
in the ocean. The aircraft drops sensors to detect the submarine. The aircraft is as-
sumed to detect the submarine at a constant rate \ , where X is the reciprocal of the
meantime to detect. After the aircraft detects the submarine, it drops additional sensors
to localize (refine the location) the submarine. Localization is assumed to take place at
a constant rate X , where X is then reciprocal of the mean time to localize. Once
the aircraft has localized the submarine, the mission is considered successful and the
aircraft returns to base.
While the aircraft is attempting localization, however, the submarine may move out
of detection range of the sensors and the aircraft may lose contact. The aircraft is as-
sumed to lose contact on the submarine while attempting to localize it at a constant rate
XQ , where X is the reciprocal of the mean time to lose contact. If the aircraft loses
O O
contact on the submarine, additional sensors are laid to redetect the submarine. The
redetection rate is assumed to be equal to the detection rate X . Given that the aircraft
can search for a long time and has an inexhaustible supply of sensors, then the probabili-
ties of the aircraft being in the search, detection, and localization states as a function of
time must be determined.
The elementary process just described is a three-state system consisting of two
transient states and one absorbing state (figure 1). The arrows in the figure indicate





FIG. 1: THREE-STATE STOCHASTIC PROCESSFigure 3.2: Search for submerged submarine. Source: Nunn and Desiderio (1977)
Figure 3.2 shows a state space model to obtain reliability of a search operation.
An aircraft searches for a submerged submarine by dropping sensors in the ocean.
When an approximate location is detected, additional sensors are dropped to ex-
actly localize the position. The time taken to detect and localize follow exponential
distribution.
Transition probabilities are defined as the probability that
the system will go from the current state i to the next state j.
XO The transition probabilities, Fji, are found according to (4) andLL1 R FO j organized into the matrix, F. Again, the columns represent the
'from' states and the rows are the 'to' states [7].
0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
P- a ~~~~~~~~00 0 0 1 0 0
a 0 0 0 0 0 0
S r . F > r S> r r= 0 0 0 0 0 0M2 ~~~~~~~~~~~~0c0 0 0 0 0 0
Io c 0 0 0 0 0
FIG. 1. GENERAL STATE SPACE DIAGRAM [9] b b b 0 0 0 0 0
O O a O O O O 0
IV. PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE MODEL Where:
A. Formulation a =k21 / (Xo +X + kX1)
The states from Fig. 1 are set according to the list below. b = 4 / (Xo + ±+ kX1)
In this case k = 3, giving the state space diagram in Fig. 2.[9] c = ), / (Xo +± + kX1)
L State The sojourn times of each state T, can be calculated by the
1 DI transition rates. Each sojourn time t1, is the inverse of the sum
2 D2 of the departure rates for state i [7].
3 D3
4 M1 t1 = 1/(o +±m+ kX2)
5 M2 t2 = I/(O +±m+ kXI)
6 M3 t3 = 1/(o ±+ m+ kXI)
7 Fo t4 = 1/ pm





It is now possible to calculate the proportion of all
k1 i 01I transitions that take the system into each state (7t). These:; 1 _ Ill.tD?2 -1\ DF proportions are figured according to (1) and (2):
so~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~RL+\74 1+2+ 73+ 74 + 75+ 76+ 77 + 78
v _1 F 14'74 + F 15275 + F177t7 + F187r8____ 162l)J e F2171+F2676
73 F3272
FIG. 2. STATE SPACE DIAGRAM FOR k = 3 (N 8) 74 F417l
The transition rates, Aij, are defined as the average 5 F5272
amount of transitions per unit of time in which the system 6 F6373
leaves state i to enter state j [7]. The transition rates are 7= F87131± F722± F73t3
denoted as 2, and px depending on leaving or entering a D- 8
state respectively. The transition rate matrix [A] of the Once the proortions are found then it is ossible toequipment with three deterioration states is of the form where p p 'calculate the final state probabilities, P. This is done using (3)the columns are the 'from' states and the rows are the 'to' with the sojour time of each state, t1. The first three elements
stte[0 ,11]: w1htesJ nheo ahsae I.Tefrtheelmnsstates,[1,11 . in t e vector P, are the state probabilities of the hree D-state .
0 0° 1m ~1m 0 p The sum of these three probabilities is the availability of the
kkl -Y2 0 0 0 itm 0 0 system.
0 kX1 -E3 0 0 0 0 0 After finding the availability of the system, 4 can be
Xm 0 0 -E 0 0 0 0 varied over a large range in order to find the optimal amount
A= 0°~01 0 -E5 0E 0 0 of prvniemaintenance for the eup nts maximum
Xo Xo XO 0 0 0 E o availability. Too much maintenance will be redundant and the
0 0 kX1 0 0 0 0 -E equipment will be shut down unnecessarily. If too little
5
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Figure 3.3: General state space diagram for preventive maintenance. Source: Toma-
sevicz and Asgarpoor (2006)
Tomasevicz and Asgarpoor (2006) et al. developed a continuous time semi-
Markov process model for equipments that fail due to both deterioration and ran-
dom occurrences as in Figure 3.3. They modelled the deterioration in k-discrete
steps with exclusive states for preventive and corrective maintenance. Their ap-
proach uses the time spent in the states in the formulation rather than statistical
distribution representing the time spent in the states and the outputs are steady-
state state probabilities.
A real time online computer database system is vulnerable to cyber attacks. A
cycle of a typical attack could comprise of six states - normal state G, infected state
36
The transition probability matrix P for the state transition




0 1− Pfa 0 0 Pfa 0
0 0 Pd 0 0 1− Pd
0 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0




To obtain the steady state probabilities of the embedded
continuous time Markov chain, solve Equation 1. We have
vG =
1
3− Pfa + Pd − PdPfa
vI =
1− Pfa
3− Pfa + Pd − PdPfa
vQ =
Pd(1− Pfa)
3− Pfa + Pd − PdPfa
vR =
Pd(1− Pfa)
3− Pfa + Pd − PdPfa
vFA =
Pfa
3− Pfa + Pd − PdPfa
vUD =
(1− Pd)(1− Pfa)
3− Pfa + Pd − PdPfa
(4)
Let vector v = (vG, vI , vQ, vR, vFA, vUD) be the steady
state probabilities of the embedded continuous time Markov
chain and vector h = (hG, hI , hQ, hR, hFA, hUD)′ be mean
sojourn time in each state, we have steady state probabili-















Figure 3. State Transition Model with IDS
V. SURVIVABILITY EVALUATION METRICS
It is very difficult to define or interpret survivability, since
it can mean many things in the context of different types of
systems and applications. For a database system, we define
survivability as follow:
Definition 1. Survivability is the quantified ability of a
system or subsystem to maintain the integrity and availability
of essential data, information, and services in presence of
attacks.
Based on the definition, we could evaluate the survivabil-
ity of intrusion tolerant database systems from two different
aspects. First is the ability of a system to maintain the
integrity of data and second is the ability to maintain the
availability of data. To quantify the survivability of intrusion
tolerant database systems in these aspects, we propose two
novel quantitative metrics integrity and availability in the
following section.
A. Integrity
According to survivability, we define integrity in a way
different from integrity constrains. In this paper, we define
integrity as follow:
Definition 2. Integrity is defined as a fraction of time that
all accessible data items in the database are clean.
High integrity means that the intrusion tolerant system
can serve the users good or clean data at a high probability.
Obviously, all data items are clean and accessible in state G.
When attacks occur, some data items will be affected. So in
state I , part of accessible data items are “dirty”. After the
intrusion is identified, the damaged data is quarantined until
finished the repair process. The accessible data items are
clean during the quarantine, damage assessment, and repair
process.
Consider the transition models presented in Section IV,
we can have the integrity of the state transition models is
I = πG + πQ + πR (5)
B. Availability
In reliability research availability is defined as a fraction
of time that the system is providing service to its users [1].
However, the big difference between reliability and surviv-
ability is that degraded services of survivable systems are
acceptable to users, while reliability assumes that the system
is either available or not [12]. For an intrusion tolerant
database system, if the clean data can not be accessed, it is
a loss of service to users. Availability means that the system
not only can serve its users, but also do not deny the request
for the clean data. In this paper, we define availability as
follow:
Definition 3. Availability is defined as a fraction of time
that the all clean data items are accessible.
Consider the transition models presented in Section IV,
some clean data items are contained in the quarantine state
Q. After damage assessment, contained clean data will be
released and only damaged data items are quarantined in
repair state R. Hence we have the availability of the state
transition models is
A = πG + πR (6)
VI. EMPIRICAL VALIDATION
Model validation is possibly the most important step in
the model building sequence. It is also one of the most
overlooked. In the survivability research literature [11], [12],
107
Authorized licensed use limited to: Penn State University. Downloaded on March 30,2010 at 16:07:43 EDT from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
Figure 3.4: Survivability model of an i trusion tolerant database system. Source:
Wang et al. (2010)
I, quarantined state Q, undetected state UD, and false alarm state FA as seen in
Figure 3.4. Wang et al. (2010) et al. developed a semi-Markov based survivability
model for this state space. Steady state probabiliti s for false alarm and detection
were obtained.
3.3 The Semi-Markov Process Model
This thesis follows the general formulation of the continuous-time discrete-state
semi-Markov process model as developed by Howard (1964, 1971).
Suppose the model has N states. Let fij(t) and Fij(t) denote the pdf and cdf ,
respectively, of the event corresponding to the transition from state i to state j at
time t.
Assume that the process is in state i. From this state, there could be k different
states to which the process could transit in a single step. These states could be
completion of a repair, further degradation of the system or a failure mode with
an underlying failure mechanism. Also assumed in this model is that all these k
possibilities are independent of the occurrence of each other. At a time instant t,
the process chooses only one state from these choices such that the time to be spent
in the current state i is the minimum before instantaneously jumping to the chosen
state. The probability that the next state is j and not any other state k reachable






For N=2, cij(t) = fij(t). The matrix C(t) = [cij(t)] is called the kernel or core





is called the waiting time density function for the state i. It represents the proba-
bility that the system waits in state i for t time units before making a transition.
Hence it is an unconditional density function. It is assumed that any row i of the





cij(t)dt ≈ 1 (3.7)
This assumption assures that there is unit probability that the system will be in one
of the N states of the system at time t, given the initial state as i. The probability





The objective of the model is to determine the probability φij(t) of being in each
state j given that the system initially is in a particular state i. φij(t) can be
determined by solving a system of integral equations:






Where i = j = k = 0, 1, 2, ...N − 1.
The right hand side of Equation 3.9 describes the following probabilities:
1. i = j and second term=0: Wi(t) is the probability that the process does not
leave state i by time t.
38
2. i = j and second term not 0: process leaves state i and returns to i by time
t.
3. i 6= j and second term 6= 0 : process leaves state i and reaches state j by time
t.
The system of equations can alternatively be written in a compact form as a
matrix:




Given that the system started its operation in state i and that state j is the
only absorbing state, the failure probability of the system is given by φij(t) and
reliability R(t) = 1− φij(t).
Table 3.1: Explanation of terms in the Markov renewal equation
Term Explanation
Cij(t) Kernel of the semi-Markov process(Howard, 1971): probability density
function for the event that the process entering state i at time zero will
make its next transition to state j after holding for t time units. A
homogeneous model is assumed which means that entry in to state i at
time t is the same as entering it at time zero.The transition from i to
j is a single step transition. Occurrence of this transition either has a
probability p or a probability is assigned according to the competing risk
model.The competing risk model states that the process chooses state j
as the successor and not any other state reachable from state i in a single
step because the time spent in i with j as the successor is the minimum
of the times spent in i with any other state as the successor.
φij(t) Interval transition probability (Howard, 1971): a conditional probability
that the process will occupy state j at time t if it entered state i at time
zero. This is a multi-step transition obtained using the Markov renewal
equations. If i is completely operational state and j is an absorbing state,
φij(t) represents the system failure probability and 1−φij(t) gives system
reliability (Lisnianski, 2003).
Wi(t) Complementary cumulative waiting time probability (Howard, 1971): an
unconditional probability that the process will not leave its starting state
i by time t. This is analogous to saying that the process will remain in
state i for t time units and the successor state is not yet known
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3.3.1 Example
Consider a simple 2-state non-repairable system with state 1 as down state and
state 2 as up state. Let f21(t) = λ e
−λt.












δ(t−∞) is just a formal notation stating that once the system enters down state,
it is irreparable.
3.3.2 Solution of Markov Renewal Equation
1. Continuous time solution
(a) Transform techniques: If the process has a few states and the waiting
time distributions are simple functions, it is convenient to apply Laplace-
Stieljes or Geometric transform on Equation 3.9. This transformed al-
gebraic set of equations is solved for φij in the transformed space and
then a corresponding inverse transform is applied to obtain φij(t). These
techniques have been discussed in Howard (1971). Sometimes even for
simple systems, application and inversion of transforms is non-trivial
and numerically intractable. Most distributions do not possess a closed
form Laplace transform. Cole.W.Gulyas (2007) in a thesis dissertation
employed a transform approximation method (TAM) to evaluate the
Laplace transform of Weibull distribution and then numerically evalu-
ated its Laplace inversion.
(b) Direct numerical evaluation: Algorithms based on trapezoidal and Simp-
son’s rule were derived by Nunn and Desiderio (1977) and Smith (1958).
Smith (1958) derived an algorithm in which Eq.(3.9) is expanded in
power series. This is a recursive algorithm, but, needs to be customized
to specific distributions.
2. Discrete time solution
(a) Discretized Markov renewal equation: Nunn and Desiderio (1977) use
Eq.(3.9) almost “as is” to produce φij(t) in a recursive manner by taking
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the values of the distribution on lattice points of the desired time period:
φ(tn) = W (tn) +
tn∑
τ=0
C(τ)φ(tn − τ) (3.11)
Starting with φ(t0) = W (t0), the above equation can be solved recur-
sively.
(b) Convolution inverse method: A discrete-time semi-Markov process (DTSMP)
generalizes discrete-time Markov chain. A DTSMP does not suffer from
state explosion like continuous-time SMP. The Markov renewal equation
can be expressed as a finite series of semi-Markov kernel convolution
product. Within this framework, the initial state distribution of the
system and the discrete semi-Markov kernel completely characterize the
system. The reliability and its related measures follow from this formu-
lation. Barbu et al. (2004) defined a discrete time semi-Markov model
and proposed a computational procedure for solving the Markov renewal
equation. They introduced identity and inverse elements for the discrete
case convolution operation.
φ = diag(W ) + C ∗ φ
⇒ φ(n) = (I − C)(−1) ∗ diag(W (n)) n ∈ N
In this proposal trapezoidal rule has been adopted for availability computations
since relatively little literature exists regarding the numerical accuracy or running
time of the other algorithms.
3.3.3 Solution by direct numerical integration
Equation 3.8 is computationally expensive if the integral has to be evaluated for












wi(t)dt n > 1
(3.12)
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{wi(tn−1) + wi(tn)} (3.13)
To solve the system of Markov renewal equations, Nunn and Desiderio(1977)
derived the following recurrence relation based on trapezoidal rule by distributing
t on a set of equally spaced points in the interval [0, t]:
φ(tn) = [I −
∆t
2







Where ∆t = tn − tn−1. The solution is started with φ(0) = W (0) = I. The
derivation is discussed in detail in the appendix.
The convolution operation in the above equation involves repeated addition and
multiplication of matrices thus slowing down the computations as n grows. With




C(tk)φ(tn − tk) =
[
C(t1) C(t2) ... C(tn)
] [
φ(tn−1) φ(tn−2) ... φ(t0) = I
]T
3.4 Concepts in reliability analysis
3.4.1 System reliability
Reliability of non-repairable system is expressed in terms of its time-to-failure dis-
tribution, which can be represented by respective cdf , pdf , or hazard (failure) rate
function (Modarres et al., 1999) i.e., the lifetime of a nonrepairable component lasts
until its first entrance in to the subset of unacceptable states called the “absorbing
state”. Given that the process started in state i at time zero, the first passage
time to the absorbing state j is given by φij(t) and its reliability is computed as
Lisnianski and Levitin (2003):
R(t) = 1− φij(t) (3.15)
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3.4.2 Availability and unavailability
Components of a system can be repaired and such an activity takes time. A re-
pairable system does not have an absorbing state. Rather it has a set of acceptable
states B that meet a preset demand and the rest are termed as unacceptable states.
The instantaneous availability of the system is computed by summing φij(t) over





and instantaneous unavailability is 1− A(t).
3.4.3 Hazard rate
Hazard rate is used to refer to instantaneous rate of failure of a non-repairable
system or non-repairable component in a system. It is denoted by λ(t) or h(t) and
has the units “failures per unit of time”. It is a conditional failure rate in the sense
that it expresses the likelihood that a component will fail in (t, t + ∆t) given that
it was reliable until time t. Hazard rate can be greater that one, but it is often
misinterpreted as a probability.
Some authors refer it to as failure rate function since it is considered as well
established in applied reliability Rausand and Høyland (2004). In this thesis, hazard
rate is used when dealing with non-repairable system with a repairable subsystem.















where f(t), F (t) and R(t) denote the density, cumulative distribution and reliability
functions respectively of the time to failure of a component.
3.5 Steady state probabilities
Given the Markov transition rate matrix A with zero diagonal entries, the Markov
transition probability matrix P = [pij] can be found by dividing every row of the
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matrix by its row sum. For N = 2, P is the following matrix:






After a long time of operation, the probability of being in a state j in the Markov
sense, regardless of where the system started is given by πj. This is called the
stationary distribution of the imbedded Markov chain of the semi-Markov process






πj = 1 (3.20)
The semi-Markov steady state probability φj for state j, considering arbitrary





Where τj is the mean time spent in the state j waiting for the next transition
to happen. For N = 2, τj is simply the mean of failure/repair time distribution of





This integral can be numerically integrated; however, the resulting steady-state




Barbu and Limnios(2008) presented an algorithm to simulate a trajectory of a given
semi-Markov chain (SMC) in the time interval [0,M ]. The output of their algorithm
was the successive visited states and the jump times up to the time M . In this
section, simulating a semi-Markov process based on the “Competing risk model” as
described by Howard(1971) is presented. Assume that the process is in state i. From
this state, there could be k different states to which the process could transit to in
a single step. These states could be completion of a repair, further degradation of
the system or a failure mode with an underlying failure mechanism. Also assumed
in this model is that all these k possibilities are independent of the occurrence
of each other. The process chooses only one state from these choices such that
the time to be spent in the current state i is the minimum before instantaneously
jumping to the chosen state. Hence, in simulation, all possible adjacent states and
a sample time to be spent in the current state based on each potential successor
are enumerated and the state corresponding to the minimum time is chosen. This
procedure is repeated either until the mission time is reached or the process lands
in a trapping state.
In a typical availability problem, if the process is in a down state at the end
of the mission, then the system is considered to be unavailable and available if
not. Since there is no absorbing state in such a problem, the simulation goes on
until mission time is reached. This constitutes a single trial of the simulation. A
sufficiently large number of such trials gives an estimate of the system availability.
On the other hand, for a reliability problem, the process terminates as soon as it
encounters the absorbing state flagging the system as unreliable in that trial.
3.6.1 Algorithm for process simulation
1. Variables
Sc: The current state the process is in (operational initially)
St: Target state (usually the system failure state)
Tci: Sample time spent in current state c given the successor is state i
Tmin: min{Tc1, Tc2, ...}
T : Current time
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Tm: Mission time (input)
xi: Whether process is in target state at end of mission in trial i; 1(true) or
0(false)
p: a uniform random number
inv(p, c, t): inverse transform of probability p based on current state c and
target state t
2. Repeat until T < Tm
• Choose p
• For each state i reachable in one-step from current state Sc
– Tci = inv(p, c, i)
• Tmin = min{Tc1, Tc2, . . .}
• If T + Tmin > Tm, then exit loop
• Sc = state i corresponding to Tmin
• If Sc = St, then exit loop





1 if Sc = St
0 otherwise
For sufficiently large number N of trials, the instantaneous unavailability of the
system at time t can be calculated from xi:





If N is small, the denominator in Equation 3.23 is replaced with N − 1 in order to
obtain an unbiased estimate of unavailability.
3.7 Example: Non-repairable system
Consider a two state non-repairable system with a failure time given by Weibull
distribution with a scale parameter λ and shape parameter γ. Assume that the
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Figure 3.5: 2-state non-repairable system with a Weibull failure time distribution











These matrices are plugged in to the Markov renewal equation (3.9) and solved re-
cursively for the state probabilities φij(t) by trapezoidal rule. Refer to the appendix
for the derivation of the algorithm. The time-dependent system failure probabili-



























Figure 3.6: System failure probability ased on semi-Markov model for Example
3.7.
ties are found in φ21(t) since the system started in state 2 and state 1 is the state
of failure. These are plotted in Figure 3.6 for λ = 0.5 and γ = 1, 1.5, 2.5. Note
that the plot corresponding to γ = 1 is the same as the one in Figure 2.2 of the
Markov chapter. It can also be seen that larger values of γ attain increased failure
probability at an earlier time than the case when γ = 1. Since the system is not
repairable, it is observed that the life time of the system does not go beyond 5 hours
given that γ = 1. But, if the transition times are not exponential in real time, it is
observed that the system fails in less than 5 hours.
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3.8 Example: Repairable system
Assume that in the example above, the system is repairable (Figure 3.7) with an
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Since there is no absorbing state for this system, it is always repairable. It is
more appropriate to discuss its availability than reliability. The state probabilities
are computed using Eq.(3.9). While φ21(t) in Figure 3.8 represents the system
unavailability, φ22(t) gives the availability (Figure 3.9) of the system. Both state
probabilities are conditioned that the system began its operation in state 2. The
assumed parameters are µ = 1, λ = 0.5 and γ = 1,5 and 15. Note that the variation
in γ produces a substantial difference in the system unavailability. The dips and
raises in the plot corresponding to low unavailability and high unavailability is due
to the effect of γ along with longer repair times and higher failure rates. Moreover,
since that the system is repairable, it is seen that the unavailability never reaches
or stays at one. After 5 hours, the availability reaches a steady state as seen in in
Figure 3.9.
3.9 Example: Repair and Redundancy
Consider two identical components connected in parallel. Let the random variables
X1 and X2 denote time to failure of the components. Let state 2 be fully operational
state, state 1 be a state with only one component working and state 0 be an
absorbing state denoting state of system failure. Let both the components be
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Figure 3.8: System unavailability for Example 3.8.




























Figure 3.9: System availability for Example 3.8.
repairable. Then the transition 1 to 2 represents repair of a single failed component.









Figure 3.10: State space exemplifying time to failure.
Let X denote the time to transit from state 2 to state 1.Then,
X = min{X1, X2}
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Since both the components are identical and indistinguishable, let the time to
transit from state 1 to state 0 be X1. The total time Z taken to reach state 0 from
state 2 can be one of the following:
Z = X +X1
Z = X + Y +X +X1
Z = X + Y +X + Y +X +X1
Z = X + Y +X + Y +X + Y +X +X1
.
.
Z = X + ...+X1
i.e., transition in to state 0 acts as a stopping rule for the process. Assuming that
X and Y follow valid statistical distributions and are statistically independent, the
sum of these finite number of random variables represents a convolution operation
in continuous time. The state diagram in shown in Figure 3.10. Note that for two
random variables X and Y, both not necessarily independent, density of the sum







By assuming independence of X and Y , we arrive at a convolution operation:
















fY (y)FX(z − y)dy (3.25)
If all the distributions are exponential, then the distribution of Z follows a gamma
distribution, otherwise one has to resort to Laplace transforms, Monte Carlo simu-
lations, saddle point approximation or other numerical techniques to arrive at the
distribution of Z.
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Let F (t),G(t), and H(t) be the cdf of X, Y and X1 respectively. Then the









3.10 Kernel with Weibull sojourn times
In this section, the kernel matrix of the semi-Markov process model is based on
Weibull family of distributions which means that time spent in each state before
a transition is made can be either a Weibull, exponential or a normal distribution.
This section is needed only when there is a competing risk situation i.e., a row of
the core matrix at any time t has multiple non-zero entries.
A matrix of Weibull cdfs (say Q(t)) and pdfs (say P (t) ) representing the tran-





FT (t|γij, λij) if λij 6= 0






fT (t|γij, λij) if λij 6= 0
0 if λij = 0
(3.27)
where it is assumed that:
γij = 1 whenever λij = 0. (3.28)
The kernel (3.5) of the semi-Markov process is obtained as follows. Let R(t) =
1 − Q(t) and let each column i of R1(t) be the product of the columns of R(t)
excluding the column i. Then an element-wise product of P (t) and R1(t) yields the
kernel or core matrix, C. This is given as C(t) = P (t)R1(t) in Howard’s (1971)
notation.
Consider a row i whose entries represent a competing risk situation, then for


















































Letting t to∞ in Equation 3.29, it is proved that the process holds the assump-
tion in Equation 3.7.
The Wi(t) in Integral Equation 3.9 based on Equation 3.8 is computed as







This simplified expression for Wi(t) aids in fast computation of the state probabil-
ities in the presence of numerous competing risk situations. It remains to plug-in
both the matrices C(t) and W (t) and evaluate the state probabilities recursively
using Equation 3.10 by applying the trapezoidal rule in Equation 3.14.
3.11 A typical system
Given the strengths and weaknesses of the semi-Markov process model, we look at
possible approaches to quantitatively evaluate the sample reliability block diagram
shown in Figure 3.11.
Figure 3.11: A typical parallel-series system.
Failure and repair data of the components are listed in Table 3.2. A coefficient
of variation (cov) of 1 is assumed for all the repair times, though this is not a must
for the analysis.
The first unsuitable way of solving this problem is to develop a single semi-
Markov model with 16 states assuming binary states for each component. Though
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Table 3.2: Component data for the four component example system




C3 30 , 1 0.5
C4 20, 0.25 1
it comprises of all possible system dynamics, this kind of modelling cannot be
considered practically as a final solution to a given arbitrarily large and complex
system due to state explosion.
Hence, in this thesis we look at alternative ways of solving this problem with a
mixture of semi-Markov process model and probability rules.
3.11.1 Component level analysis
One option is to evaluate the availability of each component and use probability
rule to arrive at the system availability. Lisnianski et al. (2003) explored this
option by proposing an extended reliability block diagram method in which each
block of the diagram embeds a multi-state semi-Markov model for the corresponding
component.
For component C1, a state space with two states is considered as seen in Figure
3.12. State 1 is working state and 0 is the failed state. The transition 1→0 repre-
sents a component failure. The mean life and cov of time to failure of C1 are listed
as the label for the edge connecting 1 and 0. Similarly, the label for the transition
0→1 represents the mean repair time along with cov of time to repair. The failure
and repair distributions are not part of the label. This facilitates the flexibility to
assume any arbitrary distribution at a later time.
Figure 3.12: State-space diagram for component C1
Let fij(t) and gij(t) be the failure and repair pdf respectively for the transitions
in Figure 3.12 corresponding to the mean and cov parameters listed along the edges































Assuming that the component begins its operation from state 1, the probability
of being in state 0 denoted by φ10(t) gives unavailability of C1. Q2(t), Q3(t), Q4(t)
are similarly obtained for rest of the components.





































Figure 3.13: Component unavailability of individual components.
In all the cases, Weibull distribution is assumed for time-to-failure and exponen-
tial distribution for repair time. Figure 3.13 shows the unavailability of individual
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components based on solving the integral equations using trapezoidal rule and vali-
dated using process simulation. The simulations were performed with 500,000 trials









Then, system unavailability is 1− As(t).
3.11.2 Steady state probabilities for component level anal-
ysis
In this section, steady state probabilities are illustrated for component C1. For
the analysis at the component level, mean waiting time need not be computed
explicitly. It is the mean of the component failure/repair distribution.
For each component Markov model as in Figure 3.12, the transition probabilities
are given as 1 for the transitions 0→1 and 1→0:






The imbedded Markov chain stationary distribution is determined by solving
the following set of equations:
π0 = π0p00 + π1p10 (3.36)
π1 = π0p01 + π1p11 (3.37)
π0 + π1 = 1 (3.38)
Since the stationary chain depends only on the transition probability matrix, it
is the same for all the components:






Finally, the steady state probabilities can be computed using Equation 3.21:





i.e., No matter in which state component C1 starts initially, its steady state
unavailability is 0.0123. Component 1 has an availability of 0.9877. Steady state
unavailability of all the components is listed in Table 3.3.









































Figure 3.14: System unavailability from components
The steady state system unavailability of the system based on Equation 3.34
without the time dependence can be computed as 0.00118. Plots for time-dependent
and steady state system unavailability are plotted in Figure 3.14. A plot of the
normalized system unavailability with Weibull, gamma and lognormal failure dis-
tributions and exponential repair distribution are shown in Figure 3.15.
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Figure 3.15: Normalized system unavailability with various distributions (Compo-
nent level analysis)
3.11.3 Subsystem level analysis
An alternative option to preserve the system dynamics to the possible extent is to
evaluate availability of each subsystem by semi-Markov technique and then compose
the system results using the probability rule. An advantage of this method is that
common cause failure can be integrated into the model.
In the example considered, there are two subsystems - {C1, C2} and {C3, C4}.
For N=2, the four possible states 0,2,1,3 are 00, 10, 01, 11 representing total system
failure (00), only component 1 working (10), only component 2 working (01), and
both working normally (11) respectively. A system transition represents a change
in the state of a single component. In the example, 3→2 means that component
































Figure 3.17: State-space diagram for subsystem 2
common cause failure. Figures 3.16 and 3.17 show the state-space models for
both the subsystems. Assuming that both the subsystems start operating from
state 3, φ30(t) represents subsystem unavailability. Let these be represented by
Q1(t) and Q2(t) for subsystem1 and subsystem2 respectively. Then the system
unavailability Qs(t) is given by:
Qs(t) = Q1(t) +Q2(t)−Q1(t)Q2(t) (3.41)
Let fij(t) and gij(t) be the failure and repair pdf respectively for the transitions




0 g01(τ) g02(τ) 0
f10(τ) 0 0 g13(τ)
f20(τ) 0 0 g23(τ)




Let Fij(t) and Gij(t) be the corresponding cdf . Then the kernel of the semi-




0 g01(τ)(1−G02(τ)) g02(τ)(1−G01(τ)) 0
f10(τ)(1−G13(τ)) 0 0 g13(τ)(1− F10(τ))
f20(τ)(1−G23(τ)) 0 0 g23(τ)(1− F20(τ))




















f10(τ)(1−G13(τ)) + g13(τ)(1− F10(τ))
f20(τ)(1−G23(τ)) + g23(τ)(1− F20(τ))




The kernel and W (t) are sufficient to calculate the state probabilities using the
Markov renewal equations. Assuming that each subsystem begins its operation in
working state 3, the probability of being in state 0 denoted by Q1(t) = φ30(t) gives
subsystem1 unavailability. Q2(t) is similarly obtained for subsystem 2. Based on
Equation 3.41, system unavailability can be determined as 1− As(t).
Figure 3.18 shows the unavailability of both the subsystems assuming Weibull
distribution for time-to-failure and exponential distribution for repair time. System
unavailability is also shown in the same figure.



























Figure 3.18: Subsystem and system unavailability
The system unavailability plots in Figures 3.14 and 3.18 based on component
and subsystem level analysis respectively do not yield the same results. The reason
for this discrepancy is the fact that semi-Markov process model is a Markov process
model at the time instants of state jumps, yet not a Markov process since the
time spent in a state can follow a non-exponential distribution. The selection of
successor state is based on the Markov chain property and not on the time spent
in the previous state. If repair of component 1 starts in state 1 in Figure 3.16,
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state 0 does not consider this time spent already in repair, rather, repair of one of
the two components begins in state 0. But, ideally repair of component 1 must be
continued in state 0 and the system must be brought online following the completion
of repair. Hence, in the rest of the thesis system availability analysis in the presence
of redundant units is not considered. However, it will be demonstrated through the
NCCW system that reliability analysis in the presence of redundant parallel units
yields accurate results. The next section delves deeper in to the problems carried
forward by semi-Markov process model from the Markov process model.
3.12 Regenerative stochastic processes
Markov and renewal processes come under a general class of processes called re-
generative processes. There are random points on the time axis called regeneration
points, the behaviour of the system after which is independent of its past opera-
tion. The system is said to regenerate or renew itself past this point and the time
between any two regeneration points called an ‘nth-cycle’ is considered as a random
variable holding a statistical distribution. These cycles are assumed to be indepen-
dent, otherwise, behaviour of the system structure could become mathematically
complicated. Also note that the moment the system begins its operation initially,
which usually is zero, is also a regeneration point.
In an ordinary renewal process, the point when system fails and is instanta-
neously replaced by a new one is a regeneration point called the ‘renewal point’.
After a renewal, the system becomes ‘as good as new’ and follows the same proba-
bilistic law as before the renewal.
In an alternating renewal process, a single regeneration cycle consists of a failure
and a repair i.e, time until failure and subsequently the time until completion of
repair together forms a cycle. The time instant at which repair is completed is a
regeneration point. The distribution of sum of the random variables representing
the time to failure and time to repair is given by convolution operation. This same
distribution is replicated for every regeneration cycle until the desired mission time.
The Markov process model is based on the ‘memoryless’ property. If current
state of the process is known, then the knowledge of the past states does not hold
a predictive value. This can be seen from the definition of discrete time Markov
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chain:
P (X(tn+1) = in+1|X(tn) = in, X(tn−1) = in−1, ..., X(t0) = i0)
= P (X(tn+1) = in+1|X(tn) = in) (3.44)
i.e., the probability of being in state in+1 at time tn+1 is dependent only on the
fact that the system is in state in at time tn. Moreover, the time spent in any
state follows an exponential distribution which is characterized by the memoryless
property:
P (T > t+ t2|T > t) = P (T > t2) (3.45)
i.e., the probability that a system will be reliable for t2 more time units is the same
as the conditional probability that it is reliable for t2 more time units given that it
was reliable until time t. Since the system forgets about its past, it does not keep
track of its age and starts anew each time it transits to a different state. Hence all
states of a Markov process model are regenerative states and the time instant at
which the state transition happens is a regeneration point.
To illustrate this point, consider a three state system shown in Figure 3.19 with
two identical components A and B. Let A be functioning and B be under repair
i.e., let the system be in state 1. Assume that A fails and the process steps in to
state 0 where both the components are non-operating. In an ideal case the repair
of B must continue and system must be brought online as soon as the repair is









Figure 3.19: A three state Markov model for 2-unit redundant system
the earlier state, B had already undergone a partial repair and begins repairing one
of them in state 0. This flaw is a consequence of the Markov property in Equation
3.44 i.e., the time spent in repairing the component B while in state 0 has nothing
to do with the partial time spent on repairing it in state 1.
As per Gulland(2003), this flaw is rectified by assuming that there are two
repair men repairing each component independently. This is achieved by halving
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the repair time which is equivalent to doubling the repair rate corresponding to the
transition from state 0 to state 1. In this sense, the associated transition rate is 2µ
instead of µ. An alternative reasoning would be that the time to get the system
online is the minimum of the repair times of the two components leading to an
exponential distribution with mean as the sum of the repair rates of the individual
components.
This anomaly can be seen by comparing the steady state probabilities obtained
through the Markov and probability rule approaches. The steady state unavail-
ability of both the components is given by QA = QB =
λ
λ+µ
. Assuming that the
repair time is much smaller compared to the failure time i.e., µ >> λ, the steady
state unavailability Qm by Markov method and the system unavailability Qp by
probability rule respectively are:
Qm =
2λ2


















Note that when µ is assumed for the transition 0 → 1, Qm is twice that of Qp.
However when 2µ is assumed for this transition, the corrected Qm is:
Qm =
2λ2







A detailed account of this flaw including the analysis of k-out-of-n systems is dis-
cussed in Gulland(2003).
Semi-Markov process is a generalization of Markov process in the sense that
it is based upon the Markov chain in selecting the successor state. It follows the
Markov property at the instant of state transition also called the ‘epoch’ of transi-
tion. It departs from the Markov process because the time spent in the state need
not be exponentially distributed. Markov renewal process is based on generalized
random variables dealing with the count of visits to each state of the process while
semi-Markov process assumes each state visited by the process is itself a random
variable. However, both the processes are considered equivalent from the view-
point of probability theory (Birolini, 2007). Hence a semi-Markov process model
is a regenerative stochastic process and if at least one of the states is not a regen-
eration point, then the process ceases to be a semi-Markov process, rather, it is a
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semi-regenerative process with an embedded semi-Markov process. For a two-state
model of a repairable component, both the states are points of regeneration since
this model corresponds to an alternating renewal process.
Usually, the system up-states are regeneration states, while the down-states are
not. Even for a simple system with more than two states in the model, the assump-
tion of arbitrary failure and repair times leads to a non-regenerative stochastic
process (Birolini, 2007). For example, consider the two component redundant sys-
tem in Figure 3.19. In this model, if failure time is assumed to follow Weibull
distribution, then states 1 and 2 are regenerative states, but state 0 is not because
the time spent in state 0 is dependent on how long the repair activity went on
in state 1. Hence, the following system of integral equations based on the state
















To work around the problem of dealing with a non-regenerative point with
arbitrary transition distribution, Birolini (2007) suggested modifying the integral
equations by considering a loop from state 1 to itself assuming a single repair-
man. In this case when component A fails while B is under repair, it waits for the
completion of repair of B and then jumps back to state 1 and starts repair of com-
ponent A. There are two problems with this approach, firstly, standard approach
in reliability analysis is to assume independent repair crew; secondly, dealing with
non-regenerative points varies with each problem.
While it seems lucrative that semi-Markov process model can handle arbitrary
sojourn time distributions, there comes an extra clause that all states must be
regenerative. Hence this technique does not offer a standard boilerplate solution to
any given reliability block diagram assuming independent repair crew and arbitrary
transition time distributions.
However, semi-Markov process model has potential in dealing with first failure
of small systems which are a mixture of repairable and non-repairable components.
It can also deal with degrading systems that eventually fail and are non-repairable.
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In rest of the chapter, such systems will be considered as independent case studies.
3.13 State Reduction Techniques for Semi-Markov
Process Models
Consider n components connected in series as shown in the Reliability Block Di-
agram in Figure 3.20. Each component has a reliability Ri. Then, assuming that
Figure 3.20: Reliability Block Diagram for n Components in series.
each of these components fails according to exponential distribution with a failure











In a Markov model, this feature acts as a state reduction technique. If a system
has complex network of parallel and series combination of components, an entire
subsystem of the form shown in Figure 3.20 can be reduced to a single block with
a failure rate of sum of the failure rates of the components connected in series.
However, in an SMP model, when Weibull distribution is assumed for fail-
ure/repair time, this elegance is lost. The product of Weibull distributions is not a












Then, the cdf of the poly-Weibull distribution is given by 1−Rs(t):



















Another instance of state reduction is a competing risk situation (Figure 3.21).
Consider two identical pipes connected in parallel each of which has a failure rate
(a) 3-States with a competing risk
(b) 3-States reduced to 2-States with no competing risk
Figure 3.21: Dealing with identical parallel components.
λ. Let P1P2 be the state in which both the pumps are in working condition.
When pump 1 fails, the process moves to state P2 and when pump 2 fails, the
process moves to state P1. Let the process be in state P1P2 initially. Let T1
and T2 be the random variables representing the random time taken to transit to
state P1 and P2 respectively. The process chooses the successor state based on the
minimum time taken to transit i.e. according to the rule min{T1, T2}. In general,
if T1, T2, ...Tn are n independent exponentially distributed random variables arising
out of a competing risk situation, min{T1, T2, ..., Tn} turns out to be an exponential
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distribution with mean nλ as can be seen in the following derivation:















Hence, in a competing risk situation involving identical components connected
in parallel, state reduction in a Markov model can be achieved by considering a state
transition with a transition rate of failure rate * number of parallel components. For
example, the 3-state model in Figure 3.21(a) can be replaced by a simple model
shown in Figure 3.21(b). Similarly, when Weibull failure times are considered,
Equation 3.54 turns out to be poly-Weibull distribution:













Such adjustments of transition rates also occur in modeling k−out−of−n systems,
load-sharing systems etc.
Now that poly-Weibull distribution is identified as an ideal distribution to
achieve state reduction in SMP models, in what follows, it is proved that an SMP
model’s kernel can be entirely built using poly-Weibull distribution.
Let transition from a state i to a state j follow a poly-Weibull distribution made
of a mixture of n Weibull distributions. If n = 1, distribution is a regular Weibull
distribution.
Consider a row i whose entries represent a competing risk situation, then for







































































































Letting t to∞ in Equation 3.56, it is proved that the process holds the assump-
tion in Equation 3.7.
The Wi(t) in Integral Equation 3.9 based on Equation 3.8 is computed as









This simplified expression for Wi(t) aids in fast computation of the state probabil-
ities in the presence of numerous competing risk situations. It remains to plug-in
both the matrices C(t) and W (t) and evaluate the state probabilities recursively
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Figure 3.22: State space exemplifying state reduction.
Consider two identical components connected in parallel. Let the random vari-
ables X1 and X2 denote time to failure of the components. Let state 2 be fully
operational state, state 1 be a state with only one component working and state 0
be an absorbing state denoting state of system failure. Let both the components be
repairable. Then the transition 1 to 2 represents repair of a single failed component.
Let its time to repair be denoted by Y .
Let X denote the time to transit from state 2 to state 1.Then,
X = min{X1, X2}
Since both the components are identical and indistinguishable, let the time to
transit from state 1 to state 0 be X1. Let X1 and X2 follow Weibull distribution




and the reliability function
H(t) = e−2(λt)
γ
Finally, let Y follow an exponential distribution with mean µ and pdf denoted





















3.14 Discrete-time Semi-Markov Process (DTSMP)
Model
3.14.1 Introduction
In continuous time semi-Markov process model, continuous statistical distributions
are used as kernel entries and the accuracy of the state probabilities depends on
how closely the time points are spaced. On the other hand DTSMP model involves
discrete holding time distributions. Since discrete distributions are evaluated for
discrete time points, the DTSMP method is much faster than its continuous coun-
terpart. Howard (1971) developed a discrete version of SMP model that can include
arbitrary discrete distributions for holding times.
The continuous Markov renewal equation 3.9 is discretized as follows:




where n = 0, 1, 2, 3, ... The period in the above expression represents an element-
wise multiplication of the matrices. All the required variables and matrices are
listed in Table 3.4.
It is seen that the core matrix is written as a product of one-step transition
probabilities and holding time densities. One-step transition probabilities are often
found from data as:
pij =
Number of transitions from state i to state j
Total number of transitions from state i
(3.59)
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Table 3.4: Notation used in Howard’s (1971) formulation of DTSMP.
Notation Meaning Remarks
pij Transition probability. Current state i,
the probability that next state is j
-
τij Random variable denoting time spent in




Holding time. Probability that n time





cumulative holding time.Probability that








time.Probability that more than n time







Waiting time. Probability that n time







cumulative waiting time.Probability that
n or fewer time units is spent in i before











time.Probability that more than n time









φij(n) Interval transition probability. Probabil-
ity of being in state j at time n given that




P Transition probability matrix {pij}
H(n) Holding time matrix {hij(n)}
P.H(m) Holding time weighted by transition prob-
ability. Element-wise multiplication
{pijhij(m)}
>W (n) complementary cumulative waiting time
diagonal matrix
{δij >wi(n)}
φ(n) state probability matrix {φij(n)}
Most noted discrete holding time distribution is the discrete Weibull distribution
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(Nakagawa and Osaki, 1975b) :
Wq,b(0) =0 (3.60)
Wq,b(γ) =q
(γ−1)b − qγb , γ ≥ 1 (3.61)
where q, b are the scale and shape parameters respectively. Khan et al. (1989)
presented a method to estimate the parameters for the distribution. Further, they
established an equivalence between the parameters of the continuous Weibull and
the discrete Weibull distributions.
For γ = 1, this distribution reduces to geometric distribution:
g(0) =0 (3.62)
g(γ) =q(γ−1)(1− q), γ ≥ 1 (3.63)
=p(1− p)(γ−1) where p+ q = 1 (3.64)
However, one has to resort to approximation techniques to compute mean and
variance of the discrete Weibull distribution. Perman et al. (1997) applied SMP
model to power plant reliability analysis. They fit semi-Markov model with dis-
cretized Weibull distributed holding-times to actual power-plant operating data.
Due to less or no availability of detailed failure data in terms of state transitions,
the DTSMP method, though much faster, is not suitable for highly reliable systems
with scanty data. Moreover collection of data at different states requires more
inspection and data storage investments.
3.14.2 Example - A three-state system
Barbu et al. (2004) defined DTSMP model and proposed a computational procedure
based on convolution inverse method for solving the Markov renewal equation along
with methods to compute the reliability and related measures. There has been no
mention of why a new convolution inverse method is needed to solve the DTSMP
renewal equations or how it is superior to Howard’s (1971) original work.
The example considered here is taken from their work and the results are verified
against the published results. However, Howard’s (1971) method is followed to solve
the Markov renewal equation.
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Consider the state space shown in Figure 3.23 to be partitioned in to the up-state
set U = {1, 2} and down-state set D = {3}.
UP UP DOWN
1 2 3
Figure 3.23: System state space.
The system is initially conditioned to be in the up-state 1 with the transition









where a = 0.7 and b = 0.3.
Assume the following discrete conditional holding times in each state before









Then, the kernel C(n) is given by








































Then the complementary cumulative diagonal waiting time matrix >W (n) fol-
lows
























Assume the following scale (q) and shape (b) parameters for the holding time
entries: 0.4, 1 for h12(n), 0.7,1 for h21(n), 0.6, 0.9 for h23(n) and 0.5,1 for h31(n).
>W (n) and the kernel C(n) can now be plugged in to the discrete Markov
Renewal Equation 3.58. A recursive computation scheme with φ(0) = I and n =
1, 2, 3.... yields the required state probabilities.
Figure 3.24 shows the reliability plot. This was obtained by disregarding the
repair from system failure state 3 to up-state 1 before solving the Markov Renewal
Equation and computing R(n) = 1 − φ13(n). In other words, the down state is
considered as an absorbing state.
Figure 3.26 is the system hazard rate plot calculated from:
λ(0) =0
λ(n) =1− R(n)
R(n− 1) , n = 1, 2, 3....
Figure 3.25 shows the availability plot. Availability was computed using the
above procedure for reliability, except that the system repair was not disregarded.
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Figure 3.24: System reliability.









Figure 3.25: System availability.








Figure 3.26: System hazard rate.
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3.15 Conclusion
This chapter focused on binary and multi-state system reliability analysis based
on the semi-Markov process model. Numerical and simulation based methods were
reviewed to solve a given model. While fault tree lacks the time dependency in
its model, Markov model is unable to handle non-exponential failure/repair times.
Though the semi-Markov model works around both the issues, it still suffers from
the state explosion problem. Simple techniques to combine two or more states in to
a single state were introduced. The next chapter explores different areas of nuclear




4.1 Nuclear Component Cooling Water (NCCW)
System
A reliability analysis of nuclear component cooling water system (NCCW) is carried
out. Semi-Markov process model is used in the analysis because it has potential to
solve a reliability block diagram with a mixture of repairable and non-repairable
components. With Markov models it is only possible to assume an exponential
profile for component failure times. An advantage of the proposed model is the
ability to assume Weibull distribution for the failure time of components. In an
attempt to reduce the number of states in the model, it is shown that usage of
poly-Weibull distribution arises. The objective of this case study is to determine
system failure probability under these assumptions. This result can be utilized as
an initiating event probability in probabilistic safety assessment projects.
4.1.1 Problem
In nuclear power plants, nuclear component cooling water (NCCW) system is used
for removing excess heat from components that may contain potentially radioactive
fluids. Xing et al. (1996) compared the Markov and fault tree models for determin-
ing system failure initiating event frequency in the Probabilistic Safety Assessment
(PSA) of NCCW systems for shutdown conditions. They argued that for systems
with short mission time and failure mode dominated by independent failure, the
effect of repair is significant.
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Figure 4.1: Reliability block diagram of the NCCW system(Xing et al., 1996).
The NCCW system constitutes two parallel pump trains connected in series
with a heat exchanger train as seen in Figure 4.1. While both the pump trains
are repairable, the heat exchanger train is a non-repairable component. This con-
figuration makes semi-Markov model a tool of choice to perform system reliability
analysis. In order to solve this system involving parallel redundancy, we first look
in to what kind of redundancy problems were tackled using semi-Markov process
model in the existing literature.
There were numerous studies in the past on the reliability of multi-unit and
in particular two-unit parallel redundant systems using semi-Markov or renewal
processes involving regeneration point techniques. These methods were utilized to
analyze systems with different configuration settings. To cite a few, Osaki and Nak-
agawa (1971) derived time to first failure distribution of two-unit standby system
allowing simultaneous failure of both the units; Gupta et al. (1982) considered a
two-unit cold standby redundant system with exponential failure and general repair
distribution; Mokaddis and Tawfek (1995) dealt with semi-Markov analysis of a two-
unit warm standby system with dissimilar units. However, in all these models, only
a single repair act was considered. Even, availability modeling with a single repair
act is not a straightforward semi-Markov process model, rather it turns out to be
a semi-regenerative process whose modeling and computations range from high to
very high difficulty levels (Birolini, 2007). This difficulty arises during availability
modeling with general failure or repair distributions because semi-Markov process
is a regenerative process which means every state must correspond to a renewal or
restoration of the system condition. Hence, Birolini (2007) cites a two-unit redun-
dant example with only two system up-states in the model and the system down
state is used in the formulation, but it is not part of the state space.
When availability of each unit of the redundant system is evaluated individu-
ally using Markov or renewal process models, it means that each unit undergoes
an independent, dedicated repair act. Usually, these unit availabilities are com-
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bined using probability rules to obtain overall system availability. If a redundancy
problem can be solved using a single semi-Markov process model with independent
number of repair acts and general failure distribution like Weibull, then the results
would be comparable to that of the probability rule method. However, a semi-
Markov process model considering independent repair act has not been modeled
and compared against the probability rule method so far due to inherent modeling
complexities. A potential use of solving this open problem is to model parallel
subsystems with common cause failures and then integrate the results using fault
trees in PSA projects. We do not address this problem in the present study, rather
use the semi-Markov process model in a setting where these issues do not hinder
the modeling i.e., we use semi-Markov process model as an effective tool to solve a
reliability block diagram in which some of the components are repairable and others
are not. In this case, once the system fails, the process terminates and we do not
require an independent repair act to repair the system. However, the repairable
components follow the failure and repair cycle until the system fails.
Relatively recent studies on the application of semi-Markov models for system
reliability have concentrated on multi-state systems with varying performance levels
(Lisnianski and Levitin, 2003). Perman et al. (1997) applied semi-Markov process
model to power plant reliability analysis. The failure times were Weibull distributed
with parameters estimated from real operating data.
The objective of this case study is to present a more advanced semi-Markov
process (SMP) model for the evaluation of NCCW system failure probability by
considering Weibull failure time distribution in the model.
4.1.2 Explosion model
Considering binary states for each component, the state space for the NCCW sys-
tem consists of 23 = 8 states as seen in Figure 4.2. The transition rate matrix
associated with this system is a square matrix with dimension 8. The list of all
possible transitions is listed in Table 4.1. In order to reduce the number of states
in this model, state reduction techniques must be used.
4.1.3 Reduced model
As per Xing et al. (1996), the Markov state-space shown in Figure 4.3 has three
























Figure 4.2: NCCW State Space Diagram (repairable pump train).
Table 4.1: Transition rate matrix
Cut set ? 000 100 010 110 001 101 011 111
Yes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yes 1 0 0 λ1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yes 0 1 0 λ1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yes 1 1 0 0 λ1 λ1 0 0 0 0 0
Yes 0 0 1 λH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 λH 0 0 λ1 0 0 µ
0 1 1 0 0 λH 0 λ1 0 0 µ
1 1 1 0 0 0 λH 0 λ1 λ1 0
fail, the system moves to state ‘P-H’. Failure of heat exchanger train leads to system
failure represented by the state ‘F’. Both the pump trains are susceptible to common
cause failure.
Both the trains are composed of five components each and their effective failure
rates are listed in Table 4.2 in the absence of common cause failure.
Let p1(t), p2(t), and p3(t) represent the probability of being in states F, P-H
and 2P-H respectively. Based on the state-space diagram, the system of differential
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Figure 4.3: Markov state-space for the NCCW system.
Table 4.2: Failure/repair data for the NCCW components(Xing et al., 1996)
λ1 Pump train failure rate 7.7243 x 10
−6 hr−1
λH Heat exchanger train failure rate 3.4243 x 10
−6 hr−1
µ−1 P p train repair time 19.4 hr
λc Common cause failure 0 (Not in present study)
dp1(t)
dt






= µp2(t)− (2λ1 + λH)p3(t) (4.1)
In the proposed semi-Markov model, we assume that pump train failure time
and repair time follow exponential distribution with mean λ1 and µ respectively.
Let the heat exchanger failure time be governed by a Weibull distribution with
mean time to failure λ−1H hours and a coefficient of variation of c associated with
the time to failure. A list of functions required to construct the kernel are shown
in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Summary of transition functions used in the kernel
f1(t), R1(t) failure time pdf and rf(pump train)
g(t), G(t) repair time pdf and rf(pump train)
fH(t), RH(t) failure time pdf and rf (heat exchanger train)
f32(t) pdf for transition from 2P-H to P-H
R32(t) reliability function corresponding to f32(t)
f21(t) pdf for transition from P-H to F
R21(t) reliability function corresponding to f21(t)
rf - reliability function
Both the pump trains are identical and the pdf of the transition from 2P-H to
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P-H is the pdf of minimum of the random variables denoting time-to-failure of the
individual pump trains and the reliability function for this transition is the product
of the reliability functions of each pump train as in Equation 3.55:
R32(t) = R1(t)R1(t) (4.2)
Similarly, for the transition from P-H to F, system failure could occur due to
pump or heat exchanger train failures acting as two competing causes. Hence, the
reliability R21(t) and pdf f21(t) of this transition are given by:
R21(t) = R1(t)RH(t) (4.3)
f21(t) = fH(t)R1(t) + f1(t)RH(t) (4.4)
f21(t) and similarly f32(t) are poly-Weibull distributions as discussed in Section
3.13.
For convenience, all the density functions corresponding to the transitions can









With the distributions for transitions, the kernel of the semi-Markov process









Since all the failure/repair time distributions in matrix f(t) are poly-Weibull,











The kernel C(t) and the matrix W (t) are sufficient to describe the time evolution
of the system. By substituting these matrices in Equation 3.10 and computing
the system of integrals using the trapezoidal rule discussed in the Appendix, time
dependent state probabilities of being in each state can be obtained.
Contrary to the preceding discussion, it is possible to assume that the pump
train failure time follows Weibull distribution and the heat exchanger train failure
time follows an exponential distribution. The analysis follows the same set of
Equations from 4.2 to 4.7.
4.1.4 Results and discussion
































Figure 4.4: System failure probability for cov = 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0 with heat exchanger
train failure time following a Weibull distribution
The time-dependent failure probability of the NCCW system is the probability
of the system being in state F with the assumption that the system started its
initial operation in state 2P-H. This quantity is given by solving for φ31(t) in the
Equation 3.10. A mission time of 100 hrs assuming various values for the coefficient
of variation c are plotted in Figures 4.4 and 4.5. Also super-imposed on both the
plots is the system failure probability obtained by solving the differential equations
for the Markov case in Equation 4.1. For c = 1, the model reduces to a Markov
model. The first observation is that the system failure probability using Markov
and semi-Markov formulations is the same. For the entire range of c considered
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Figure 4.5: System failure probability for cov = 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 with heat exchanger
train failure time following a Weibull distribution
i.e., c = 0.7, ..., 1.3, we see an increasing trend in the failure probability with time
for each c. For c < 1, the failure probability decreases and increases when c > 1
relative to c = 1. In simpler words, failure probability is a function of the variability
in the failure times. Higher the variability, higher is the system failure probability.
Random failures often show up large variation in failure times whereas those of a
cohort of ageing systems are likely to show less variability.
For the NCCW system, with low failure rate of the components and perfect
repair of the pump trains, system failure probability will reach a certain probability
of 1.0 much beyond the mission time. Further, assumption of this model is that the
observation starts from the time when the system is newly installed i.e., from age
zero. Xing et al. (1996) stated that the transient nature of the hazard rate of their
NCCW Markov model with in the mission time is due to the dominant independent
component failure mode making the repairs significant as opposed to the common
cause failure. Hence, in order to witness any ageing in the system, the Markov and
semi-Markov model results must be compared long after the considered mission
time where the hazard rate of the Markov model plateaus. An alternative solution
is to introduce common cause failure in to the semi-Markov model and consider
truncated Weibull distribution to shift the focus to period of time when ageing is
clearly observable.
Consider the second case where pump train failure time follows a Weibull distri-
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Figure 4.6: System failure probability for cov=0.3,1.0,1.3 with pump train failure
time following a Weibull distribution
bution with mean λ−11 hours and cov of c associated with the time to failure, where
as heat exchanger train failure time follows exponential distribution. The system
failure probability for this case is plotted in Figure 4.6 for c = 0.3, 1.0 and 1.3. It
is interesting to see that the failure probabilities for c = 0.3 and c = 1.0 are hardly
distinguishable, while for c = 1.3, the system failure probability is relatively larger.
i.e., an increase in the cov until 1.0 has not led to a distinguishable increase in
system failure probability. This system behavior is a result of the following reasons
with respect to the pump trains: (1) parallel redundancy: two pump train units,
(2) small expected repair time of 19.4 hrs against very small failure rate of 7.7243
x 10−6 hr−1.
We see Markov model being used widely though it restricts the failure time
profile to exponential distribution. However, for engineering systems, often Weibull
distribution is a desirable choice due to its additional shape parameter signifying
the trend in the component’s failure rate. Hence, this case study demonstrated that
semi-Markov model for reliability analysis is a choice where better predictability is
desired by considering Weibull distribution for failure times in a partially repairable
system.
The fault tree is extensively used in the nuclear industry as part of Probabilistic
Safety Analysis (PSA). The basic events are often quantified in terms of failure
probabilities or frequencies resulting from Markov models. For example, the failure
of the NCCW system could be a basic event that initiates a potential Loss of
84
Coolant Accident (LOCA) leading to a core damage. The present study proposes
the use of semi-Markov models in place of Markov models for better accuracy of
failure probabilities in such PSA applications.
4.1.5 Conclusion
The component cooling water system failure probability was determined using Semi-
Markov process model. This method is found to be effective when a system is com-
posed of two-unit parallel redundant components in combination with at least one
non-repairable component. Unlike the Markov model, the proposed method allows
the usage of Weibull distribution for the component failure time. The NCCW sys-
tem failure probability can be used as an initiating event probability in probabilistic
safety assessment projects.
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4.2 Nuclear Piping System
This section presents a general model for evaluating the rupture frequencies and
reliability of the piping system in nuclear power plant based on the theory of semi-
Markov process. The proposed model is able to incorporate the effect of ageing
related degradation of pipes. Time dependent rupture frequencies are computed
and compared against those obtained from the homogeneous Markov process model.
The influence of flaw and leak inspection intervals on the piping rupture probability
is investigated.
4.2.1 Problem
Piping systems in nuclear power plants are susceptible to ageing mechanisms such
as corrosion, cracking and fatigue. Since data regarding pipe ruptures in the nuclear
plant are rare, different modelling approaches have been developed in the literature
to estimate the rupture frequency, which serves as a useful input of the frequency of
an initiating event in probabilistic safety analysis (PSA). A piping reliability model
(Simonen and Woo, 1984) was developed based on probabilistic fracture mechanics
using Monte Carlo simulation. This method considered initial crack size, flaw (or
crack) detection probability, crack growth relation, and the deterministic stress
history as the random variables and it was observed that crack detection capability
and inspection time had the greatest impact on leak probabilities. The Markov
process model also has been applied to analyze reliability of the piping system
(Fleming, 2004). This method identifies various states of degradation, and requires
input regarding the transition rates and average time taken to recover from one
state to another. Based on this input, the Markov model is able to predict the
rupture frequency in a future operating interval.
In the context of modelling of pipe failure, the Markov model consists of three
main states or events other than the normal state of the pipe. They are flaw initia-
tion, leakage and rupture. The Markov process model assumes constant transition
rate, which means that the transition time follows an exponential distribution. In
case of an ageing piping system, this assumption is problematic. For example,
flaw initiation rate in degrading pipes is likely to change with the age of the pipe.
The exponential distribution with constant hazard rate cannot capture this aspect
of ageing. Typically, the Weibull distribution with time-dependent hazard rate is
used for modelling the ageing effects. In summary, the homogeneous Markov pro-
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cess model is not adequate for modelling the ageing effects contributing to the pipe
rupture.
The objective of this paper is to present a more advanced semi-Markov process
(SMP) model for the evaluation of rupture frequencies including the effect of ageing
related degradation mechanisms.
Section 4.2.2 defines the problem of piping reliability analysis, as described by
Fleming (2004). Section 4.2.3 discusses formulation of the piping system reliability
using semi-Markov process model.
4.2.2 State Space Model
Formulation
Figure 4.7: Four-state transition model for nuclear piping system degradation.
The Markov process model to predict piping system reliability was proposed by
Fleming (2004). The model consists of four states as seen in Figure 4.7. In the first
state S, the piping system is assumed to be in a normal operational state. Flaws
formed in the system grow gradually until they become detectable. At this time,
the system moves to the state F with a transition rate of φ per year. A detectable
flaw is either detected and repaired with a repair rate of ω, or further degrades until
it becomes a detectable leak, or directly leads to rupture of the piping system. If
the flaw is detected and repaired, the system moves back to state S, if not, it moves
to either state L or R. The rates to transit from state F to L and F to R are λF
and ρF per year respectively. In this model, the transitions S → F , F → L, and
L→ R represent gradual degradation processes.
A leak when detected is either repaired with a repair rate of µ or it develops
into a rupture with a rate of ρL per year. If the leak is repaired, the system moves
back to the state S, otherwise it transits to the state R.
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The system is assumed to be non-repairable, fail state once a flaw or leak de-
velops in to a rupture i.e., the state R is an absorbing state. This is primarily done
to evaluate the reliability of the piping system. It is assumed that all other repairs
bring back the system to ‘as good as new’ condition.





Where PI=0.25 is the probability that a piping segment with a flaw will be
inspected per inspection interval, PFD = 0.90 is the probability that this flaw is
detected and TR =200hrs is the time to repair the flaw once it is detected. The
flaw inspection interval TFI is taken as 10 years in the present paper unless stated
otherwise.





Where PI =0.90 is the probability that a piping segment with a flaw will be in-
spected per inspection interval, PLD = 0.90 is the probability that this leak is
detected and TR =200hrs is the time to repair the leak once it is detected. The leak
inspection interval TLI is taken as 1 year in the present paper unless stated other-
wise. (Note that the formula for µ in Fleming (2004) is missing PI , but considered
in the table entitled “Example Markov model transition parameters for a weld in
a PWR reactor coolant system”).
This four state model is applicable to pipe failure mechanisms which are a com-
bination of crack propagation (e.g. thermal fatigue near welds) and wall thinning
(e.g. flow accelerated corrosion in pipe base metal) failure mechanisms. Failures
due to severe loading such as overpressure are not accounted as observed from the
absence of direct transitions S → R and S → L. In other words, leak or a rupture
can only occur from the state of an existing flaw (Fleming, 2004).
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Homogeneous Markov Process Model
The system state transition matrix (Lisnianski and Levitin, 2003) for the model in




−φ φ 0 0
ω −(ω + λF + ρF ) λF ρF
µ 0 −(µ+ ρL) ρL




Let S(t), F (t), L(t),and R(t) represent the time-dependent probabilities of being
in the states S,F ,L, and R respectively. These state probabilities can be obtained
by solving the system of differential Equations 4.11 with the initial condition S(0) =
1, F (0) = L(0) = R(0) = 0. The initial condition ensures that the system initially
starts operating in state S.
dS(t)/dt = ωF (t) + µL(t)− φS(t)
dF (t)/dt = φS(t)− (ω + λF + ρF )F (t)
dL(t)/dt = λFF (t)− (µ+ ρL)L(t)
dR(t)/dt = ρFF (t) + ρLL(t) (4.11)
subject to the condition that S(t) + F (t) + L(t) +R(t) = 1
This system of equations is based on the fact that the rate of change of prob-
ability of being in any state S is negatively proportional to the rate at which the
transitions occur outward from S and positively proportional to the rate at which
inward transitions occur from other states (Lisnianski and Levitin, 2003).
For example, from Figure 4.7, it is seen that there are two inward transitions in
to state S originating from states F and L with transition rates ω and µ respectively.
ωF (t) and µL(t) are weighted transition rates added to dS(t)/dt. There is one
outward transition to state F with transition rate φ and hence negatively influences
dS(t)/dt as seen in the system of equations. The numerical solution to this system
yields the state probabilities.
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4.2.3 Rupture Frequency Analysis
Formulation
The pdfs are denoted by general symbol f(t) and subscripts are used to denote the




0 fSF (t) 0 0
fFS(t) 0 fFL(t) fFR(t)
fLS(t) 0 0 fLR(t)
0 0 0 0


The elements cij(t) of the kernel matrix C(t) are found according to Equation
3.5:
cSF (t) =fSF (t)
cFS(t) =fFS(t)[1− FFL(t)][1− FFR(t)]
cFL(t) =fFL(t)[1− FFS(t)][1− FFR(t)]
cFR(t) =fFR(t)[1− FFS(t)][1− FFL(t)]
cLS(t) =fLS(t)[1− FLR(t)]
cLR(t) =fLR(t)[1− FLS(t)]
The transition probability matrix and its elements are denoted by φ(t) and
φij(t) respectively as per Howard’s (1971) notation. These are a function of time
and will be written in bold font in this paper. φ has been used by Fleming (2004) to
denote the rate of flaw growth and is independent of time. This symbol is written
in normal font in the present paper. This approach to distinguish the symbols has
been done so as to be consistent with the notation of both the authors.
The flaw occurrence rate φ is based on the data from results of Non-Destructive
Examination (NDE) (Fleming, 2004). In order to obtain parameters of an assumed
non-exponential distribution for the time to flaw growth i.e., for the transition
S → F , it is beneficial to additionally consider the variability associated with
the time to flaw growth from the test results. Hence, the parameters affecting
the coefficient of variation (cov) will be the chemical, material, texture and other
properties taken in to consideration in the NDE inspections. For example, let the
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Table 4.4: Constant transition rates for the piping system model (Fleming, 2004)
Parameter Value
φ Flaw detection rate 4.35 x 10−4/yr
ω Repair rate of a detected flaw 2.1 x 10−2/yr
λF Leak detection rate 1.79 x 10
−4/yr
ρF Rupture occurrence rate from flaw state 9.53 x 10
−6/yr
µ Repair rate of a detected leak 7.92 x 10−1/yr
ρL Rupture occurrence rate from leak state 1.97 x 10
−2/yr
time to flaw growth until being detectable in the piping system represented by the
state transition S → F be considered a Weibull distribution with scale λφ and shape
γφ corresponding to the mean φ
−1 years and cov of c. Let the rest of the transition
times follow exponential distribution. W (t) is constructed as per Equation 3.8,
and the details are presented in Section 3.3.3. Then the Markov Renewal given in







0 e−(ω+λF+ρF )t 0 0
0 0 e−(µ+ρL)t 0








0 cSF (τ) 0 0
cFS(τ) 0 cFL(τ) cFR(τ)
cLS(τ) 0 0 cLR(τ)




By solving the above system using the trapezoidal rule, the state probabilities
φ(t) can be found. Given that the system initially started in a perfect operating
condition (state S), the probability of a flaw being detectable (state F ), a leak being
detectable (state L) and that of a rupture (state R) are given by φSF (t) = φ12(t),
φSL(t) = φ13(t), and φSR(t) = φ14(t) respectively.
Results
The transition rates for the Markov model are taken from Fleming (2004) and are
summarized in Table 4.4.
When the coefficient of variation of the flaw initiation time is c=1.0, the semi-
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State F - DETECTABLE FLAW
State R-RUPTURE
State L - DETECTABLE LEAK
Figure 4.8: State probabilities. Time to flaw growth: mean = φ−1 years, cov = 1.0

































Figure 4.9: State probabilities. Time to flaw growth: mean = φ−1 years, cov = 0.6
Markov process model yields the same results as reported by Fleming (2004) using
homogeneous Markov model (Figure 4.8). It is seen that the state probability of
being in state F is higher than being in states L and R. This is due to timely
detection and repair of detectable flaws. On repair, the system goes back to state
S thus reducing the probability of going to state of rupture.
Now we consider the cases in which flaw initiation time is modeled by the Weibull
distribution and proposed SMP model is used for reliability computation. Figure
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Figure 4.10: State probabilities. Time to flaw growth: mean = φ−1 years, cov=1.3
4.9 and Figure 4.10 show the state probabilities for c=0.6 and c=1.3 respectively.
When c < 1, the state probabilities are lesser than that when c = 1. A reduced c
implies lesser variability in the time-to-flaw initiation, which leads to smaller state
probabilities as compared to the case of c= 1. On the other hand, increased c means
that there is large variance in the observed data. Therefore, the flaw initiation rate
is higher, which in turn increases the probability of leak and rupture events.



























Figure 4.11: Influence of flaw inspection interval on rupture probability, Time to
flaw growth: mean φ−1 years with cov=0.6
The impact on rupture probability with change in the flaw inspection interval
TFI is seen in Figure 4.11. Setting TFI in Equation 4.8 to 5, 10, and 15 year intervals,
it is observed that rupture probability increases with increase in the flaw inspection
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interval. However, the difference in the probabilities is hardly distinguishable with
in a life span of 60 years for c=0.6.



























Figure 4.12: Influence of leak inspection interval on rupture probability, Time to
flaw growth: mean φ−1 years with cov=0.6
The change in rupture probability for c=0.6 with change in the leak inspection
interval TLI is seen in Figure 4.12. Setting TLI in Equation 4.9 to 1,5, and 10 year
intervals, it is observed that rupture probability increases with increase in the leak
inspection interval.

























Figure 4.13: Hazard rate of rupture with repair. Time to flaw growth: mean φ−1
years with cov=0.4, 0.5,..., 1.3
The rupture frequency increases with increase in variability (or cov) associated
with the time to flaw initiation distribution, as shown in Figure 5. In early life
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time, the transient nature of solution is seen by increasing nature of the hazard
rate curve. However, a steady state solution is likely to be achieved at in long
term, which may be way beyond the intended life time of the nuclear plant.
























Figure 4.14: Hazard rate of rupture without repair. Time to flaw growth: mean
φ−1 years with cov=0.4, ..., 0.6,1.0, 1.3.
The rupture hazard rate in the absence of repair is plotted in Figure 4.14. As
expected, in the absence of repair, the rupture rate will increase significantly.




























Figure 4.15: Ratio of rupture rate without repair to rupture rate with repair.
The ratio of rupture rate without repair to rupture rate with repair is shown in
Figure 4.15 for three cases, c=0.6, 1 and 1.3. The increasing ratio with time shows
that in the absence of repair, rupture rate is larger. Moreover, higher the variability
in flaw growth, larger is the ratio. At the end of 30 years with a variation of 0.6
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in the time to flaw growth, it is seen that the rupture rate without repair is four
times larger than that in the presence of repair. This demonstrates the importance
of effective in-service inspection (ISI) programs for timely detection and repair of
flaws. Further research involves using the knowledge of these rupture rates in risk
informed programs to optimize the inspection intervals.
4.2.4 Conclusion
A semi-Markov process model was proposed to analyze reliability of the nuclear
piping system. In this model, the flaw initiation is modelled by Weibull distribution,
which allows to incorporate the ageing effect, i.e., increase in flaw initiation rate
with time. It was observed that the pipe rupture rate increases with increase in the
variability of time to flaw initiation distribution. Hence, a maintenance program
that removes the flaw from piping systems and repair leaks promptly will improve
the reliability against rupture event. The proposed model provides a tool set to
optimize the pipe inspection and maintenance program over the life cycle of the
plant.
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4.3 Availability Analysis of a System
Availability analysis of a general system with multi-state components following ar-
bitrary failure and repair time distributions is described in presence of preventive
maintenance. Each component can be in one of the following four states - oper-
ational, degraded, repair and corrective maintenance. Analysis at the component
level is conducted using semi-Markov process model. Based on a general reliabil-
ity block diagram, the collection of all possible operational set of components are
identified using network reliability techniques. Component availabilities from the
semi-Markov model are combined with probability rules to arrive at system un-
availability. This general method is illustrated using a seven component system.
The influence of inspection interval on the system unavailability is investigated.
4.3.1 Problem
A large reliability block diagram consisting of all repairable components with each
component’s failure and repair time following a general distribution can be solved
for unavailability using Monte Carlo simulation (Billinton and Li, 1994). But simu-
lation requires either large number of repeated trials or effective variance reduction
techniques with added complexity. In this section, semi-Markov process model
combined with simple probability rules is applied to obtain system unavailability
from constituent components.
Time-dependent availability analysis of a large system involves obtaining avail-
ability of individual components, finding the minimal path sets of the system and
finally using an algorithm to integrate all these results. A reliability block diagram
can be represented in the form of a links matrix (Younes and Girgis, 2005). This
matrix has all the information required to identify which two of the components in
the system are connected directly in series. Using this matrix, all the minimal path
sets of the system can also be enumerated.
For example, consider the tail-gas quench and clean-up system (Caceres and
Henley, 1976) whose reliability block diagram is shown in Figure 4.16. The links


































Using this links matrix we can trace all possible paths from A to G. For example,
tracing the ones, we find that A → B → D → E → G is a valid path which
maintains the system in an operational state. The set {A,B,D,E,G} is called a
minimal path set. If all the components in this set are functional, then the system
is guaranteed to be operational i.e., these components are connected in series. This
fact can also be represented in the form of an expression using set theoretic symbols.
For example (B ∪ C) ∩ (E ∪ F ) would mean that either of {B,C} and either of
{E,F} must be operational. Using this notation, we find the following possible
ways of the system being in operational state:
E1 = A ∩B ∩D ∩ E ∩G
E2 = A ∩B ∩D ∩ F ∩G
E3 = A ∩ C ∩D ∩ E ∩G
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E4 = A ∩ C ∩D ∩ F ∩G (4.13)
Similarly, one can define a path matrix. Each row of this matrix corresponds to
one path set and the number of rows corresponds to number of minimal path sets
in the system. For the tail-gas system, the path matrix is given in Matrix 4.14.


A B C D E F G
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1




All these path sets are analogous to four components connected in parallel. Let T
represent the fact that the system works through at least one of the paths listed in
4.13:
T = E1 ∪ E2 ∪ E3 ∪ E4 (4.15)
T can be arrived at using a step by step procedure:
E1 ∪ E2 = A ∩B ∩D ∩ (E ∪ F ) ∩G
E3 ∪ E4 = A ∩ C ∩D ∩ (E ∪ F ) ∩G
T = A ∩ (B ∪ C) ∩D ∩ (E ∪ F ) ∩G (4.16)
While for a human eye it is easy to simplify the expressions, for automation and
computation of arbitrarily large and complex systems, obtaining T is not straight-
forward. In this thesis the algorithm developed by Younes and Girgis (2005) is
applied in conjunction with semi-Markov process model to carry out system avail-
ability analysis.
4.3.2 Expression for system unavailability
Assuming that failure of one component does not affect the other, for a series system
with components B and C, let the availability of the components be B(t) and C(t)
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respectively, then the system availability As(t) is given by:
As(t) = P (B ∩ C) = B(t)C(t) (4.17)
If any two components B and C are connected in parallel with availabilities B(t)
and C(t) respectively, then system availability is given by:
As(t) = P (B ∪ C) = B(t) + C(t)−B(t)C(t) (4.18)
Using these notations, availability of the tail-gas system using Equation 4.16 can
be evaluated as
As(t) = P (T ) = A(t)[B(t) + C(t)−B(t)C(t)]D(t)[E(t) + F (t)− E(t)F (t)]G(t)
(4.19)
Using the same notation, Equations 4.13 translate to:
E1(t) = A(t)B(t)D(t)E(t)G(t)
E2(t) = A(t)B(t)D(t)F (t)G(t)
E3(t) = A(t)C(t)D(t)E(t)G(t)
E4(t) = A(t)C(t)D(t)F (t)G(t) (4.20)
where each Ei(t) represents the combined availability of all components in its path
set. However, union of more than two events as in Equation 4.15 becomes a com-
binatorial problem:








P (Ei ∪ Ej ∪ Ek)
...
(−1)(p−1)P (E1 ∪ E2 ∪ ... ∪ En) (4.21)
Younes and Girgis (2005) proposed to construct the union matrix in order to avoid
repetitions in evaluating the Expression 4.21. The first k rows of the union matrix
is nothing but the path matrix. The subsequent rows are the union of the sets listed
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in the last column of the matrix. Table 4.5 shows the union matrix for the tail gas
system. For example, by the union of first two rows corresponding to E1 and E2, we
get the fifth row i.e., E1∪E2. Further, the probability of the event listed in the last
column is the product of the availabilities of the components which are tagged as
1. For example P (E1 ∪ E2) = A(t)B(t)D(t)E(t)F (t)G(t). Similarly, by evaluating
each row of the union matrix and summing them up, we get the system availability
at a single time instant t. System unavailability follows by finding 1-(4.21).
Table 4.5: Union Matrix for the tail-gas system
A B C D E F G
1 1 1 1 1 E1
1 1 1 1 1 E2
1 1 1 1 1 E3
1 1 1 1 1 E4
1 1 1 1 1 1 E1 ∪ E2
1 1 1 1 1 1 E1 ∪ E3
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 E1 ∪ E4
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 E2 ∪ E3
1 1 1 1 1 1 E2 ∪ E4
1 1 1 1 1 1 E3 ∪ E4
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 E1 ∪ E2 ∪ E3
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 E1 ∪ E2 ∪ E4
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 E1 ∪ E3 ∪ E4
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 E2 ∪ E3 ∪ E4
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 E1 ∪ E2 ∪ E3 ∪ E4
Equation 4.19 is simple and can be computed swiftly, but arriving at it from
Equations 4.13 needs an advanced programming construct which could get time
consuming for a complex system. Equation 4.21 is long and computation of possi-
bilities might get time consuming, but, arriving at this equation is a straightforward
programming approach from Equations 4.13.
The Universal Generating Function (UGF) technique proposed by Lisnianski
and Levitin (2003) greatly helps in managing combinations by assuming that states
of a component can be expressed in the form of a polynomial. The polynomials
thus obtained can be integrated at the system level to obtain system unavailability.
This technique, however, is effective when there are at least three states for each
component. In the case of binary states, storing both the failure and operational
probabilities in each polynomial is redundant since one probability can be obtained
when the other is known.
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4.3.3 Results
Consider the hypothetical life and repair data of the tail-gas quench and clean-up
system shown in Table 4.6. Availability of each of the components is obtained
Table 4.6: Hypothetical life data for the components of the tail-gas system
Component Mean life (cov) Repair time
(years) (days)
Booster fan (A) 5 (0.6) 7
Quench pumps (B,C) 10(0.4) 15
Feedwater pump (D) 10(0.3) 15
Circulation pump (E,F) 10(0.6) 15
Filter (G) 5 (0.4) 7
using the semi-Markov process model described in Section 3.3 with an illustrative
example. Let the availability computed by this method for component A be denoted
as A(t) = φ21(t). The same method is followed for rest of the components. In the
next step, these quantities are used in Equation 4.21 with the help of Table 4.5 to
evaluate the system availability.
Time dependent unavailability of A,D, and G are plotted in Figure 4.17 and
that of B,C,E, and F are plotted in Figure 4.18. It is observed that the peak
unavailabilities of these components fall around their respective mean life. Time-

























Figure 4.17: Unavailabilities of components A, D and G
dependent system unavailability by both the exact method (4.19) and automated
method (4.21) are shown in Figure 4.19.The observed difference between both the
results is indistinguishable.
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Figure 4.18: Unavailabilities of components B,C, E and F























Figure 4.19: Tail-gas quench and clean-up system unavailability by exact and au-
tomated methods
For a general series-parallel system the steps to be followed to evaluate system
availability are (1) Translate block diagram in to links matrix - this step can be
done by updating a matrix as and when a link is made between blocks using a
Graphical User Interface (GUI) (2) Determine the path matrix and hence path sets
from the links matrix (3) Compute component availabilities using semi-Markov
process model (4) Generate a union matrix to quantify individual terms (5) Use
probability rule to arrive at expression for system availability.
In conclusion, this section analyzed a general method to automate availability
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analysis of a given reliability block diagram using semi-Markov process model com-
bined with probability rules was discussed. It was demonstrated with examples
how the path set of a general system can be obtained using links matrix form of the
block diagram. The advantage of using this combination of semi-Markov process
model and probability rules is that the semi-Markov method is faster than Monte
Carlo simulations and does not need additional variance reduction methods. The
proposed technique has potential in virtually every field of reliability design. How-
ever, for modeling aspects such as spares, preventive maintenance etc. in a large
and complex system, Monte Carlo simulation method continues to be the tool of
choice.
4.3.4 Multi-State Availability Analysis
This section has two objectives - (1) Present a semi-Markov process model for
multi-state component availability analysis in the presence of preventive mainte-
nance with Weibull failure time and (2) Apply the results of this model to a general
system made of many components. Tomasevicz and Asgarpoor (2006) developed a
continuous time semi-Markov process model for equipments that fail due to both
deterioration and random occurrences. They modeled the deterioration in k dis-
crete steps with exclusive states for corrective maintenance. For practical purposes,
it is desirable to improvise their paper with possibility of considering general statis-
tical distributions like Weibull for failure time. Vesely (1993) presented a compre-
hensive Markov model with four states - operational, degraded, maintenance and
failure for quantifying the effects of maintenance on availability. Marais and Saleh
(2009) developed a Markov model based framework for capturing and quantifying
the value of maintenance and argued that maintenance optimization techniques in
existing literature focus merely on cost minimization and not on the value of main-
tenance. Markov model has a limitation that the time spent in the states follows
an exponential distribution. A semi-Markov process has the flexibility to incorpo-
rate non-exponential distributions. Hence this section applies semi-Markov process
model combined with simple probability rules to obtain system unavailability from
constituent multi-state components.
In the proposed model, it is assumed that the entire system undergoes a pre-
ventive maintenance at specified inspection intervals. At these intervals, all the
components of the system are assumed to be independently inspected for signs of
degradation. A preventive maintenance action involving repair of each component
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is undertaken. This kind of repair leads to an ‘as good as new’ state of the com-
ponent. If the component fails even before a preventive action is taken, it leads to
a component failure. In this situation, a corrective action in the form of repair is
taken in order to restore the component to its operational state.
Consider again the tail-gas quench and clean-up system (Caceres and Henley,
1976) whose reliability block diagram is shown in Figure 4.16. The link, path and
union matrices of this system remain the same as discussed in the earlier section
with binary states.













Figure 4.20: State-space of a four-state repairable component with preventive main-
tenance.
Consider a repairable multi-state component whose state-space diagram is shown
in Figure 4.20. The transitions from one state to another are labeled with the cor-
responding density (pdf) functions with the assumption that time to transit is a
random variable. The model has four states - operating state (3), degraded state
(2), preventive maintenance state (1), and failure state or corrective maintenance
state (0). Initially, the component is assumed to be operating in state 3. Let the
time taken to proceed to a significant state of degradation (3 → 2) be a random
variable with an observed mean and coefficient of variation (cov). From this infor-
mation, a Weibull distribution can be fit using a mapping between cov and Weibull
shape parameter. Let the pdf of this transition be f1(t).
In the degraded state, the component either waits until the next inspection
(2 → 1) takes place or fails (2 → 0) completely. If an inspection takes place, a
repair is undertaken and the component is restored to operating state. Let the
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time to next inspection follow an exponential distribution with mean µ. Let its pdf
be given by g1(t). Let the Weibull parameters for the time to failure (2→ 0) be λ
and γ with a pdf given by f2(t).
Upon inspection, the time to repair (1→ 3) follows pdf given by g2(t). On the
other hand, if the component fails completely, let the time to repair (0→ 3) follow
an exponential distribution with pdf given by g3(t). Let the cdf of the distributions
considered be denoted by capital letter versions of the pdf . For example, let the
cdf of time to failure (pdf f2(t)) be F2(t).
It is assumed that the component failure occurs only after an amount of degra-
dation i.e., this model does not take random failure in to consideration. If it is
considered, the transition 3→ 0 must also be taken in to account.





0 0 0 g3(t)
0 0 0 g2(t)
f2(t)(1−G1(t)) g1(t)(1− F2(t)) 0 0
0 0 f1(t) 0


and the matrix W (t) consists of the closed form expressions as derived for a general











The state probabilities can be computed by substituting the above matrices in















The element at (4,1) of the matrix φ(t) yields the component unavailability at
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time t and the element at (4,4) yields component availability.
Example























Figure 4.21: Unavailability of 4-state repairable component with a 30 day inspection
interval.


















s State 2 (degraded)
State 1 (preventive maintenance)
Figure 4.22: Probability of taking a preventive action versus that of being in de-
graded state.
For illustrative purposes, consider a component which degrades significantly
around a mean time of five years with a cov of 0.4 associated with the time to
degradation. Let the preventive maintenance be carried out every 30 days on av-
erage. Let the mean time to repair from the degraded state be 3 days while the
mean time for completion of a corrective action be 5 days. Let the mean time to
fail completely from a degraded state be 5 years with a cov of 0.8 associated with
the time to failure. The unavailability of this component obtained using both the
analytical and Monte Carlo process simulation methods is plotted in Figure 4.21.
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It required 8 x 10−6 Monte Carlo iterations to achieve the accuracy shown in the
Figure. It is rather time consuming and still needs a reduction in the variance.
However, solving Equation 3.10 using trapezoidal rule needed only 8000 points on
the interval. It is seen that the component unavailability is peak around the mean
time to degradation i.e 5 years.
Figure 4.22 shows probabilities of being in a degraded state and undergoing a
preventive maintenance action. Since the time spent in preventive repairs is lesser
than the time spent in the degraded state waiting for the next inspection, we observe
that the probability of being in state 2 is larger than that of being in state 1. Both
these probabilities are larger than the unavailability in Figure 4.21 since there is
higher probability of detecting degradation and carrying out a minimal repair given
an inspection interval smaller than the time to failure.






















Figure 4.23: Effect of cov associated with time to degradation.
The cov of the time to degradation represented by the transition 3 → 2 has a
profound influence on the component’s unavailability. This effect is shown in Figure
4.23. A decrease in the cov shows a decrease in the unavailability of the component
until around the mean time to degradation. After that a lesser cov shows increased
unavailability. This behavior can be attributed to aging of the component.
4.3.6 Results
Consider the hypothetical life and repair data of the tail-gas quench and clean-up
system shown in Table 4.7. Availability of each of the components is obtained using
the semi-Markov process model. Let the availability computed by this method for
component A be denoted as A(t) = φ44(t). The same method is followed for rest of
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Table 4.7: Life data for the components of the multi-state system.
Component degradation time time-to-failure PM time CM time
3→2 2→0 1→3 0→3
(years) (years) (days) (days)
Booster fan (A) 7 (0.4) 8(0.6) 3 5
Quench pumps (B,C) 10(0.5) 10(0.4) 5 7
Feedwater pump (D) 9(0.6) 6(0.4) 5 7
Circulation pump (E,F) 8(0.4) 12(0.5) 5 7
Filter (G) 8(0.4) 7(0.3) 3 5
the components. In the next step, these quantities are used in Equation 4.21 with
the help of Table 4.5 to evaluate the system availability.
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Figure 4.24: Component unavailability with one year inspection program.
Time dependent unavailability of all the components is plotted in Figures 4.24
and 4.25 with an inspection interval of one and five years respectively. It is observed
that the peak unavailabilities of these components fall around the mean time to
reach the degraded state. The unavailabilities are in the order of 10−4 in the five
year inspection program whereas they have decreased to the order of 10−5 in the one
year case i.e., increasing the frequency of inspection shows decreased unavailability.
In comparison, it is also seen that there is a general shift in the unavailability of
the components. For example, peak unavailability of component A is between 5
and 10 years in the first case whereas peak unavailability is reached between 10 and
15 years for the second case. As a result, steady state is reached relatively quickly
with a one year inspection schedule. This pattern of availability improvement as
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Figure 4.25: Component unavailability with five year inspection program.
a result of in-service inspection was demonstrated in the context of nuclear piping
reliability analysis (Simonen and Woo, 1984).














































Figure 4.26: Mean time spent in corrective action as a function of inspection inter-
val.
The mean time spent in corrective maintenance action can be evaluated as the
time spent in state 0 using Equation 3.22 with i = 3, j = 0 and T = 20. It is a
function of the inspection interval and increases with decrease in the frequency of
inspections as seen in the Figure 4.26. However, inspections done at too frequent
or rare intervals may not be practically effective. This needs further investigation
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by augmenting the unavailability model to a cost model. Results of such a model
have direct impact on inspection programs and policy making.
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Figure 4.27: Tail-gas quench and clean-up system unavailability.
Time-dependent system unavailability by the proposed method using Equation
4.21 is shown in Figure 4.27 with inspection intervals of 1,3, and 5 years. There
is a visible improvement in the system availability with smaller inspection inter-
vals. Also, steady state unavailability is reached quicker with increased inspection
frequency. In a general sense, the proposed method has qualitative impact in any
field where there is a notion of components and systems or where there is a need
for multi-state system modeling - dependability analysis in software testing, fault
tolerant control systems in hardware reliability, wireless sensor reliability in ad hoc
communication networks, search and destroy/rescue scenario analysis in defense
etc.
4.3.7 Conclusion
A general method to conduct availability analysis of a given reliability block dia-
gram using semi-Markov process model combined with probability rules was dis-
cussed. A general four state model was proposed for component availability analy-
sis in the presence of preventive maintenance. It was demonstrated with examples
how the path set of a general system can be obtained using links matrix form of
the block diagram. The advantage of using this combination of semi-Markov pro-
cess model and probability rules is that the semi-Markov method is faster than
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Monte Carlo simulations and does not need additional variance reduction methods.
The proposed technique has potential in virtually every field of reliability analysis.
However, for modeling aspects such as spares, crew availability etc. in a large and
complex system, Monte Carlo simulation method continues to be the tool of choice.
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4.4 Substation Reliability and Cost Analysis
A reliability model to study the effect of number of spares on a system comprising
of a series of transformers in a substation is developed. The model takes ageing of
the transformers in to consideration. This is achieved by developing a semi-Markov
model assuming Weibull distribution for failure times. Further, it is assumed that
the transformers are repairable. The results for both Markov and semi-Markov
models are compared and the advantage of considering variability in failure times
as measure of ageing is demonstrated. Further, a substation cost model is developed
to determine the ideal number of spares to have in the inventory.
4.4.1 Problem
Redundancies and spares are expensive, yet well established ways of preventing a
mission critical system from failing. daSilva et al. (2010) proposed Markov and
Monte Carlo simulation methods to determine the optimal number of spares that
minimize the total cost. The paper compared the obtained results against a model
based on Poisson distribution. Marseguerra et al. (2005) applied a combination of
Monte Carlo simulation and genetic algorithms to optimize the number of spare
parts required by a multi-component system. The objective was to maximize the
system revenues and minimize the total spares volume. While the Markov model as-
sumes constant failure rates irrespective of the variability in the transformer failure
times, the Monte Carlo simulation is prone to large variability in reliability esti-
mates and demands specialized variance reduction techniques. Hence, the present
paper studies the effect of number of spares on substation reliability based on the
semi-Markov framework so that non-exponential distributions like Weibull can be
considered in the model implementation. The major advantage of this extension is
to study the ageing effects on the system. The paper further focuses on a predictive
financial model to determine the ideal number of spares to invest upon in order to
avoid economic losses due to unforeseen outages. The proposed model is of interest
to technical personnel to have reliability estimates at hand and for station owners
to decide how much investment needs to be made on spare transformers.
The case study is organized as follows. Section 4.4.2 discusses a Markov model
for substation reliability. A subsection in it shows an example with two spares and
develops the required differential equations. The theory for semi-Markov model is
covered in Section 3.3. Section 4.4.4 deals with the semi-Markov solution of the
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transformer problem. Markov and semi-Markov results are shown for a 12 trans-
former system with different number of spares. The Markov reward (cost) model
is reviewed in Section 2.7. Section 4.4.5 develops the cost model for determining
















Figure 4.28: State space for N Transformers with n Spares.
Consider N transformers connected in series with n spares available for replace-
ment on failure of any of the operational transformers. It is assumed that when all
the spares are used up and at least one of the transformers in use fails, then the
system fails. Further, the time taken to replace a failed transformer with a spare is
assumed to be negligible. While a single transformer could fail with a failure rate
of λ, it can be repaired with a repair rate of µ. The state space diagram for this
model is shown in Figure 4.28. For a system with n available spares there are n+ 2
states in the model. Assume that the system starts in state n + 1 where all the
transformers are functional and all the spares are readily available. Then, the prob-
ability of landing in state 0 gives the failure probability of the system. The model
in daSilva et al. (2010) assumes that two or more transformers are connected in















Figure 4.29: State space for N = 12 Transformers with n = 2 Spares.
4.4.3 Example: 12 Transformers and 2 Spares
In particular, consider an example with N = 12 transformers and n = 2 spares.




0 0 0 0
Nλ −(Nλ+ 2µ) 2µ 0
0 Nλ −(Nλ+ µ) µ




Let P(t) be a row vector of state probabilities to be determined:
P(t) = [p0(t) p1(t) p2(t) p3(t)] (4.23)
Then, the system of differential equations to obtain the state probabilities can






dp1(t)/dt = Nλp2(t)− (Nλ+ 2µ)p1(t)




p0(t) yields the failure probability of the system assuming the initial state vector
as [0 0 0 1].
4.4.4 Semi-Markov model for substation reliability
The kernel matrix of the semi-Markov process model consists of statistical dis-
tributions respecting the competing risk law of Equation 3.5 instead of constant
transition rates. The failure time distributions are modeled as poly-Weibull dis-
tributions while the repair times follow an exponential distribution. This section
describes how these distributions can be used to construct the kernel matrix.
The cdf of the poly-Weibull distribution for the transition time corresponding
to the failure rate Nλ in the Markov model of Figure 4.28 is given by:
Fi,i−1(t) = 1− e−N(λ
′
t)γ (4.26)
where the subscript i, i− 1 represents the transition from state i to i− 1 signifying
failure of a transformer and replacement by a spare.








Assuming that the repair time follows an exponential distribution, the cdf of
the time to repair is the minimum of all the times taken to repair the failed k
transformers each having a repair rate of µ:
Gi,i+1(t; k) = 1− e−kµt i 6= 0 (4.28)
The corresponding pdf is:
gi,i+1(t; k) = kµe
−kµt i 6= 0 (4.29)
The kernel matrix C(τ) = [cij(τ)] is given by arranging the distribution func-
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tions as per Equation 3.5:


0 1 2 . n n+ 1
0 0 0 0 . 0 0
1 f10(τ)[1−G12(τ ;n)] 0 g12(τ ;n)[1− F10(τ)] . 0 0
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
n+ 1 0 0 0 fn+1,n(τ) 0


The integral equations corresponding to the above kernel matrix can be formu-
lated based on Equation 3.9. The system is then solved using numerical scheme
like trapezoidal rule as given in the appendix. Assuming that the system starts
functioning in state n + 1, the probability of being in state 0 denoted by φn+1,0(t)
gives the system failure probability.
The system of integral equations for N = 12 and n = 2 is given as an example
in the appendix.



































Figure 4.30: System failure probability with exponential failure and repair time; 12
transformers and n = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 spares.
Considering a constant failure rate of λ = 0.03 per year and a repair rate of
4 per year for a transformer and supposing there are N = 12 such transformers
connected in series, Figure 4.30 shows the system failure probability by solving
the system of differential equations of the Markov model and the system of integral
equations of the semi-Markov model proving that the results are identical no matter
which method is used by assuming an exponential distribution for both failure and
repair times. In both cases, varying number of spares were considered. It is also
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observed that failure probability is inversely related to the number of spares i.e.,
system reliability improves with increased number of spares.































Weibull failure time, cov=0.4
Figure 4.31: System failure probability comparing Webull and exponential failure
time; 12 transformers and 2 spares.

































Figure 4.32: System failure probability with Webull failure time and exponential
repair time; 12 transformers and n = 0, 1, 2 spares.
In the absence of spares, system failure probability reaches 0.9999 at the end of
40 years. In this scenario, there are only two states in the system and either all the
transformers are functional or the system fails due to failure of one of the transform-
ers. Addition of a spare lowers the failure probability to 0.667 thus boosting the
system reliability by approximately 33%. In this case, there are three states in the
system. When one of the spares is used, the failed transformer can undergo repair.
After completion of the repair, a spare can be made available again. However, if one
of the transformers fails when the spare is being used, then the system fails as the
earlier failed transformer is still under repair. Adding further spares increase the
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reliability, however, beyond a certain number of spares, the system would become
too reliable to afford the spares.
Figure 4.31 compares the system failure probability for the case of two spares
assuming exponential and Weibull failure times respectively at the end of 40 years.
A cov of 0.4 is assumed for the Weibull case. While the system failure probability
for the exponential case is 4.92 x 10−2, the same for Weibull case is 1.76 x 10−9
signifying that lower variability in failure times yields higher reliability. The same
trend is observed for varying number of spares in Figure 4.32 assuming Weibull
transformer failure times. Random failures often show up large variation in fail-
ure times whereas those of a cohort of ageing transformers are likely to show less
variability.




# Spares Exponential (cov = 1) Weibull (cov = 0.4)
0 0.9999 0.9999
1 6.67 x 10−1 1.70 x 10−4
2 4.92 x 10−2 1.76 x 10−9
3 1.53 x 10−3 6.15 x 10−15
4 3.47 x 10−5 9.89 x 10−21
Table 4.8 compares the effect of adding more spares to a system at the end of 40
years by assuming Weibull and exponential transformer failure times respectively.
A cov of 0.4 was assumed for the Weibull case. In both cases, the repair time is
exponentially distributed. Both the results show that the system performs better by
having more spares. The failure probability when there are no spares is very high.
Since it is assumed that the transformer failure time is less variable in the Weibull
case, the system failure probability drops to 1.76 x 10−9 by having one spare against
no spares. When system reliability is analyzed along with a financial model, these
results can have a profound impact on decision making and budget allocation with
respect to spare handling. However, one has to invest in more accurate and regular
reporting of transformer failure times if variability is also needed as the input. In
either case, simultaneous transformer failures due to common cause failures is not
considered in the present paper. The next section explores the Markov reward
model as an aid in deciding the ideal number of spares to have in the stock.
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4.4.5 Cost Model for Substation Spares
N, 0
State 1












Figure 4.33: Markov Reward Model for N Transformers with n Spares.
The state space for the reward model is similar to the Markov model of Figure
4.28 except that the system is assumed to be repairable from state 0. Each repair is
assumed to cost Cr million dollars. A loss of r00 million dollars per year is assumed
on an outage which is equivalent to the process staying in state 0 and waiting for
a system repair to be completed. This loss is based on kilowatts of energy per year
not supplied to the consumer until the system goes online again.
The Markov reward model with the specifications described is shown in Figure
4.33. The Markov reward matrix r is a square matrix obtained from the state space:


0 1 2 ... n+ 1
0 r00 Cr 0 ... 0




n 0 0 0 ... Cr




4.4.6 Results and discussion
The list of symbols in the model and the assumed values are listed in Table 4.9.
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Table 4.9: Parameters for evaluating the cost model
Symbol Description Assumed Value
λ Failure rate of transformer 0.03 yr−1
µ Repair rate of transformer 4 yr−1
N Number of transformers connected in series 12
n Number of required spares 0,1,2,. . .
L Nominal capacity of one transformer 105 kW
Cr Expected cost of repair C$ 0.05 million
of one transformer
Cj Expected cost of one spare transformer C$ 8 million
Cp Cost of Energy Not Supplied (ENS) per kWh C$ 1.00
r00 Cost of ENS per year = CpL x 8760 C$ 876 million
m Assumed lifespan of a plant 40 years
r Discount rate 0.07

















































Figure 4.34: Expected Cumulative Losses for 12 Transformers and n Spares.
The accumulated economic loss due to repairs and outages up to m years is
shown in Figure 4.34. The reward model does not yet consider the investment on
procuring the spares. It is seen that the expected loss is the maximum when there
are no spares available in the inventory. For 1,2 or 3 spares, the expected loss
decreases and then it is observed that the average loss is the same no matter how
many more spares are added.
To get a complete picture, the amount invested on the spares and the net present
cost obtained by combining the investment and the net present value of the expected
losses is investigated in the next step.
From the cumulative expected losses V4(t) of the reward model, from hereon re-
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ferred to as V (t), the annual combined cost of repairs and outages can be calculated
as vk = V (k+1)−V (k) for k = 1, 2, 3, ..m for the m years under consideration. The
net present value of the losses is represented as Lj, where j represents the number
of spares. The NPV Lj of the annual costs v1, v2, ..vm discounted at a rate r over







Let Cj denote the investment made on procuring j spares. The net present cost of
losses and investments for j spares is given by A = Lj + Cj. The objective then is
to determine for what j the value of A is minimum.
Table 4.10: Net present cost of investments and losses
Spares Investment NPV of Losses Net Present Cost
j Cj Lj C = Lj + Cj
C$ million C$ million C$ million
0 0 949.01 949.01
1 8 42.37 50.37
2 16 1.49 17.49
3 24 0.26 24.26
4 32 0.24 32.24
5 40 0.24 40.24
Table 4.10 tabulates the net present cost as a function of number of spares. It
is seen that the NPV of the losses remains constant beyond three spares. The net
present cost is 949 million dollars in the absence of spares highlighting the huge
risk involved in running a generating station without spares. With addition of two
spares, the net present cost is seen to decrease to nearly 18 million dollars and then
increases monotonically if the station decides to invest in more than two spares.
This concludes that for the given configuration and assumed costs, it is optimal to
have two spares always in the inventory.
Figure 4.35 shows graphically the trend seen in Table 4.10. A simple and final
plot as this is of great aid to decision makers for budget allocation and for the
smooth and reliable running of the station.
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Figure 4.35: Net present cost vs.the number of spares.
4.4.7 Conclusion
A semi-Markov model with Weibull failure times was developed for assessing relia-
bility of ageing transformers. Results were compared against a Markov model and
was proved that knowledge of variability in failure times of the transformers helps
in obtaining more accurate estimates of system reliability. The Markov model was
further extended to a Markov reward model to determine the number of spares
to have in the inventory at all times to avoid economic losses due to unforeseen
outages.
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4.5 A Semi-Markov Fire Growth Model
This paper aims to describe a new fire growth model that allows prediction of
fire development, including time to flashover, with inclusion of the unpredictable
nature of real fire development and, where available, appropriate fire test data. The
model considers potential variability in the times at which the fire will undergo
transitions between the various stages of development, using a state transition
method called semi-Markov process model. By assuming that the fire goes through
five different stages starting from ignition and progressing to flashover, the total
time to flashover may also be estimated. Perhaps most importantly, the model is
based on a reusable framework which can be modified for use with different sets
of fire data and is flexible enough for use in a variety of applications important to
both product design engineers and fire safety regulators.
4.5.1 Introduction
Fire is a complex physical phenomenon driven by interactions between chemistry,
fluid dynamics and heat transfer within the fire compartment. As such, there is
significant variation in fire behavior even in repeated tests of specific fire scenarios.
This variation can be attributed not only to the complex physics driving the fire
behavior itself, but also to the arrangement and geometry of the fuel, as well as
numerous environmental factors. In a real fire, availability of fuel and air, as well as
attempts to suppress the fire, due to consecutive fluctuations between fire growth
and recession. The many sources of variation inherent if real fire development
make probabilistic approaches the favorable choice with which to model the full
chronology of a fire.
Probabilistic models have been developed for a wide variety of applications re-
lating to fire safety, including fire detection (Joglar et al., 2005), fire growth (Au
et al., 2007; Hasofer and Beck, 1997; Williamson, 1981), fire spread (Rasbash et al.,
2004; Colbourn et al., 1994; Platt et al., 1994; Ramachandran, 1991; Morishita,
1985), smoke spread (Hadjisophocleous, 1992; Watts, 1986), and safe egress (Ha-
sofer and Odigie, 2001). Of most interest here are fire growth models which include
fire inception and growth up to flashover within a single compartment, and fire
spread models which consider the spread of fire from compartment to compartment
within a multi-enclosure building.
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In these applications, a wide range of modeling techniques have been explored for
fire modeling including Bayesian networks (Cheng and Hadjisophocleous, 2009),Monte
Carlo simulation (Au et al., 2007; Joglar et al., 2005), stochastic differential equa-
tions based on physical laws (Hasofer and Beck, 1997), network reliability tech-
niques(Hasofer and Odigie, 2001; Colbourn et al., 1994), stress-strength models in
the context of fire barriers(Platt et al., 1994; Watts, 1986), state transition meth-
ods(Berlin, 1985; Williamson, 1981) and other stochastic models(Ramachandran,
1991) including epidemic theory, percolation process and random walk. Graphi-
cal(Watts, 1986) means of representing fire resistance and growth include circuit
diagrams, fault trees, fire safety trees and logic trees whose quantification can be
done using simple probability rules.
Bayesian network models combine graph theory and Bayesian probability the-
ory. For example, in modeling fire spread in an office building fire, the office floor is
transformed into a directed acyclic graph (DAG) with the room of origin taken as
the root node and assigned an ignition probability (Cheng and Hadjisophocleous,
2009). Fire spread for rest of the nodes is predicted using probabilities conditioned
on the root node probability. Computations are performed for two cases: one with
fire protection but no suppression and the other for a building with sprinklers. The
model produces static fire spread probabilities but no time information is provided
on the progress of the fire with time. Though theoretically it could be extended
to predict time dependent behaviour, the mathematics would involve multiple in-
tegrals and their solution would require Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) type
numerical simulations. Of course, the difficulty in formulating stochastic differential
equations based on physical laws depends on the configuration of the compartment
and complexity of the fire scenarios under investigation, but even simplified situ-
ations result in the need to do Monte Carlo simulations. In general, Monte Carlo
simulations are computationally intensive, requiring long calculation times to cover
a sufficient range of cases to appropriately model a given scenario. Therefore, hybrid
models based on combinations of Monte Carlo and other fire modelling methods
have also been developed.
Such hybrid models have gained popularity for modeling fire behaviour in nu-
clear power plants where the occurrence of a fire is an extremely rare event. In
this industry, a fire may progress from ignition of a fuel spill to a larger fire which
damages critical electrical cable trays and could lead to reactor core damage. It is
clearly of primary interest to determine the core damage frequency (CDF); how-
ever, a probabilistic approach must be taken due to uncertainty in fire initiation,
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in damage to equipment and fire brigade response(Vinod et al., 2008). A combina-
tion of fire models such as CFAST(Peacock et al., 1986), FDS(McGrattan, 2004)
or COMPBRN(Siu, 1982) are used with Monte Carlo simulation and probabilistic
safety assessment (PSA) event/fault tree tools like SAPHIRE(Idaho National Engi-
neering Laboratory, 2010) to determine the estimated frequency of a fire leading to
core damage (Valbuena and Modarres, 2009; Siu and Apostolakis, 1982; Lee et al.,
2010; Arshi et al., 2010; Hostikka and Keski-Rahkonen, 2003; Frank and Moieni,
1986).
Network reliability methods also take a graph theoretic approach to modeling
fire propagation through a multi-enclosure structure. Each node represents a room
and is associated with an ignition probability and a fire spread probability. The arcs
are used to designate barriers to fire spread and therefore each is given a fire breach
probability. The goal is to start from the node of fire origin and recursively traverse
through various directed paths until the target room (a leaf) is reached, using
probability rules to arrive at the fire spread probability to that target. While such
an approach has been developed theoretically in Colbourn et al. (1994) by drawing
an analog from communication networks, the fire time dimension is missing in the
formulation so important events such as time to flashover cannot be determined.
Other approaches have visualized growing and receding fires as a game between
two gamblers and utilized stochastic random walk theory to predict the time to fire
extinguishment (Ramachandran, 1991). This method does not, however, account
for various stages that a fire under goes from inception to flashover. This method
has been extended to examine building to building fire spread via a percolation
process (i.e. random walk over a graph) and predict the average number of buildings
burnt. In both manifestations, however, there is no consideration made of the
various stages of fire growth or development and time dependence is lacking.
Stress-strength models consider two random variables with fire severity modeled
as the stress and fire resistance of the barrier modeled as the strength. For fire pro-
tection, it is of interest to calculate the probability that the fire resistance is greater
than the fire severity. Again, however, no account is taken of the various stages
of fire growth and spread, nor of any time dependence of the real fire event(Platt
et al., 1994; Watts, 1986).
The spread of fire is dynamic in nature and the variability in real fire scenarios
is best modeled as a continuous time dependent process with threshold conditions
defining the discrete stages of fire development. Hence, the present paper adopts a
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state transition approach to fire growth modeling which allows representation and
quantification of the key events in the overall fire development. In the next section,
existing state transition models for fire analysis are reviewed.
A stochastic state transition model of fire spread has been developed and ap-
plied to a hypothetical small house fire to illustrate its effectiveness(Morishita,
1985). Fire spread was analyzed both with and without fire extinguishment. It
was assumed that the fire propagates discretely from one space to another and that
an arbitrary point in space could ignite due to heat transfer from any other points
in the vicinity. While this assumption may be valid and fairly realistic, when in-
corporated into the model, the number of states in the model grows exponentially
with increasing numbers of possible surrounding points of interest. This makes it
difficult to determine the rate at which the fire grows between each pair of required
points.
In other work, six states were defined in the fire growth model (FGM) of fire
development (Williamson, 1981). The states included fire ignition, fire spread to (ig-
nition of) surrounding wall and furniture, fire impingement on the ceiling, flashover,
well ventilated fire with steady state burning, and finally, fire burn out. The state
transition model was depicted in the form of an event diagram. Deterministic mod-
els, supported by experimental data from the U.S. National Bureau of Standards
(NBS), were then used to predict the overall fire behavior. For example, within the
final model, a set of differential equations was solved to arrive at a distribution to
represent the time taken for flames to touch the ceiling. However, the approach













Figure 4.36: State transition model for fire growth.
A more versatile state transition model depicted in Figure 4.36 was based on
fire test results and was developed to explain variability in the development of a
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smoldering fire in a couch with cotton cushions(Berlin, 1985). Statistical distribu-
tions were fit to fire test data and the time to transit from one state to another was
taken as a random variable. The model was an early attempt to incorporate non-
exponential distributions to represent the time to transit from one state to another.
Although the exact computations and numerical approximations were not clearly
outlined in the paper, the convolution of the random variables led to a probabilistic
distribution of the time it would take a given fire to reach flashover. While this
model provided a good first step, since its development there have been tremen-
dous advances in state transition models and in computational power, pointing to
an opportunity for refinement and/or enhancement of the original concepts. This
forms the premise for development of the model outlined here.
Berlin (1985) developed a state transition model (Figure 4.36) based on fire
tests to explain the variability of a smoldering fire in a couch with cotton cushions.
This paper fitted statistical distributions to fire test data assuming that the time
to transit from one state to another is a random variable. The model was an
early attempt to incorporate non-exponential distributions to represent the time
to transit from one state to another. The result was a probabilistic distribution
of a fire ending up in a flashover. Apparently, the results were obtained using
convolution of random variables. Further, the paper lacks ideas and thoughts on
what computations and numerical approximations were performed. Since then,
there have been tremendous advancements in mathematical models and computer
programming.
A sophisticated state transition model, which has been successfully applied to
model failures in nuclear power plant systems is the semi-Markov process model
(Veeramany and Pandey, 2011c,b,a). Using such a model, fire growth can be
modeled as a continuous-time, discrete-state process with a wide variety of non-
exponential distributions utilized to appropriately describe the time spent in each
of the possible fire states. The present paper applies this method to model fire
behavior, employing the widely used normal and log-normal distributions to repre-
sent the various stages of fire growth. For purposes of illustration and comparison,
the new method is initially applied using concepts of fire development and data
presented by Berlin (1985); however, it is important to contrast the fundamen-
tal bases of the techniques by Berlin (1985) with those applied here. While the
method by Berlin (1985) involved the direct convolution of random variables, the
semi-Markov process model presented here is based on a structured mathematical
approach. Therefore, the background to the present model will first be described
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and then the method applied to predict average times to flashover based on the
maximum probability and the likelihood that an ignited fire does or does not reach
flashover conditions for a given fire scenario.
4.5.2 The fire growth model
Table 4.11: Classification of states based on fire characteristics (Berlin, 1985).
State Upper Room Flame Heat
Temperature Height Release Rate
1 Non-fire Normal - -
2 Sustained/Ignited Normal - -
3 Vigorous > 15oC 25 cm > 2 kW
4 Interactive > 150oC 120 cm > 50 kW
5 Remote > 450oC - -
6 Full room > 800oC - -
The six transition states chosen for use in the present model mirror those pre-
sented by Berlin (1985) as listed in 4.11. These are defined based upon values of
upper layer room or ceiling layer temperature, flame height and heat release rate.
The first state is the non-fire state and represents a pre-flaming stage of the fire.
While it was used to represent a smouldering phase in the original model (Berlin,
1985), for the present paper, it in itself, does not lead to ignition. Instead it is
used as the end, non-fire, state in the case when a growing fire does not continue
to full room involvement but instead recedes back, possibly through intermediate
stages, to a non-fire state. The second state is the situation in which ignition occurs
and the first item ignited begins to burn in a sustained manner. A fire then grows
from this state, undergoing transitions to the other states based on it reaching and
exceeding the threshold criteria for each state, as listed in Table 4.11. The names
of states 4 and 5 are taken directly as those assigned by Berlin (1985); however,
it should be noted that no clear explanation was provided for these terms in the
original source. Therefore, in this work, the ‘interactive’ stage is defined as the
period of time during which surrounding objects might be ignited and contribute
to flame spread. The ‘remote’ burning stage is defined as the transition zone to
full room involvement (according to Berlin (1985), the external heat flux returning
to the fuel surface exceeds 5 kW/m2 during this period). A given fire need not go
through the entire cycle of all states in the model. It can recede from any state to
a lower state due to lack of oxygen, lack of fuel or suppression by a fire protection
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system or even manual suppression by firefighters. In these cases, as in the real
situation, the fire can return to the non-fire state without ever reaching flashover.
On the other hand, if a fire does grow and reach flashover, in reality the fire physics
and dynamics change very rapidly. This is accounted for in the present model,
since all fires that have reached flashover (i.e., all post-flashover fires) are forced
to remain in the state of ‘full-room’ involvement and cannot recede back to any
previous state.
Table 4.12: Temporal distributions for the state transitions assumedBerlin (1985).
State Transition Distribution Mean Std. dev.
(min) (min)
2 → 1 Sustained to Non-fire Uniform 2.0 5.0
2 → 3 Sustained to Vigorous Log-normal 8.45 0.78
3 → 2 Vigorous to Sustained Uniform 1.0 2.0
3 → 4 Vigorous to Interactive Normal 5.55 3.22
4 → 3 Interactive to Vigorous Uniform 1.5 9.0
4 → 5 Interactive to Remote Uniform 0.5 3.5
5 → 4 Remote to Interactive Uniform 0.6 6.0
5 → 6 Remote to Full-room Log-normal 5.18 4.18
Once the transition states have been defined, it is of interest to determine the
time it takes a fire to transit from one state to another. Since, this is highly
variable and uncertain in any real fire scenario, the transition times from state to
state are considered as random variables with associated statistical distributions in
the present model. Based on fire test data, a combination of discrete and continuous
distributions were used in previous model (Berlin, 1985) as shown in Table 4.12.
There is no justification provided for the choice of distribution, for example, as to
why a receding fire was assigned a discrete uniform distribution.













Figure 4.37: Comparison of distributions for 2→ 1 with mean 2.0 min and s.d. 5.0
min.
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Figure 4.38: Comparison of distributions for 3 → 4 with mean 5.55 min and s.d.
3.22 min.
The authors believe that the appropriate choice of distributions is contextual
based on the material and/or test data. For example, Figures 4.37 and 4.38 show
various distributions fit to a decaying and growing fire for the transitions 2 → 1
and 3 → 4 respectively. Exponential distribution is a good fit for decaying fires,
lognormal and normal are good for fires that grow gradually and then exhibit a
slowing trend. Exponential distribution for the forward transition is sensible in the
context where there is a high probability of an instant transition during a rapid
fire growth. Uniform distribution associates with equal chance at all times during
a transition.
Table 4.13: Various configurations differing in distributions chosen for state tran-
sitions
Case# Configuration
1 As listed in Table 4.12
2 Backward transitions in Table 4.12 replaced with exponential distribution
3 All transitions in Table 4.12 replaced with log-normal distribution
4 All transitions in Table 4.12 replaced with exponential distribution
The present model explores the possible configurations as listed in Table 4.13.
One key difference over the distributions assigned in Berlin (1985) is that all back-
ward transitions in the present work are assumed to follow a continuous distribution,
a justifiable assumption since both fire growth and recession occur on a continuous
time scale but at times occupy the discrete states defined in the model. Further,
it was assumed in Berlin (1985) that all fires that did reach the stage of full room
involvement were automatically reset to the non-fire state and no temporal distribu-
tion was associated with this state transition. In the present model, the transition
from full room involvement to non-fire state is not included as it would necessi-
tate significant additional data to properly describe this transition across real fire
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scenarios.
Table 4.14: Case 1:Assumed distributions for the state transitions based on Berlin
(1985)
Transition Distribution Parameters Mean Std. Dev.
(min) (min)
2 → 1 Uniform a= -6.66 2.00 5.00
b= 10.66
2 → 3 Log-normal µ=2.13 8.45 0.78
σ2=0.01
3 → 2 Uniform a=-2.46 1.00 2.00
b=4.46
3 → 4 Normal µ= 5.55 5.55 3.22
σ2=10.37
4 → 3 Uniform a=-14.09 1.50 9.00
b=17.09
4 → 5 Uniform a=-5.56 0.50 3.50
b=6.56
5 → 4 Uniform a=-9.79 0.60 6.00
b=10.99
5 → 6 Log-normal µ=1.39 5.18 4.18
σ2=0.50
Table 4.15: Case 2: Backward distributions in Table 4.14 replaced with Exponential
distribution
Transition Distribution Parameters Mean Std. Dev.
(min) (min)
2 → 1 Exponential λ= 0.5 2.00 2.00
2 → 3 Log-normal µ= 2.13 8.45 0.78
σ2= 0.01
3 → 2 Exponential λ= 1 1.00 1.00
3 → 4 Normal µ= 5.55 5.55 3.22
σ2= 10.37
4 → 3 Exponential λ= 0.67 1.50 1.50
4 → 5 Uniform a= -5.56 0.50 3.50
b= 6.56
5 → 4 Exponential λ= 1.67 0.60 0.60
5 → 6 Log-normal µ= 1.39 5.18 4.18
σ2= 0.50
Tables 4.14 - 4.17 list the distributions assumed in the present model for each
configuration listed in Table 4.13. These parameters are adapted from Berlin (1985)
and therefore reflect the data of the 1970’s. They are used here for illustrative
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Table 4.16: Case 3: All distributions in Table 4.14 replaced with Log-normal dis-
tribution
Transition Parameters Mean Std. Dev.
(min) (min)
2 → 1 µ= -0.30 2.00 5.00
σ2= 1.98
2 → 3 µ= 2.13 8.45 0.78
σ2= 0.01
3 → 2 µ= -0.80 1.00 2.00
σ2= 1.61
3 → 4 µ= 1.57 5.55 3.22
σ2= 0.29
4 → 3 µ= -1.40 1.50 9.00
σ2= 3.61
4 → 5 µ= -2.65 0.50 3.50
σ2= 3.91
5 → 4 µ= -2.82 0.60 6.00
σ2= 4.62
5 → 6 µ= 1.39 5.18 4.18
σ2= 0.50
Table 4.17: Case 4: All distributions in Table 4.14 replaced with Exponential
distribution
Transition Parameter(λ) Mean Std. Dev.
(min) (min)
2 → 1 0.50 2.00 2.00
2 → 3 0.12 8.45 8.45
3 → 2 1.00 1.00 1.00
3 → 4 0.18 5.55 5.55
4 → 3 0.67 1.50 1.50
4 → 5 2.00 0.50 0.50
5 → 4 1.67 0.60 0.60
5 → 6 0.19 5.18 5.18
purposes only; the model can be re-run any number of times using different and/or
more current datasets with their associated distributions as may be required to
model each new set of fire scenarios.
Flashover conditions
Prediction of average times to the onset of flashover is of key importance in defining
compartment fire development since this is a time of extremely rapid fire growth
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Figure 4.39: Parabolic fire growth for slow to medium fires.
leading to the everything in the room being involved in the fire. Despite this, the
scientific definition of flashover is the subject of some debate and times to flashover
for similar fire scenarios, even in controlled test situations, can vary greatly. For
example, a set of three similar experiments on a furnished bedroom fire yielded
flashover times of 17.6 min, 7.2 min and 6.5 min respectively (Croce, 1974) with
the large differences attributed to variations in relative humidity. In other experi-
ments, flashover conditions have been reported to occur at ceiling temperature of
approximately 600o C (Hagglund et al., 1974; Fang, 1975; Drysdale, 1998) in 2.7m
high compartments or over 450o C (Heselden and Melinek, 1975; Drysdale, 1998) in
a 1m high experimental compartment. Alternative definitions suggest criteria such
as heat flux level of 20 kW/m2 to the compartment floor(Waterman, 1966). The
minimum heat release rate (HRR) at which flashover is likely to occur, as per the
600oC criterion, is around 1 MW (Babrauskas et al., 2003). Using these threshold
values and a simplified correlation for fire growth, such as the parabolic or t2 fire,
the relation between heat release and time is given by Heskestad (1984):
Q̇ = αf (t− t0)2 (4.32)
where Q̇ is the heat release rate (KW), αf is the fire-growth coefficient (kW/s
2)
and t0 is the initial incubation period (s).
These elements are used, with the fuel specified by Berlin (1985) to make an
initial estimate of the fire development as a benchmark for the present work. The
cotton cushions in Berlin (1985) can be categorized as resulting in slow to medium
growth fires, with growth coefficients ranging between 0.00293 and 0.01172 (Drys-
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dale, 1998). Based on this correlation and the proposed threshold HRR of 1 MW
for flashover, it can be seen from Figure 4.39 that the times to flashover for the
fires in Berlin (1985) should range from 9.2 to 18.5 min.
Recalling that the probability density function of a transition from state i to
state j is represented by fij(t) and the distribution function by Fij(t), and letting
Rij(t) = 1− Fij(t), the kernel C(t) of the semi-Markov process for the fire growth
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Further, the matrix W (t) in Equation 3.8 can be computed numerically using
methods outlined in the Appendix. The kernel matrix and the matrix W (t) are then
sufficient to solve for state probabilities. Finally, the probability of being in each
of the states is computed by solving the system of integral equations in Equation
3.10 using the trapezoidal rule. The time at which the fires undergoes a transition
to that state is taken as the time when the maximum probability of being in that
state is reached.
The next step in setting up the model is to define a set of appropriate statistical
distributions to use as the state transition descriptors. Appropriate functions can
be determined from real fire test data when it is available; however, for the time
estimates to be meaningful, the data used must be representative of the fire sce-
narios of interest. For example, transition descriptors in Berlin’s model relied on
test data collected between 1959 and 1975 from large scale dwelling and room fires.
This data was based on fires initiated in sofas comprising cotton cushions. While
this was a representative scenario at that time, new materials and upholstery con-
struction methods will limit its utility for prediction of more modern fire scenarios.
Nonetheless, for the purposes of comparison, the data from Berlin is used for the
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initial test case run with the present model. Then, to demonstrate the flexibility
of the model, three combinations of transition state distributions were explored as
listed in Table 4.13.
4.5.3 Results






























Figure 4.40: Probability of being in each state. Case 1.
Table 4.18: Time at which maximum state probabilities occur. [Case 1]
State Maximum Time (min) at which
probability (1) (1) occurs
3 Vigorous 0.05 9.1
4 Interactive 0.0002 11.7
5 Remote 0.0006 15.2
Figure 4.40 shows the calculated probabilities that the fire has reached a certain
state at a given time, assuming the distributions for case 1 in Table 4.13. The
corresponding times at which values of maximum probability are reached for the
various states are summarized in Table 4.18. In these results, the fire is assumed to
start in the sustained state (state 2), so the probability of being in each state after
fire initiation is given by φ2j(t). The probability of the fire having grown enough
to enter any other state begins to increase after 5 minutes, reaches a maximum
value at some time thereafter and then eventually begins to decrease. At the same
time, the probability of the fire being in the sustained state (state 2) decreases in
time, since the fire is indeed growing. If the fire does not sustain itself, it moves
back to the pre-burning stage (state 1). The 5 minute delay could be attributed
to the incubation period. For those fires that do grow, the peak probability of
the fire growing large enough that the upper layer temperature reaches 450oC, i.e.,
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reaching the remote state (state 5), is slightly larger than the probability that the
fire remains smaller, i.e., in the interactive state (state 4), but the differences are
minimal since they are seen only when three digits of precision are used in the
calculations. The difference is physically reasonable, however, because as would be
expected in a real fire scenario, it often takes the fire longer to grow from a 450oC
upper layer temperature to full room involvement, than to grow from a 150oC upper
layer temperature to a 450oC upper layer temperature. The maximum probability
of full room involvement is slightly lower than those for either the remote or the
interactive stages. This is again as expected since, in general, the probability of
full room involvement is expected to be quite low. In reality, there is a lower
chance of a fire growing to involve the entire room due to the many paths by
which the fire can recede before growing to this point. However, since full room
involvement is a high consequence event and is often linked to fire resistance and
severity assessments, it can be important to estimate the time taken for the fire
to grow to that stage. For this case and all others in the present work, the curve
indicating full room involvement will more or less plateau without decay because
this state is considered a final state which is not connected back to the non-fire
state.
In contrast to the smoothed probability distribution for full room involvement
is that for the vigourous state (state 3), where the fire is characterized by low
flame heights and heat release rates. This distribution appears multi-modal, which
may suggest that describing the transitions to and from this state using a single
distribution may not truly represent the real fire data. Again, such an observation
is consistent with true fire behavior, since, this stage of fire growth will be highly
variable due to frequent fluctuations in development as the fire grows and recedes
(Berlin, 1985).
The time-dependent realm frequency plot (Berlin, 1985) do not represent a
statistical distribution. In contrast, the state probabilities in Figure 4.40 form a
discrete distribution with their sum equal to 1 at all times. Hence not more than
one state at any given time can have a probability be equal to 1. In the proposed
model, probabilities of states 2 to 5 approach zero beyond 45 min so that the non-
fire state probability starts increasing toward certain probability of 1.0. This gives
an impression that every fire gets extinguished with in a finite time as per the
collected fire test data.
If we retain the criterion that time to flashover corresponds to the time it takes
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the fire to enter into the remote state, and further that our best estimate of this
time can be taken as the time at which we have the maximum probability that
the fire is in that state, then the estimated time to flashover for Case 1 in Table
4.13 is 15.2 min. This falls within the range of 9.2min to 18.5min discussed in
Section 4.5.2. It is longer, however, than both the comparable empirical estimate
of 12.9 min made by the Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute (IITRI)
based on 68 fire tests (Vodvarka and Waterman, 1975) and the estimate of 11.6 min.
made based on data from 100 fire tests including the IITRI test data (Berlin, 1985).
The increase of more than 31% in time to flashover predicted here as compared to
the 11.59 min listed above (Berlin, 1985) can be attributed to the fact that unlike
previous estimates, consideration was included here of the fact that, in reality, a
fire can recede from its present state to a less well developed state with time.






























Figure 4.41: Probability of being in each state. Case 2.
Table 4.19: Time at which maximum state probabilities occur. [Case 2]
State Maximum Time (min) at which
probability (1) (1) occurs
3 Vigorous 0.005 8.7
4 Interactive 0.0001 10.0
5 Remote 0.00001 10.8
For realistic fire scenarios, it can be difficult to determine the possible variability
in time that it might take for a fire to recede from one state back to another. A
typical example might be an under-ventilated fire that grows and recedes at different
rates across many tests. In these situations, it may only be possible to determine
the mean time that it takes the fire to change from being in the remote state (state
4 based on criterion of 150oC upper layer temperature) to being in the interactive
state (state 5 based on criterion of a 450oC upper layer temperature). It might
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then be assumed that the mean time for a transition is the same as the variability,
which could be modeled using an exponential distribution with a constant rate
of transition. Hence, this case is scenario reflecting that reflects inadequate data
collection mechanism, yet incorporating a possible variability information in to
model. It is inferred that the resulting time to flashover estimate could be either
over or under predicted. This situation is modeled in Case 2 (Table 4.15) where
all backward transitions are set to follow exponential distributions. The results are
plotted in Figure 4.41. They indicate less fluctuation in the state probabilities than
seen for Case 1, with the highest probability that the fire will grow only slightly and
less and less probability that ceiling temperatures will reach 150oC (remote), 450oC
(interactive) or full room involvement. As indicated in Table 4.19, the maximum
probability of the fire reaching each state is lower overall and the fire likely to decay
much earlier than in Case 1. Finally, time to reach any given fire growth state, and
therefore time to reach flashover, is much shorter, around 10.8min, since the large
variability in the fire test data is essentially neglected in the backward distributions
used for this case.



























Figure 4.42: Probability of being in each state. Case 3.
Table 4.20: Time at which maximum state probabilities occur. [Case 3]
State Maximum Time (min) at which
probability (1) (1) occurs
3 Vigorous 0.0127652 8.8
4 Interactive 0.00013 11.8
5 Remote 0.0002 12.4
Case 3 models the situation for which all the transition times are assumed to
follow log-normal distributions which are considered to provide good fits to a wide
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range of fire test data (Barnett, 2002, 2007). Results are plotted in Figure 4.42
with maximum probability values and times summarized in Table 4.20. For this
case, the maximum probability that the fire will reach the remote stage (stage 4)
is very close to that estimated for the fire reaching the interactive stage (stage 5),
both slightly higher than that for the fire going to full room involvement. Results
suggest an earlier time to flashover compared to Case 1, though longer than that
for Case 2. Here, the time to flashover, and interestingly for this case also the time
to full room involvement, is 12.4 min, comparable to that predicted by IITRI from
their fire test data and about 7% higher to that estimated by Berlin.



























Figure 4.43: Probability of being in each state. Case 4.[Markov method]
Table 4.21: Time at which maximum state probabilities occur. [Markov method]
State Maximum Time (min) at which
probability (1) (1) occurs
3 Vigorous 0.0516441 1.27
4 Interactive 0.00627998 3.08
5 Remote 0.00658725 3.71
In Case 4, all of the distributions in Table 2 are assumed to be exponential,
leading to a Markov process model. The resulting state probability time curves are
shown in Figure 4.43 and times to maximum probability summarized in Table 8.
Overall trends, compared to results from the semi-Markov model shown in Figure
5 and Table 4.18, are similar though the time scales of events is marked different,
particularly with respect to the times at which maximum probabilities occur. As
an example of the differences, the semi-Markov model (Case 3) predicts a time to
flashover of 12.4 min, while the Markov model predicts time to flashover of only 3.71
min, i.e., about a third of the semi-Markov model time. This clearly illustrates the
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importance of the form of the assumed distributions for state to state transitions,
since assuming exponential distributions for all the transitions in this study will
potentially lead to serious under prediction of critical fire development times and
consequent misinterpretation of results.
Table 4.22: Time (min) to flashover
Berlin’s model IITRI fire test Proposed model
Berlin (1985) Vodvarka and Waterman (1975) [Case 3]
11.59 12.9 12.4
Table 4.23: Time to flashover (TTF) for various configurations
Case# TTF (min) Comments
1 15.2 31.15% increase compared to Berlin’s model (Table 4.22)
2 10.8 Variability information from Table 4.12 is unused
3 12.4 6.99% increase compared to Berlin’s model (Table 4.22)
4 3.7 Variability information from Table 4.12 is unused
The time to flashover estimated by each of the cases investigated here is sum-
marized in Table 4.23. The semi-Markov model (Case 3) estimate of 12.4 min falls
between the estimate of 11.59 min contained in the original paper (Berlin, 1985)
and the IITRI test data estimate of 12.9 min. Cases 2 and 4 do not utilize the
variability information from the fire test data and both yield times to flashover of
less than 11.59 min. Since there was no justification provided for the distributions
chosen in Berlin (1985), it is not clear that their selection is in any way optimal.
Similarly with changes in fuels and fuel load distributions in modern enclosures, it
is unlikely that the original test data is entirely representative of more ‘modern’
fires. Through the refinement of methodology and exploration of the effects of vary-
ing the distributions, the model described in present paper has been shown to be
flexible enough to quantify time to flashover accounting for all the variability of real
fire test data, as well as cyclically receding and growing fires or other important
fire events by using varying statistical distributions and parameters as the state
transition descriptors.
Transition descriptors in Berlin’s model relied on large scale dwelling room fire
test data collected between 1959 and 1975. The test data was based on combus-
tion of sofas made of cotton cushions which is not the only material marketed
today. However, the developed model can still be utilized with appropriate choice
of statistical distributions reflecting the test data. Keeping in view the flexibility
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needed in the model development, Table 4.13 explores four different configurations
of distributions possible in applying the model.
4.5.4 Applications
As an early fire growth model, the proposed method has several potential applica-
tions. Appropriate transition state distributions, determined from existing fire test
data can be acquired and applied to account for specific fire events. Variability in
lining or construction materials, potential fuel loads or detector/sprinkler response
can also be included through appropriate identification and specification of the
transition states. The proposed model could then be used by fire safety regulators
for sensitivity analysis or as a “what if” preliminary risk assessment tool to inves-
tigate considerations such as required response times or definition of requirements
for the kinds of materials allowed in a particular structure.
4.5.5 Conclusions
Existing probabilistic fire behavior models were reviewed. A new model of early
fire development based on a mathematically well structured approach called semi-
Markov process model was proposed. The model takes into account realistic vari-
ability in the timeline for fire growth as well as the possible modes of fire extin-
guishment. Interpretations were drawn based on the time at which maximum state
probabilities occurred with one state transition used as a predictor for time to
flashover. The proposed model, with further modification, will be useful to fire
safety designers, regulators and practitioners, particularly when they seek to do a
sensitivity analysis or wish to incorporate variability into their predictions of overall
fire growth.
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4.6 Digital Controller System
A semi-Markov process model is developed for the reliability analysis of main feed-
water valve (MFV) controller system that is used for regulating the water level in a
steam generator. The proposed model is generalization of a Markov process model
reported in the literature and allows the use of non-exponential distribution for
various state transition times.
4.6.1 Problem
Digital control and protection systems are installed in nuclear power plants (NPP)
or as part of upgrades to older plants with analog systems. The primary advan-
tage of a digital system over an analog one in instrumentation and control(I&C)
systems is the fault tolerance feature offered through the use of microprocessors
instead of relay logic (Hassan and Vesely, 1998). Moreover, digital systems have
memory, enabling them to provide diagnostic data at the component level of the
control system. While logic in analog systems is driven through the use of relays
and transistors, digital systems incorporate logic into software. However, software
failures could potentially impact the performance of mitigating systems. Certain
failure modes could arise due to software that are not encountered in analog sys-
tems (Chu et al., 2010a). This integration of hardware and software in digital I&C
systems offers unique challenges in reliability modelling and hence, is an area of
important research.
Literature
The technical report by Aldemir et al. (2006) explored various methods available
for system reliability evaluation of digital instrumentation and control (I&C) sys-
tems. Static fault tree and event tree approaches were considered obsolete due to
the inherent inability of these methods to tackle “dynamic interaction” between
digital systems and rest of the plant processes. An example of such an interaction
is a competition between two tasks to get hold of a digital controller’s resources.
Deadlock could be a situation when two threads wait for each other to release re-
sources they are in control of. Starvation is a situation where a low priority thread
might have to wait indefinitely for the controller’s time slice. Hence temporal inter-
actions could lead to dynamic situations and these can be handled well using state
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transition methods by branching different situations as distinct states. Despite the
provisions for specialized dependency gates, the dynamic fault tree (DFT) method
(Rao et al., 2009) has the shortcoming that the generated cutsets might change as
the system evolves in time.
The dynamic flowgraph methodology, DFM (Al-Dabbagh and Lu, 2010) is an-
other alternative for modelling reliability of digital I&C systems. It takes the di-
rected graph approach with decision tables for state transitions, edges for failure
dependencies and nodes for variables (.e.g., Water level, Valve position). Nodes can
have discrete states (e.g., High, Stationary, Low). The decision table construction
involves all possible mappings of variables and corresponding states (e.g., Water
level high and valve open). The mapping must also account for various switching
actions for backup solutions. Yau et al. (1995) demonstrated the use of DFM for a
digital flight control system where 9 input variables with 5 states each led to 59 rows
in the decision table. The paper worked around the problem by using equations of
motion and control laws thus bypassing the construction and lookup of the decision
table. Hence decision table construction could potentially encounter a dimension-
ality problem and modelling would not adhere to a universal solution though it has
the ability to model multiple top events. Stochastic petri nets (Kleyner and Volovoi,
2010) is also a graph theoretic approach whose quantification can be done using
simulation. These models can be converted to fault trees, but size of the model and
simulation speed could severely prohibit its usage for digital I&C systems.
Another technical report by Aldemir et al. (2007) focused exclusively on reli-
ability modelling of digital I&C systems for nuclear reactor probabilistic risk as-
sessments. Markov models were developed for various controllers and computer
systems of the DFWCS. These include the main feedwater regulating valve (MFV)
controller, the bypass feedwater regulating valve (BFV) controller, the feedwater
pump (FP) controller, the pressure drop indicator (PDI) controller, power source
of these controllers and finally the main and its backup computers. This report was
at large a proof-of-concept for the use of Markov models for digital systems. The
state space for the models were elaborately developed and then reduced according
to state reduction principles for practical applications. Aldemir et al. (2010) refined
and quantified some of these models by generating Markov transition rates using
fault injection techniques. Such techniques in software testing widen the scope of
test data by introducing deliberate faults in the system.
Markov models are able to predict future failures while considering failure de-
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pendencies and can accommodate both hardware and digital interaction. However,
Markov models assume only constant transition rates leading to the assumption
that the time spent in any state can follow only the exponential distribution. A
system involving complex interactions between hard-wired analog and software con-
trolled digital subsystems could be subjected to human, software, electrical, me-
chanical and electronic failures. Lognormal, Weibull and Gamma distributions to
represent time-to-event have been found to be appropriate in different contexts
(Vineyard et al., 1999).
Proposed approach
A water level controller valve could be subject to high failure rates due to surge
voltages during startup or shutdown and a fairly constant failure rate at any ran-
dom running time. With this rationale, the present paper assumes that a Weibull
distribution is suitable to model the time to a send a previous valid output to the
valve. In order to achieve this ability to consider a non-exponential holding time
distribution in the model, the semi-Markov process model is applied for the relia-
bility analysis of digital feedwater regulating valve controller. The idea of applying
semi-Markov process model to incorporate the effect of ageing related degradation
of pipes in the nuclear industry has earlier been explored by Veeramany and Pandey
(2011c).
Markov model requires continuous plant state information to generate the tran-
sition rates required as inputs. The semi-Markov process model is also subject to
this inhibitive requirement. Further disadvantage is the difficult learning curve for
an analyst. This hindrance can be negated to an extent by the use of simple visual
interfaces.
4.6.2 The digital feedwater regulating valve controller sys-
tem
Problem
The present case study is a semi-Markov extension of one of the feedwater controller
Markov models from Aldemir et al. (2010). The digital feed water control system
(DFWCS) shown in Figure 4.44 is responsible for regulating water level in the steam














Figure 4.44: Schematic of the digital feed water control system (DFWCS).
determines the amount by which the valves need to be repositioned so as to adjust
the water flow speed. This information is sent in the form of a signal to the
controller. Accordingly, the controller actuates the main feedwater regulating valve
(MFV) to optimize the water flow. Apart from MFV, there are other controllers and
actuating devices as part of the DFWCS. The focus of this case study is to analyze
the reliability of the MFV controller system based on its output to the valve. There
is a finite probability of the valve getting stuck in its maximum or minimum flow
position due to an erroneous output from the controller. It is also possible that the
controller sends an arbitrary or random output to the valve. These could be due to
a processing error or an internal problem in the computer. In these abnormal cases
the controller feeds a valid previous output to the valve. This situation is termed

















Figure 4.45: State space for Main Feedwater regulating Valve (MFV)(Aldemir et al.,
2010).
146
The model proposed by Aldemir et al. (2010) based on Aldemir et al. (2007)
has five states as shown in Figure 4.45. The system initially begins operation in
state 1. In this state, the controller receives correct output from the computer and
sends it to the valve. The system moves to state 2,4 or 5 when the output is too
low, high or arbitrary respectively. It is assumed that these states do not lead back
to the correct output, instead move on to state 3 where a valid previous output is
sent to the valve. For modelling purposes, state 3 is an absorbing state representing
system failure. As per this model, there is a transition from state 1 to state 3 in
which case an internal problem with the computer is recognized by the controller
and a previous output is sent to the valve. The literature also suggests that there
are circumstances when the controller fails to sense the failure of the computer and
hence sends arbitrary output to the valve.
Table 4.24: Sample Markov transition rates for the controller system. (Aldemir
et al., 2010)
State Transition Transition Rate (hr−1)
λ12 Correct Output → Output Low 2.55 x 10−7
λ13 Correct Output → Previous Output 4.2 x 10−5
λ14 Correct Output → Output High 5.5 x 10−8
λ15 Correct Output → Arbitrary Output 5.5 x 10−8
λ23 Output Low → Previous Output 4.2 x 10−5
λ43 Output High → Previous Output 4.2 x 10−5
λ53 Arbitrary Output → Previous Output 4.2 x 10−5
Due to lack of practical data, Aldemir et al. (2010) estimated failure rates
based on fault injection experiments. These rates listed in Table 4.24 are useful for
demonstrative purposes.
The system of differential equations to solve the Markov model is based on the
fact that the rate of change of the probability of being in any state S is negatively
proportional to the rate at which the transitions occur outward from S and posi-
tively proportional to the rate at which inward transitions occur from other states
(Lisnianski and Levitin, 2003).
For example, from Figure 4.45, it is seen that there are four inward transitions
in to state 3 originating from states 1,2,4 and 5 while there is only one transition
going out from states 2,4 and 5.
dp1(t)/dt = −(λ12 + λ13 + λ14 + λ15)p1(t)
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dp2(t)/dt = λ12p1(t)− λ23p2(t)
dp3(t)/dt = λ13p1(t) + λ23p2(t) + λ43p4(t) + λ53p5(t)
dp4(t)/dt = λ14p1(t)− λ43p4(t)
dp5(t)/dt = λ15p1(t)− λ53p5(t)



























Figure 4.46: Controller failure probability.
Results
Figure 4.46 plots the probability of being in state 3, which is the probability of
controller system failure. Note that the system could land in state 3 either directly
from state 1 or through the other states. Out of a year, the operational mission
time of the DFWCS is assumed to be 11 months allowing for one month of outage
time (Aldemir et al., 2007). For PRA purposes, the usual (default) reference time
period is 24h (Aldemir et al., 2010). Hence, in this paper, duration for all the plots
is 24 hours.
Figure 4.47 plots the probability of being in states 2, 4 and 5. The state prob-
ability of a high or an arbitrary output is the same owing to the same failure rate
shared by the respective transitions from the state of correct output. The failure
rate of a low output from correct output is lower than that of a high or an arbi-
trary output. Correspondingly, the state probabilities reflect the trend. However,
comparing Figure 4.46 and 4.47 the probability of a controller failure is higher than
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ty State 2: Output Low
State 4, 5: Output High, Arbitrary Output
Figure 4.47: Probability of being in states 2,4 and 5.
being in any of the other states. This can be attributed to the fact that state of
previous output is an absorbing state and hence all transitions eventually end in
this state.
A direct transition from correct to previous output has higher influence over
the controller failure probability than that due to transiting through intermediate
steps and reaching the previous output. This is due to relatively larger failure rate
for the transition from correct to previous output when compared to the combined
failure rates of the alternate paths.
4.6.3 Mission Reliability
For the feedwater valve controller system, φ13(t) denotes the failure probability and
R(t) = 1 − φ13(t). Let the time to failure T of the system be a random variable.
Assume that the system is reliable until the time tb i.e., T > tb. The probability
that the system is able to further complete a mission duration of tm successfully is






1− φ13(tb + tm)
1− φ13(tb)
MR(tb, tm) represents the probability that the system stays in one of the states
other than the failure state (state 3) given that it has not yet stepped in to state
3 until tb. Note that if distribution of T is exponential then the mission reliability
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is independent of tb, MR(tb, tm) = R(tm). For plotting, the mission unreliability,
1−MR(tb, tm), is a convenient choice:
1−MR(tb, tm) =
φ13(tb + tm)− φ13(tb)
1− φ13(tb)
This quantity represents the probability that the system enters state 3 during the
time interval (tb, tb + tm) given that it has been reliable until time tb.
4.6.4 Semi-Markov model for digital feedwater valve con-
troller
The holding time in any state is a random variable. Though hard to determine
and establish the variability, this information can be of potential use to study its
effect on the controller system’s failure probability. In this paper, it is assumed
that the time-to-previous output from the state of correct output follows a Weibull
distribution. The coefficient of variation (cov) is varied between 0.4 and 1.0. The
rest of the transition times are assumed to follow exponential distributions with
the mean transition rates as listed in Table 4.24. Let Rij(t) = 1 − Fij(t). Then,

















0 0 f23(t) 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 f43(t) 0 0
0 0 f53(t) 0 0


The kernel matrix and the matrix W (t) are sufficient to solve for state proba-
bilities. The probability of being in each of the states is computed by solving the
system of integral equations in Equation 3.10 using the trapezoidal rule (Veeramany
and Pandey, 2011c,b).
The transition rates for the Markov model (Aldemir et al., 2010) were a result
of reducing the total number of states to five from a seven state model. These
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effective rates are used in the proposed model as a first hand approximation. Alter-
natively, state reduction techniques can be applied on a semi-Markov process model
to determine the effective distribution parameters as explored by Veeramany and
Pandey (2011b).
Results of semi-Markov process model

































Figure 4.48: Controller system failure probability comparing variability in time to
previous-output.
Figure 4.48 shows the controller failure probability for three cases of coefficient
of variation: 1.0, 0.6 and 0.4. Recall that this variability corresponds to time to
the previous output from the state of correct output. Comparing the Figures 4.46
and 4.48, it can be seen that a cov of 1.0 corresponds to the Markov case. On the
other hand, the lower the variability, the lower is the failure probability.
Table 4.25: Controller failure probability at the end of 24 hrs.
cov Controller failure
probability
1.0 1.0075 x 10−3
0.6 5.88034 x 10−6
0.4 1.05061 x 10−8
The controller failure probabilities at the end of 24h are shown in Table 4.25 for
each of the covs considered. It is seen that the failure probability increases with an
increase in cov and it is the highest for the Markov model.
Consider two MFV controller systems - the first system has been in service
for 10 hours and the second system is newly installed after first system has been
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Figure 4.49: Controller system mission unreliability for additional 14 hrs given that
the system was reliable for the initial 10 hrs [cov=1].
operational for 10 hours. The mission unreliability of the first system given a
10h reliable operating history and the failure probability of the second system are
compared in Figure 4.49. The comparison assumes cov = 1 for the time to transition
from state 1 to state 3. It is observed that both probabilities are the same for the
observed 14 hour period. This well known result shows that the Markov model
does not differentiate a system already in service and a newly installed one.

























Figure 4.50: Controller system mission unreliability for additional 14 hrs given that
the system was reliable for the initial 10 hrs [cov=0.6].
Assuming cov = 0.6 for the time to transition from state 1 to state 3, Figure
4.50 shows that mission unreliability of the first system is higher than the system
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failure probability of the newly installed system. This is a result of considering
non-exponential distribution in the semi-Markov model formulation.
Since a digital I&C system is a combination of hardware and software systems,
it is prone to ageing. Nuclear power plant systems undergo certain maintenance ac-
tivities that could be carried out even without outages. Under these circumstances,
continuous execution of software embedded in hardware (firmware) could exhibit
software ageing due to performance degradation, numerical error accumulation and
unexpected crashes (Laird and Brennan, 2006). Moreover, mechanical movement
of the feedwater valve in response to controller commands could go out of control.
In an intuitive sense, the failure probability of an ageing system at the present
moment is very low given that the system was reliable until now. Overtime, failure
probability of such a system is likely to be higher than that of a newly installed sys-
tem due to increased risks of wear and tear. However both these quantities remain
the same if the failure time of a system is assumed to follow an exponential distri-
bution. This inability to take ageing in to account is a result of the memoryless
property of the exponential distribution. A recommendation for future research is
to analyze reliability of an ageing digital I&C system over the life span of a typical
power plant and not just for a short period of 24h.
Apart from the main feedwater regulating valve (MFV) controller, the digital
feedwater controller system (DFWCS) is connected to a feedwater pump (FP) and
its controller, a bypass feedwater valve (BFV) and its controller, a main computer
and its backup and a pressure drop indicator (PDI) controller. A critical application
in the nuclear plant reliability analysis is the probabilistic assessment of the entire
digital controller system. NUREG-CR/6942 proposed Markov models for each of
MFV, computer and the PDI systems. The MFV, BFV and the FP share the same
model used in this paper. Hence, a larger application of semi-Markov process model
would be to integrate the reliability models of the above said systems in to a single
model for the digital feedwater controller system.
4.6.5 Conclusion
The main feedwater valve controller system used to regulate water level in a nuclear
power plant steam generator is a critical digital instrumentation and control system
of interest. A Markov model was developed in NUREG-CR/6942. This case study
presents a more general semi-Markov model so that non-exponential distributions
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can be included in the model. An example is presented to analyze this problem in
which Weibull distribution is assumed for a state transition time in the model.
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4.7 Quantifying Maintenance Effects on Unavail-
ability
This case study presents a general model for evaluating unavailability of engineer-
ing systems with maintenance effects based on the theory of semi-Markov process.
The proposed model is able to incorporate non-exponential distributions to consider
degradation of systems. The effect of degradation intensity, variability in degrada-
tion and maintenance interval on the component’s unavailability are investigated.
The model is able to recommend an optimal maintenance interval for minimizing
the operational unavailability.
4.7.1 Problem
Samanta et al. (1991)’s NUREG report was an early attempt to show that degra-
dation can be modeled using state space techniques to identify ageing trends and
thus formed the basis for Vesely (1993)’s Markov model. The basic idea was to bor-
row minimal inputs from standard two-state probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)
models and build a Markov model capable of identifying optimal maintenance in-
tervals. However, the Markov process model assumes constant rate of occurrence of
degradation implying that the time-to-degradation initiation is a random variable
following an exponential distribution. However, if degradation accelerates rapidly
due to ageing, Weibull or gamma distribution can be a better choice. For example,
Bae et al. (2007) derive insights from comprehensive degradation analyses done by
Lu and Meeker (1993); Meeker and Escobar (1998). They explain that the choice of
distribution in metal corrosion and degradation of electronic devices such as semi-
conductors has profound implications on the resulting lifetime model. The paper
investigated the characteristics of lifetime distributions when Weibull, Gamma and
log-logistical distributions are used in degradation analysis. Vineyard et al. (1999)
identified that the Weibull distribution was found to be a strong fit for the time
between failures for electronic, human, mechanical, and software failures. Similarly
lognormal distribution was found to be a strong fit for the time between failures
for electrical failures. Hence, keeping in view the importance of non-exponential
distributions in degradation modelling, the objective of this case study is to extend
Vesely (1993)’s Markov model in to a more general semi-Markov process (SMP)
model that permits the use of non-exponential distributions for time spent in the
component states in order to quantify the maintenance effects on unavailability.
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Consequences and maintenance management of ageing components have been
investigated through renewal theory (Radulovich et al., 1995), physics of ageing
damage in passive components(Smith et al., 2001) and linear and Weibull ageing
models (Kancev and C̆epin, 2011; Vesely, 1978). Veeramany and Pandey (2011c)
developed a semi-Markov model to evaluate reliability of a degrading nuclear pip-
ing system to support risk-informed in-service inspection programs. The model as-
sumed that the time to flaw growth in a pipe follows non-exponential distribution.
The paper extended a Markov model proposed by Fleming (2004) which argues that
apart from catastrophic failures like severe loading, there can be a number of piping
related degradation issues like flow accelerated erosion-corrosion, thermal fatigue,
wall thinning, crack propagation, flaws and leaks. The present case study proposes
a more general model that quantifies the effect of maintenance on unavailability of
degrading systems. Veeramany and Pandey (2011b) focused on modelling reliabil-
ity of redundant systems where one or more constituent components could follow
non-exponential distribution for time to failure. Ideas for reducing the number of
states in the model for specific cases were proposed. Gupta and Dharmaraja (2011)
proposed a ten state semi-Markov dependability model yielding time-dependent re-
sults. The paper explained the necessity to introduce non-exponential distributions
for resource degradation and presented an application that assumed exponential dis-
tribution for all sojourn times. Simulation was used to determine probability of a
security attack in a telecommunications network. Semi-Markov process model has
also been explored (Veeramany and Pandey, 2011a) to model reliability of digital
instrumentation and control (I&C) systems where there is a scope for firmware
to undergo performance degradation due to software ageing in combination with
risks of mechanical wear and tear. Tomasevicz and Asgarpoor (2009) developed a
semi-Markov decision process based on an n-state degradation model to solve for
optimal maintenance policy of repairable equipment without the use of continuous
time statistical distributions.
4.7.2 State Space Model
The original Markov model by Vesely (1993) seen in Figure 4.51 consists of four
states - operational, degraded, maintenance and failure. The only input available
from a standard probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is the component’s failure rate
λ. Vesely derived analytical expressions to connect λ to each of the transition rates


















Figure 4.51: Four-state transition model for system degradation (Vesely, 1993).
model additionally introduces coefficient of variation, γ in the time to failure. As
a result there is a scope for the time spent in the states o and d towards the
transitions o → d, o → f and d → f to follow non-exponential distribution. An
application is presented assuming that only the time to degradation corresponding
to the transition o→ d follows non-exponential distribution.
The component failure rate λ accounts for both catastrophic failures and also the
failures that pass through degradation. However, these are not directly observable.
λ is related to the catastrophic failure rate λof through the catastrophic failure
fraction fof (Vesely, 1993):
λof = fofλ
If a non-exponential distribution is to be used for transitions o→ d and o→ f , it
is desirable to have the mean time to failure and the cov of the time to event data
so that distribution specific parameters can be fitted for each of the transitions.





Let the coefficient of variation (cov) of data that yield µ and µof be γ and γof
respectively. If the time spent in the operational state is assumed to follow an
exponential distribution then, γof = γ = 1. If not, γof = γ assuming that scal-
ing the mean corresponds to a dataset in which each of the data points is scaled
accordingly.
Hence, by knowing λ, γ and with an estimate of fof , one could arrive at the
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mean µof and cov γof of catastrophic time to failure corresponding to the transition
o → f . These two quantities are sufficient to set up a desired non-exponential
distribution to time to catastrophic failure given that the system is operational.
Let the probability density function (pdf) and the cumulative distribution function
(cdf) corresponding to this set of mean and cov be denoted by gof (t) and Gof (t)
respectively.
On similar lines, it can be argued that the component failure rate λ and the







The above two quantities are sufficient to set up a desired non-exponential distri-
bution to time to degradation given that the system is operational. Let the pdf
and the cdf corresponding to this set of mean and cov be denoted by god(t) and
God(t) respectively.
In view of restricting to as less additional variables as possible, the degraded
failure rate λdf is related to the total failure rate λ through the ratios rod and fof
and the definition that Todf = Tod + Tdf (Vesely, 1993):
rdf =
rod(1− fof )








The above two quantities are sufficient to set up a desired non-exponential dis-
tribution to time to failure given that the system is degraded. Let the pdf and
the cdf corresponding to this set of mean and cov be denoted by gdf (t) and Gdf (t)
respectively.
The maintenance frequencies λom and λdm when in operational and degraded
states respectively can be assumed to be constant transition rates owing to the fact
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that there is less variability in time to maintenance once a maintenance policy is
selected. These rates were derived on the assumption that the degradation rate is








where Tm is the average time between maintenances.
The transition m → f representing a component failure while under mainte-
nance and backward transitions m → o, m → d, f → o and f → d represent-
ing component state improvements are assumed to follow constant transition rates
keeping in view the scarcity of data to fit non-exponential distributions. These
transition rates (Vesely, 1993) are listed in Table 4.26.
Table 4.26: Constant transition rates for rest of the transitions (Vesely, 1993)
Transition Transition rate Constraints
m→ o λmo = pmo/dm pmo + pmd + pmf = 1
m→ d λmd = pmd/dm dm: average maintenance duration
m→ f λmf = pmf/dm
f → o λfo = pfo/df pfo + pfd = 1
f → d λfd = pfd/df df = T2 (1− 13 TTm ) + r
r = average repair time
T=surveillance test interval




0 λod λom λof
0 0 λdm λdf
λmo λmd 0 λmf
λfo λfd 0 0


and the time evolution of states yielding the state probabilities is given by a system
of differential equations. In the next section, the semi-Markov process model is
described to arrive at a system of integral equations taking in to account the ability
to incorporate non-exponential distributions.
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4.7.3 Application of SMP to the maintenance model
The proposed model is applied to a hypothetical component assuming that the time
to degradation follows Weibull distribution. The mean time to degradation µod and





od parameters of Weibull distribution.
The kernel of the semi-Markov process model can be constructed with all the




o d m f
o 0 cod(t) com(t) cof (t)
d 0 0 cdm(t) cdf (t)
m cmo(t) cmd(t) 0 cmf (t)




cod(t) = god(t)(1−Gom(t))(1−Gof (t))
com(t) = gom(t)(1−God(t))(1−Gof (t))
cof (t) = gof (t)(1−God(t))(1−Gom(t))
cdm(t) = gdm(t)(1−Gdf (t))
cdf (t) = gdf (t)(1−Gdm(t))
cmo(t) = gmo(t)(1−Gmd(t))(1−Gmf (t))
cmd(t) = gmd(t)(1−Gmo(t))(1−Gmf (t))






0 φod(t) φom(t) φof (t)
0 0 φdm(t) φdf (t)
φmo(t) φmd(t) 0 φmf (t)












od+(λom+λof )t) 0 0 0
0 e−(λdm+λdf )t 0 0
0 0 e−(λmo+λmd+λmf )t 0







If it is assumed that the component begins in the operating state, the cumula-
tive probability of being in the degraded, maintenance and failure states is given by
φod(t), φom(t) and φof (t) respectively. The sum φod(t)+φom(t) + φof (t) yields oper-
ational unavailability of the component. The goal then is to determine an optimal
maintenance interval that corresponds to minimum operational unavailability.
Table 4.27: Sample input data
Quantity Value
λ 1 x 10−6h−1 Component failure rate
γ 1.0, 0.6, 0.4 variability in time to degradation
fof 0.1 catastrophic failure fraction
rod 3.0, 10.0 degradation ratio
pmo 0.9990 fraction of maintenances resulting in state o
pmd 0.0009 fraction of maintenances resulting in state d
pmf 0.0001 fraction of maintenances resulting in state f
pfd 0.01 fraction of failures resulting in state d
pfo 0.09 fraction of failures resulting in state o
r 20h average repair time
T 730h surveillance test interval
Tm various 1 week, 2 weeks, 1 month, 3 months, 6 months,
1 year, 2.5 years, 5 years, 8.33 years
Table 4.27 lists the set of sample inputs used for the present illustrative appli-
cation. Of these λ, fof and rod have been borrowed from Vesely (1993). γ is specific
to the proposed model and rest of the inputs missing from Vesely (1993) have been
assumed here based on a hypothetical degrading component.
Results
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(a) rod = 10, Tm = 1yr, cov = 0.6









































(b) rod = 10, Tm = 1yr, cov = 1.0












































(c) rod = 10, Tm = 1week, cov = 0.6











































(d) rod = 10, Tm = 1week, cov = 1.0
Figure 4.52: Effect of variability in time to degradation and maintenance interval on state probabilities
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Table 4.28: Effect of variability in degradation - steady state probabilities, rod = 10
PPPPPPPPPState
Tm 1 week 1 year
cov=0.6 1.0 Increase cov=0.6 1.0 Increase
Degraded 0.0003 0.0009 200% 0.0104 0.0421 304.8%
Maintenance 0.3035 0.3037 0.07% 0.0076 0.0078 2.6%
Operationally 0.3040 0.3048 0.26% 0.0180 0.0500 177.8%
Unavailable
Figure 4.52 and Table 4.28 show how variability in degradation affects steady
state probabilities. In each of the plots, rod is assumed to be 10. Assuming a
constant degradation rate over-estimates the degradation probability by more than
200% when the actual variability in degradation is only 0.6. This proves that expo-
nential distribution for time to degradation is an overly conservative assumption.
The conservativeness is significantly reflected in increase in the operational un-
availability (177.8%) as the maintenance interval increases. This is because longer
maintenance interval adds more to degradation propagation apart from uncertainty













































Figure 4.53: Effect of variability in time to degradation and degradation ratio on
degradation probability
Figure 4.53 shows that lower degradation probability is associated with lower
degradation ratio i.e., if the component failures are driven more by degradation
rather than catastrophic failures, it follows that probability of being in the degra-
dation state is higher. Given a degradation ratio and maintenance interval, the
degradation probability is proportional to the variability in degradation. However,
significant differences in degradation probabilities are not evident for smaller main-
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tenance intervals. If the component undergoes maintenance once in 8.33 years,
the degradation probability is the highest (0.2503) when rod = 10,cov=1 and low-


















































































(b) rod = 10
Figure 4.54: Operational unavailability φod(t)+φom(t)+φof (t) for degradation ratio
rod = 3, 10
An important application of the proposed model is to suggest an optimal main-
tenance interval based on the component’s failure rate extracted from a standard
PRA model. Such an optimal interval depends additionally on variability in degra-
dation for better accuracy. In Figure 4.54 maintenance interval was varied between
one week to 8.33 years and operational unavailability was plotted for degradation
ratio of 3.0 and 10.0 separately. It is observed that operational unavailability de-
creases with decreasing variability in degradation though significant only beyond a
two month maintenance interval for rod = 3.0 and one month interval for rod = 10.0.
In all the plots, there is a point at which operational unavailability stops decreas-
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Table 4.29: Operational unavailability
Maintenance rod = 3 rod = 10
Interval Tm cov = 1 0.6 0.4 cov = 1 0.6 0.4
1 week 0.3045 0.3042 0.3042 0.3048 0.3040 0.3040
2 weeks 0.1784 0.1780 0.1780 0.1792 0.1776 0.1776
1 month 0.0915 0.0904 0.0904 0.0936 0.0901 0.0900
3 months 0.0354 0.0323 0.0322 0.0425 0.0326 0.0317
6 months 0.0230 0.0168 0.0165 0.0374 0.0190 0.0163
1 year 0.0214 0.0097 0.0085 0.0500 0.0180 0.0103
2.5 years 0.0353 0.0094 0.0044 0.1018 0.0487 0.0270
5 years 0.0618 0.0173 0.0048 0.1783 0.1148 0.0797
8.33 years 0.0893 0.0265 0.0064 0.2513 0.1811 0.1341
ing and then reverses the trend with increasing maintenance interval. Thus, irre-
spective of the variability in degradation, too frequent and delayed maintenance
schemes increase unavailability due to longer stay in the maintenance state with
reduced performance or total unavailability.
The observed point of inflection is a suggested optimal maintenance interval
that minimizes unavailability. Table 4.29 shows that for an rod = 3.0, it is sufficient
to perform maintenance once in 2.5 years when the cov=0.6 as compared to a more
frequent 1 year maintenance when the cov=1.0. When cov=0.6, rod = 10.0 would
require a maintenance interval of 6 months as opposed to an yearly maintenance for
rod = 3.0. A Markov model would recommend frequent maintenance which could
have significant financial implications.
The difference in optimal maintenance intervals between cov=0.6 and cov=1.0 is
more dramatic than that between cov=0.6 and cov=0.4. For example, for rod = 3.0,
the interval could be one year when cov=1.0, but an interval of 2.5 years is sufficient
for both cov=0.6 and 0.4 though the operational unavailability is lesser for cov=0.4
when compared to that of cov=0.6. Also observed for a degradation ratio of 10.0
is the relatively steeper increase in operational unavailability if the maintenance
interval is more than a year. The application demonstrated could be practically
utilized to decide on a maintenance frequency for a class of components prone more
to degradation induced failures than catastrophic ones.
165
4.7.4 Conclusion
An extension of Markov model to evaluate optimum maintenance interval has been
proposed based on the theory of semi-Markov process model. This advancement
allows non-exponential distributions to be used in the model to describe phenomena
underlying state transitions. An example application was demonstrated assuming
that component degradation follows Weibull distribution. It was observed that
there is significant scope of over-estimating operational unavailability and hence
optimum maintenance intervals by assuming a constant degradation rate. The
proposed model reduces to a Markov model by assuming constant rate for all the
transitions, and further reduces to a standard PRA model if the degradation and
maintenance states are eliminated from the model. In other words, the proposed
model can be viewed as a direct extension of PRA techniques to account for ageing





Wang and Pham (1997) listed four main difficulties in evaluating availability of
complex large scale systems - complex system structure, various failure distribu-
tions, arbitrary repair distributions in case of maintainability and insufficient failure
data This paper identified Monte Carlo technique combined with Bayes method as
a powerful tool to deal with these complexities. This chapter is primarily targeted
at promoting Monte Carlo simulation as a validation tool to verify the semi-Markov
process model.
5.2 Literature review
Billinton and Li (1994) introduced basic concepts and applications of Monte Carlo
simulation with practical applications to electric power generation, transmission,
and distribution systems. They summarized Monte Carlo availability simulation
procedures and surveyed various reduction techniques. Ramirez-Marquez and Coit
(2005) argued that binary state analysis of a system is insufficient and described a
Monte Carlo methodology for estimating reliability of a multi-state network based
on minimal cutsets. Billinton and Wangdee (2006) utilized sequential Monte Carlo
simulation in bulk electric systems to obtain reliability indices. Naess et al. (2009)
focused on development of Monte Carlo based method for estimating the reliability
of structural systems. Based on the failure probability obtained by Monte Carlo
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simulation,the paper set up an approximation procedure to reduce the computa-
tional cost.
5.3 Reliability indices
Instantaneous or point availability of a system is the probability that it is opera-
tional at a time t. A single trial in availability simulation consists of failure and
repair times generated until the mission time t. Many such trials are conducted.





1 if system operating at end of mission for ith trial
0 otherwise
Then, for sufficiently large number N of trials, the instantaneous unavailability of
the system at time t can be calculated from xi:





If N is small, the denominator in Equation 5.3 is replaced with N − 1 in order to
obtain an unbiased estimate of unavailability.
Further, by keeping track of the mean downtime, an estimate of the steady state
unavailability can be determined:
Q =
mean downtime
mean uptime + mean downtime
The mean E(x) and variance V (x) of the simulated observations can be obtained
from:




















Note that xi in 5.3 can be any reliability index whose mean and variance are
of interest. For example, if xi are the steady state unavailabilities for each trial
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i, then x and V (x) represent the average and variance estimates of steady state
unavailability.
5.4 Simulation algorithm
The algorithm to obtain the reliability estimates consists of two major modules -
building a time line of events and then analyzing them to obtain the necessary reli-
ability indices. An abridged pseudo-code comprising both the modules is presented
in this section.
5.4.1 Time line construction
A time line consists of all the component events placed in chronological order until
the assumed mission time. A time line corresponds to one trial. This section
presents a pseudo-code to construct such a time line.
It is assumed that each component of the system follows a general failure
and repair distribution. Further each component can either be repairable or non-
repairable. Random failure and repair times are based on the “inverse transform”
method (Billinton and Li, 1994). In this method, a uniform random number p in
[0,1] is generated and the cdf of the distribution for the time to event is inverted
to obtain a sample time. A pseudo-random generator like Mersenne twister (Mat-
sumoto and Nishimura, 1998) can be used to generate p. It is ideal for Monte Carlo
simulations with provision for fast and high quality pseudo-random numbers.
1. Constants
• DOWN: event denoting component failure
• UP: event denoting completion of component repair
2. Variables
• Tcum: cumulative time
• Tm: mission time
• E: component event - either component DOWN or UP
• Te: Time associated with event E
169
• C: Component associated with event E
• L: List of events
3. For each component C in the system
• Tcum=0, E=DOWN





next failure time of C if E=DOWN
time of completion of repair of C if E=UP
– If Tcum + Te has exceeded Tm, proceed to next component
– Add event E to the list L
– If component is not repairable, proceed to next component
– Tcum = Tcum + Te






4. Sort L according to Te
5. L is the required time line
5.4.2 System analysis
Availability analysis
For each time line made up of component events, the time line is analyzed for
system failures and down time of the system is tracked accordingly. In order to
evaluate availability, the status of the system at the end of the mission is noted.
It is assumed that components and hence the system cannot fail until the system
is completely recovered from an earlier system failure. The time line consists of
all failures and repairs irrespective of whether they have occurred when system is
in repair or not. The pseudo code in this section ignores failures during a system
failure, however, components that failed earlier to system failure can continue to be
repaired. Since components of a cutset are equivalent to a parallel system, failure
of all components in the cutset leads to system failure and repair of at least one
of its components leads to system repair. To achieve this, a count of the number
of components failed in each cutset is stored. When this count reaches length of
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the cutset, it is considered as a system failure provided system is not already under
repair.
1. Variables
• E: a component event - failure / repair
• C: component associated with E
• M : minimal cutset of which C is a member
• len(M): length of the minimal cutset M
• N(M): Number of components failed in M





Failure time if E is DOWN
Repair time completion if E is UP
• Tf : Time of last system failure
• S: minimal cutset due to which system failed
• DT : total downtime of the system until mission time
• RDT : remaining down time from the current time





1 if system operating at end of mission for ith trial
0 otherwise
• Nf : Number of system failures encountered
• Tff : Time to first system failure
2. Initialize
• S = M = None




• System repair completion
– System earlier failed due to cutset M
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– Component C belongs to M
– E is completion of repair of component C
• System failure
– E is failure of component C
– C belongs to the cutset M
– N(M) has reached len(M) (all components of cutset M have failed)
– Bf is false (ensure no failures when system down)
4. For each event E on the time line
• Set C,Te and M based on E
• If E is a “system repair completion”
– DT = DT + (Te-Tf ) (down time since last system failure)
– Bf= False, RDT=0, xi= 1




1 if E is DOWN
−1 if E is UP
• If E is a “system failure”
– Bf= True, Tf= Te,xi=0
– Nf = Nf + 1 (Increment system failures)
– If Nf = 1, then set Tf to Te (time-to-first-failure)
– RDT=RDT+(Tm - Te)
5. DT = DT + RDT (add up any remaining down time)
6. UT = Tm - DT
Reliability analysis
In reliability analysis, only the first failure of the system is of interest. However,
component repairs can take place as long as the component failure does not lead
to a system failure. The time line construction for reliability analysis remains the
same as discussed in Section 5.4.1. Hence, in this section the above pseudo-code is
modified so that the system repairs are not considered. The algorithm exits when
a system failure is encountered.
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1. Variables
• E: a component event - failure / repair
• C: component associated with E
• M : minimal cutset of which C is a member
• len(M): length of the minimal cutset M
• N(M): Number of components failed in M





Failure time if E is DOWN
Repair time completion if E is UP
• S: minimal cutset due to which system failed





1 system operating at end of mission
0 otherwise
2. Initialize
• S = M =None, xi= 1
• Te= N(M) = 0
3. Definitions
• System failure
– E is failure of component C
– C belongs to the cutset M
– N(M) has reached len(M) (all components of cutset M have failed)
4. For each event E on the time line
• Set C,Te and M based on E




1 if E is DOWN
−1 if E is UP




Consider the reliability block diagram in Figure 5.1. This is the same problem
considered in Section 3.11. For convenience, component data is listed again in
Table 5.1.
Figure 5.1: Reliability block diagram.
This system has seven cutsets:
{C1, C2}, {C3, C4}
{C1, C2, C3}, {C1, C2, C4}
{C3, C4, C1}, {C3, C4, C2}
{C1, C2, C3, C4}
However only the first two cutsets are minimal cutsets. The others are not since
there is at least one component in each of these cutsets such that by removing these
components, the set is still a cutset. For example, by removing {C3} from {C1,
C2, C3}, the resulting set {C1, C2} is still a cutset. Recall the assumption that
components do not fail when the system is down and until completely restored.
However, repair of components can continue whether or not they are part of the
cutset that failed.
Table 5.1: Component data for the four component example system




C3 30 , 1 0.5
C4 20, 0.25 1
For a single component, the only cutset and minimal cutset is the singleton
set with the component itself. In this case, the component and the system mean
the same. The system is up when this component is up and it is down when
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this component is down. This is equivalent to an alternating renewal process with
distinct failure and repair distributions. Unavailability of each of the components
is shown in Figure 5.2. It is seen that for a single component the Monte Carlo
estimates are quite accurate with less variance.






































Figure 5.2: Unavailability of individual components.
A sample time line for each component of the 4-component system generated

















By merging all the events and sorting them in the order of occurrence, a single
trial representing the time line of events is listed in Table 5.2. This table was
generated using the algorithm to generate the times lines. It also shows which of
the components were operational at each instant an event occurred.
Table 5.2: A sample trial of events until 90 years
Component Event Event Working
Type Time (yrs) Components
C3 Down 30.0195 1,2,4
C3 Up 30.2037 1,2,3,4
C4 Down 32.0616 1,2,3
C3 Down 33.2826 1,2
C3 Up 33.6788 1,2,3
C4 Up 35.4109 1,2,3,4
C2 Down 38.9459 1,3,4
C2 Up 39.0817 1,2,3,4
C3 Down 43.4714 1,2,4
C3 Up 43.5758 1,2,3,4
C4 Down 64.1478 1,2,3
C4 Up 64.3193 1,2,3,4
C3 Down 67.3238 1,2,4
C1 Down 67.4363 2,4
C1 Up 67.5091 1,2,4
C3 Up 69.7963 1,2,3,4
C2 Down 85.5416 1,3,4
C4 Down 87.5023 1,3
C2 Up 87.9878 1,2,3
In the above trial, failure of C3 at 33.28 years led to a system failure and the
system is recovered at 33.68 years after C3 is repaired. The downtime is nearly 4.8
months. Despite system failure, the system is operational at the end of the mission.
Hence, for this trial the system is available at the end of 90 years.
By repeating such trials large number of times for each time point in the interval
[0,90] using the algorithm for analyzing the time line and applying the formula in
Equation 5.3, time dependent system unavailability can determined as in Figure
5.3.
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Figure 5.3: System unavailability.
For subsystem 1 and subsystem 2, there is one minimal cutset each. Figure 5.4
and 5.5 respectively illustrate the subsystem level unavailability.































Figure 5.4: Unavailability of subsystem 1.
By averaging all the down times obtained in each trial and applying the for-
mulae in Equation 5.3 and 5.3, an estimate of mean and variance of steady state
unavailability of each component and the system can be obtained. However, con-
vergence to steady state unavailability often requires that the trial is carried out
beyond the mission time. In cases where failure rates are extremely low and repair
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Figure 5.5: Unavailability of subsystem 2.
times are small, steady state unavailability might be reached much beyond the use-
ful life period of the system. Figure 5.6 shows how steady state unavailability is
gradually reached with increasing time until 90 years.



































Estimate of steady state unavailability
Steady state unavailability
Figure 5.6: Steady state availability of component C2.
Component and system steady state unavailabilities for the 4-component system
are listed in Table 5.5. Components trials were replicated 500,000 times while
system trials were replicated 1,000,000 times.
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C1 0.0128121 ( 0.00012996 )
C2 0.0322879 ( 0.00031301 )
C3 0.0168828 ( 0.00017276 )
C4 0.0476043 ( 0.00045350 )
System 0.0010268 ( 0.00000756 )
Table 5.4 lists the other indices such as mean time-to-first failure of the system,
average unproductive time spent and the mean number of failures encountered until
the mission time of 90 years. Note that all these indices are relatively lesser in the
system case. This is due to the rarity of occurrence of minimal cutset failures. The
mean number of failures for the components is approximately equal to the ratio of
mission time to mean life of the component.
Table 5.4: Time to first failure and other indices of the 4-component example.
Component mean time-to- mean mean number
first failure(yrs) downtime(yrs) of failures
C1 26.2975 1.1043 2.22182
C2 29.9824 2.4403 2.47324
C3 24.0351 1.46529 2.94996
C4 20.0027 3.81532 3.86452
System 11.8996 0.09246 0.278077
The simple 4-component example demonstrates the validity of semi-Markov
process model and further proves that Monte Carlo has the potential to yield many
other reliability estimates of interest to an analyst.
5.6 Case Study: Nuclear Component Cooling Wa-
ter (NCCW) system
In this section the results of the NCCW system obtained by semi-Markov process
model are validated using the Monte Carlo simulation method.
Table 5.5 shows four possible trials leading to a system failure. Since the failure
rates of the redundant pump trains and heat exchanger train are of the order of
10−6, it is likely that hardly one pump train failure is experienced in 106 trials.
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Table 5.5: Sample trials for the NCCW system.
Trial Component Event Type Event Time (hrs) Remarks
1 Pump Train 12 Down 927.911
Pump Train 11 Down 959.527 System down
Pump Train 12 Up 977.454 for 17.927 hrs
Pump Train 11 Up 983.887
2 Pump Train 12 Down 412.041
Pump Train 11 Down 439.551 System down
Pump Train 11 Up 440.034 for 0.483 hrs
Pump Train 12 Up 452.759
3 Pump Train 11 Down 378.39
Pump Train 12 Down 380.199 System down
Pump Train 12 Up 382.885 for 2.686 hrs
Pump Train 11 Up 410.539
4 Heat Exchanger Down 442.113 System down,
Train not repairable
Hence this table considers a mission time of 1000 hrs to track the failures and
repairs. The first three trials exemplify a system failure due to the failure of both
the pump trains while the last one shows the possibility of a system failure due to
heat exchanger train.



































Figure 5.7: System failure probability.
Figure 5.7 compares the system unreliability of the NCCW system with Weibull
distribution for heat exchanger train failure obtained by Monte Carlo and semi-
Markov methods. It is seen that Monte Carlo traces the stochastic process very
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Monte Carlo cov 0.3, 1.0,1.3
Semi-Markov cov 1.3
Figure 5.8: System failure probability with cov=0.3,1.0, and 1.3.
well except for relatively higher variance in the first 30 hrs.
Figure 5.8 verifies the results in the case where only the pump train failure
follows Weibull distribution. Redundancy, low failure rates and prompt repair
prevent the system from rapidly ageing.
5.7 Conclusion
Monte Carlo method has immense flexibility in simulating a large system with a
wide array of features and events including degrading components, redundancy, re-
pair, repair crews, spares, inspections, preventive maintenance, cost, logistic delays
etc. However, combinatorics and replications consume large amount of time lead-
ing us in search of better options. For large systems with multi-state components,
system availability computation using Monte Carlo simulation becomes extremely
prohibitive. The next chapter deals with a technique that has the ability to mix






A typical nuclear power plant system consists of several components (elements)
with different hazard and repair rates. The reliability indices of a complex system
has been computed traditionally using Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Reliability Block
Diagrams (RBD), stochastic processes like Markov and semi-Markov processes etc.
Stochastic processes mentioned are well suited for dealing with multi-state elements,
but, they suffer from ‘state-explosion’ or ‘dimension damnation’ when applied to a
system with many elements. If there are N elements, the number of system states
may go up to 2N . Moreover, state enumeration cannot be elegantly depicted. The
number of system states have to be forcibly reduced by different techniques such as
lumping series elements in to one component or merging states of similar function-
ality thus compromising the accuracy of the results. Hence this chapter explores
and brings together a set of engineering tools that can deftly compute the availabil-
ity of a complex system with accuracy, simplicity, less computational burden and
without compromising all the possible states of a system and its components.
6.2 Literature Review
The mathematical fundamentals of the Universal Generating Function (UGF) were
introduced by Ushakov (1987). Levitin et al. (1998) generalized a redundancy opti-
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mization problem to multi-state systems where in UGF is used as a fast procedure
to evaluate the multi-state system availability. Levitin and Lisnianski (1999) de-
veloped an importance analysis tool for complex series-parallel multi-state systems
based on UGF. Ushakov (2000) introduced a composition operator for UGF as a
special case of the operator in generalized generating sequences suitable to optimal
redundancy problems. Levitin (2001b) adapted the UGF method of multi-state
system reliability analysis to incorporate common-cause failures (CCF) using an
implicit 2-stage approach. Levitin (2001a) combined the UGF technique with Ge-
netic Algorithm (GA) for solving a family of MSS reliability optimization problems,
such as structure optimization, optimal expansion, maintenance optimization and
optimal multistage modernization. Lisnianski and Levitin (2003) presented a UGF
based method for reliability evaluation of different types of analysis of multi-state
system reliability. They also proposed a combination of Markov process with the
UGF method by extending the Reliability Block Diagram. Levitin (2004) extended
the UGF technique used for the analysis of multi-state systems to the case when the
performance distributions of some elements depend on states of another element
or group of elements. Levitin (2005) gave a comprehensive description of the UGF
technique and its applications in both binary and multi-state system reliability
analysis.
6.3 Foundations of Universal Generating Func-
tion
6.3.1 Probability mass function (pmf)
For a discrete random variable X, the probability mass function (pmf) is the prob-
ability that X assumes the exact value of x; i.e., pmf of X is P(X = x).
Example
Consider an element A whose set of states are denoted by the r.v. X1. Let x1={0,1},
p1={0.6, 0.4} be the pmf of X1. i.e. P (X1 = 0) = 0.6 and P (X1 = 1) = 0.4 such
that P (X1 = 0) + P (X1 = 1) = 1 Here, element failure is denoted by 0 and its
functional state is denoted by 1.
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Similarly, let B be another element denoted by the r.v. X2. Let x2={0,1},
p2={0.7, 0.3} be the pmf of X2.
Let A and B undergo failures and repairs independently. Then X1 and X2 are
statistically independent random variables. This assumption allows the multiplica-
tion of probabilities to find the corresponding system level probabilities.
If A and B are connected in series and form a system, then Y1 = X1X2 yields
all possible states of the system. Similarly, Y2 = 1 − (1 − X1)(1 − X2) yields all
possible states of the system for a parallel configuration. Table 6.1 lists the pmf
of the system states.
From the table, it is possible to obtain availability of a parallel system as
A = P (Y2 = 1)
= P (X1 = 0)P (X2 = 1) + P (X1 = 1)P (X2 = 0) + P (X1 = 1)P (X2 = 1)
= 0.18 + 0.28 + 0.12 = 0.58
Table 6.1: System states for a series and parallel configuration
# X1 = x1 X2 = x2 Series Parallel Probability
Y1 Y2 P(X1=x1)P(X2=x2)
1 0 0 0 0 0.42
2 0 1 0 1 0.18
3 1 0 0 1 0.28
4 1 1 1 1 0.12
Sum 1.0
It would be elegant if these possibilities can be represented in a compact form
and easily computed. With this intent the next section discusses the moment
generating function.
6.3.2 Moment generating function (mgf)
The mgf mX(t) of the discrete random variable X with pmf x, p is defined for all







The function mX(t) is called the moment generating function because all of the
moments of r.v. X can be obtained by successively differentiating mX(t).
6.3.3 Probability generating function (pgf)







i.e., pmf of a r.v. X can be represented by its pgf in polynomial form.
Example
pgf of X1 and X2 in Example 6.3.1 are given by the following functions:
u1(z) = ωX1(z) = 0.6z
0 + 0.4z1
u2(z) = ωX2(z) = 0.7z
0 + 0.3z1
pmf of the system is given by the product of these polynomials. A formal procedure
for multiplication of these functions is discussed in the next section.
6.3.4 Universal Generating Function


















Thus the z-transforms of the random variables along with the composition operator
Ωφ to combine them is called the universal z-transform or universal (moment)
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generating function (UGF).



































It can be seen that the probabilities in Table 6.1 can be obtained by simple poly-
nomial multiplication of u1(z) and u2(z) as per Equations 6.3.4 and 6.3.4 for series
and parallel configurations respectively.
For series connection, U(z) = Ωφs(0.6z
0 + 0.4z1, 0.7z0 + 0.3z1)
= 0.42z0 + 0.18z0 + 0.28z0 + 0.12z1
For parallel connection, U(z) = Ωφp(0.6z
0 + 0.4z1, 0.7z0 + 0.3z1)
= 0.42z0 + 0.18z1 + 0.28z1 + 0.12z1
6.3.5 Extended Reliability Block Diagram
For multi-state components which have to be connected in a particular order, an
extended RBD embeds a Markov or a semi-Markov space diagram with in it. By
doing so, each block of the RBD would have multiple states embedded in it. Figure
6.1 illustrates an extended RBD of two elements A and B connected in series with
their corresponding Markov space diagrams embedded in their respective blocks.
The evaluation of the system structure function φ(x) becomes more tedious be-
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Figure 6.1: An extended RBD with embedded Markov space.
Hence, the next section introduces the idea of u-functions and composition oper-
ators attached to an extended RBD in order to simplify the tracking of numerous
possibilities.
6.3.6 The u-function
A u-function is essentially a pgf in random variable z and it relates possible values






Each element j with kj states is represented as a u-function. The coefficients of
z are time-dependent conditional state probabilities of the element j obtained by
modelling the element as a semi-Markov process as discussed in Chapter 4. The ex-
ponent of z can be any arbitrary mathematical object representing the performance
or state in which the element is currently in. It could be as simple as {0,1} corre-
sponding to the failure or functioning state of the system or numbers representing
the output of the element like the electricity in megawatts produced by the ele-
ment. These u-functions are then composed together step-by-step according to the
definition of a composition operator Ωφ which is tailored to the series-parallel na-
ture of the connections. φ is called the structure function, a terminology borrowed
from RBD method and it defines how the performance or status of the elements are
combined. Considering the series and parallel connections as AND and OR logical
operations respectively, Ωφ is defined as follows:
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1. Series Connection

















































It is assumed that the elements of the system are statistically independent. The in-
dependence constraint assures that each element can be in one of its set of allowable
states irrespective of which state the other elements are. This feature allows the
multiplication of the state probabilities as seen in Equations 1 and 2. Since, a single
(semi-)Markov system has been modularized in to individual blocks of an extended
RBD, the UGF method does not consider the characteristics of system transitions
between different states and hence the second assumption of repairability is needed.
The reliability indices like instantaneous availability and unavailability of the
system can be derived directly from the final u-function after the composition.
Usage of semi-Markov methods has been so far restricted to small systems due to
their analytical and computational complexities. This proposed procedure leverages
semi-Markov models by modularizing the entire system and composing them one
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at a time thus bringing a huge impact factor to the field of nuclear reliability
engineering.
Example
Consider a system with two elements connected in series. Let each element be
repairable with two states having the performance status - 1 (functioning) and 0
(failed). Let the failure/repair be exponentially distributed with a constant fail-
ure/repair rate. This system setup can be depicted in an extended RBD as in Figure
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Figure 6.2: Extended Reliability Diagram for Example 6.3.6.
and state 2 respectively. Similarly, let p21(t) and p22(t) be defined for element two.
Then, the u-functions for element 1 and element 2 are respectively:
u1(z, t) = p11(t)z
0 + p12(t)z
1
u2(z, t) = p21(t)z
0 + p22(t)z
1
Since the elements are in series, the above u-functions are composed as per Equation
1:
U(z, t) = {p12(t)p21(t) + p11(t)p21(t) + p11(t)p22(t)}z0 + p12(t)p22(t)z1
The state probabilities are either obtained from Markov or semi-Markov models.
The coefficient of z0 gives the unavailability of the system and that of z1 gives the
availability.
Availability, A(t) =p12(t)p22(t)
Unavailability = 1− A(t) =p12(t)p21(t) + p11(t)p21(t) + p11(t)p22(t)
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Figure 6.3: System availability of 2-state repairable system.
The availability plot is shown in Figure 6.3 with the parameters λ1 = λ2 = 0.5
and µ1 = µ2 = 1. Note that this example is the same as the Example 2.8.1 in the
chapter on Markov processes. Over there, a system of four differential equations
were solved. Here, two systems of two differential equations are solved at a time, the
benefit here being the ability to modularize the system, depict the state transitions
pictorially and avoid the problem of state explosion.
6.4 Example: Multi-State System
This section looks at a hypothetical system where each component of the system
goes through multiple states. Consider two redundant parallel subsystems con-
nected in series as shown in Figure 6.4.
Figure 6.4: Reliability Block Diagram for the four component example problem.
This problem was earlier solved using the semi-Markov process model by solving
for each component individually. Assume that each component can exist in three
states - operational, degraded and failure.
The probability of being in each state for each individual component can be
determined using semi-Markov process model and then the system unavailability
can be obtained using the UGF technique. It is assumed that components C1 and
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C2 are identical. Similarly, C3 and C4 are identical. The failure and repair data
for each of the components is listed in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2: Failure/repair data in (time in hours, cov) format.
time-to time-to time-to time-to
Component degradation failure recover restoration
2→ 1 1→ 0 0→ 1 1→ 2
C1, C2 20,0.3 10,0.6 0.8,1 0.5,1
C3, C4 35,0.3 5,0.6 0.8,1 0.5,1
State-space diagram for components C1 and C2 is shown in Figure 6.5. Similarly,
the corresponding diagram for components C3 and C4 is shown in Figure 6.6.
Figure 6.5: State-space for component C1 and C2.
Figure 6.6: State-space for component C3 and C4.
A semi-Markov process model is fitted for each component. The results of the
model are then used as the coefficients in the u-functions. For example, p10(t)
represents the probability of component 1 being in state 0. It is equivalent to
φ20(t) of the corresponding semi-Markov model which represents that probability
of component 1 being in state 0 at time t assuming that the component started its
operation in state 2. u-function for each of the components is given below:

















The coefficients of z0 in uCi(z, t) correspond to the unavailability of the compo-
nent Ci. These quantities are plotted in Figure 6.7.


























Component 1 & 2
Component 3 & 4
Figure 6.7: Unavailability of individual components.
u-functions can be written for the subsystems as well. Since components C1 and
C2 are connected in parallel, the state performance for subsystem 1 is considered as
the maximum of the state performances of both the components. These possibilities
are listed in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3: Subsystem performance based on component states
State
Component 1 Component 2 Subsystem
(s1) (s2) max(s1, s2)
Normal (2) Normal (2) Normal (2)
Normal (2) Degraded (1) Normal (2)
Normal (2) Failure (0) Normal (2)
Degraded (1) Normal (2) Normal (2)
Degraded (1) Degraded (1) Degraded (1)
Degraded (1) Failure (0) Degraded (1)
Failure (0) Normal (2) Normal (2)
Failure (0) Degraded (1) Degraded (1)
Failure (0) Failure (0) Failure (0)
Let the u-functions for subsystem 1 and subsystem 2 be denoted as uS1(z, t)
and uS2(z, t) respectively:
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(p10(t)p21(t) + p11(t)p20(t) + p11(t)p21(t))z
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uS2(z, t) = p30(t)p40(t)z
0+
(p30(t)p41(t) + p31(t)p40(t) + p31(t)p41(t))z
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Since subsystems S1 and S2 are connected in series, the state performance for
the system is considered as the minimum of the state performances of both the
subsystems. These possibilities are listed in Table 6.4.
Let the u-function for the system be denoted as uS(z, t):













= (v10(t)v20(t) + v10(t)v21(t) + v10(t)v22(t)+
v11(t)v20(t) + v12(t)v20(t))z
0+
(v11(t)v21(t) + v11(t)v22(t) + v12(t)v21(t))z
1+
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Table 6.4: System performance based on subsystem states
State
Subsystem 1 Subsystem 2 System
(s1) (s2) min(s1, s2)
Normal (2) Normal (2) Normal (2)
Normal (2) Degraded (1) Degraded (1)
Normal (2) Failure (0) Failure (0)
Degraded (1) Normal (2) Degraded (1)
Degraded (1) Degraded (1) Degraded (1)
Degraded (1) Failure (0) Failure (0)
Failure (0) Normal (2) Failure (0)
Failure (0) Degraded (1) Failure (0)
Failure (0) Failure (0) Failure (0)


























Figure 6.8: Unavailability of individual subsystems.
v12(t)v22(t)z
2
Collecting the coefficient of z0 from uS(z, t), the system unavailability is found.
It is plotted in Figure 6.9.
If this problem is solved by a single semi-Markov process model, there would
be 34 = 81 states leading to long computational times. Instead, by simplifying
the model, there are only 3 states per component and hence 12 states overall.
Polynomial multiplication is relatively much faster once the state probabilities are
found by any of Markov, semi-Markov or Monte Carlo methods.
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Figure 6.9: Unavailability of the system.
6.5 Case Study: Heat Transport System (HTS)
The proposed method is an improvement over conventional state-space analysis
techniques. It needs a reliability block diagram with an embedded state space
diagram as the main input. The block diagram helps in identifying the critical
components and their series-parallel configuration. The state-space diagram gives
an idea of failure and repair times during the life of the components.
Given the above, the objective is to find the availability of individual compo-
nents and that of the entire system. A semi-Markov model is fitted to each of the
components of the system and the respective state probabilities are computed. All
these semi-Markov models are combined using the UGF technique. Availability
and unavailability of the system follows from the polynomials output by UGF. The
following case study on the heat transport system in a nuclear power plant walks
through all the above steps.
The heat transport system (HTS) (Figure 6.10) circulates pressurizedD20 coolant
through the fuel channels to remove the heat produced by fission in the nuclear fuel.
The coolant transports the heat to steam generators, where it is transferred to light
water to produce steam to drive the turbine. Two parallel HTS coolant loops are
provided in the CANDU system. The heat from half of the several hundred fuel
channels in the reactor core (380 in CANDU 6) is removed by each loop. Each












Figure 6.10: Schematic diagram of the CANDU Heat Transport System.
to each of the fuel channels through individual feeder pipes from the inlet headers
and is returned from each channel through individual feeder pipes to the outlet
headers. Each heat transport system loop is arranged in a ”Figure of 8”, with the
coolant making two passes, in opposite directions, through the core during each
complete circuit, and the pumps in each loop operating in series. The coolant flow
in adjacent fuel channels is in opposite directions. The HTS piping is fabricated
from corrosion resistant carbon steel. The pressure in the heat transport system is
controlled by a pressurizer connected to the outlet headers at one end of the reac-
tor. Valves provide isolation between the two loops in the event of a loss-of-coolant
accident. Thus, the pressure tubes, feeder pipes and the steam generators form the
             
 
  
Figure 6.11: Fault tree diagram for the Heat Transport System.
main subsystem connected in series to each other as seen in the fault tree diagram
in Figure 6.11. The reliability block diagram for this subsystem is shown in Figure
6.12. Moreover, only one loop of the two parallel coolant loops has been considered
here for demonstration.
The mean life of the element gives an idea of the mean time to failure of the
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Figure 6.12: Extended Reliability Block Diagram of the Heat Transport System.
element. The coefficient of variation is the ratio of the standard deviation to the
mean and for the Weibull distribution, it is a function of the shape parameter.
These parameters along with the repair time are listed in Table 6.5.
Table 6.5: Parameters for the elements of heat transport system.
Feeders Pressure Tubes Steam Generator
Mean Life (Yrs) µwbl 25 30 30
Coeff. of Var. covwbl 0.2 0.3 0.25
MTTR (Yrs) µi 0.1, 0.5, 1 0.1, 0.5, 1 0.1, 0.5, 1
The Weibull shape and scale parameters listed in Table 6.6 are back calculated
from the following formulas for Weibull mean, standard deviation and coefficient of
variation:












Table 6.6: Weibull shape and scale parameters for the elements of the heat transport
system.
Feeder Pressure Tubes Steam Generator
Shape (γi) 5.797 3.714 4.542
Scale (λi) 26.999 44.3146 32.856
With the parameters of the Weibull and exponential distributions in hand, the
semi-Markov kernel and waiting time matrices can be set up for i=1,2,3 correspond-












These matrices are plugged in to the semi-Markov renewal equation 3.10 and solved
using the Trapezoidal algorithm to evaluate all the state probabilities pij(t). Then,
the u-functions for the pressure tubes, feeders and the steam generator are respec-
tively:
u1(z, t) = p11(t)z
0 + p12(t)z
1
u2(z, t) = p21(t)z
0 + p22(t)z
1
u3(z, t) = p31(t)z
0 + p32(t)z
1
Since the elements are connected in series, the operator Ωφs is applied to the above
u-functions:
U(z, t) = Ωφs(u1(z, t), u2(z, t), u3(z, t))
= {p11(t)p21(t)p31(t) + p11(t)p21(t)p32(t) + p11(t)p22(t)p31(t)+
p11(t)p22(t)p32(t) + p12(t)p21(t)p31(t) + p12(t)p21(t)p32(t)+
p12(t)p22(t)p31(t)}z0 + p12(t)p22(t)p32(t)z1
While the terms with zero as the exponent of z contribute to the unavailability of
the system, the coefficient of the single remaining term gives the availability A(t)
of the heat transport system. Let c > 0 be the mean life of an element. Then its







The average availability of each of the elements over the mission time given by
their respective mean life for various repair times are shown in Table 6.7. Given
the smaller failure rates and repair times, the average availability is very high
signifying the heat transport system as a highly reliable subsystem of the nuclear
power plant.
Table 6.7: Average availability for the elements and the heat transport system.
MTTR Feeder Pressure Tubes Steam Generator System
0.1 0.9979 0.9985 0.9985 0.9943
0.5 0.9910 0.9920 0.9923 0.9713
1 0.9837 0.9847 0.9855 0.9464
The observed pattern of unavailability of the elements of heat transport system
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Figure 6.13: Unavailability plot - Effect of repair.
Figure 6.14: Unavailability plot - Effect of ageing.
is plotted in Figure 6.13. The plots show highest unavailability around the mean
life time of the respective elements. The unavailability decreases gradually later on
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due to repair. When the repair time is lesser, the unavailability after the restoration
is lesser before the next failure shows its influence. Hence a total availability of one
is not witnessed over time after the first failure. The system plot shows multiple
dips of high unavailability during a span of 60 years corresponding to the failures
of the elements of the system. In all, it can be said that the higher availability is a
function of lower failure rates and lesser repair times.
The effect of aging while keeping the mean time to failure and the repair time
constant is seen in Figure 6.14. In this plot, only the variability in the time to
failure is manipulated. As a result, a decreased coefficient of variation leads to an
increased shape parameter of the Weibull failure distribution. As seen in the plots,
increasing the shape parameter γ results in increased peak unavailability of the
components and of the entire system.
The reader is reminded again the fact that this application considers non-
exponential failure distributions for the elements allowing way to more realistic
time-dependent availability of the heat transport system while eliminating the state
explosion problem faced by the semi-Markov technique.
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter has brought together the versatility of semi-Markov process and the
flexibility of UGF technique in eliminating the problem of dimension damnation.
The proposed approach is useful in estimating the time-dependent availability of
nuclear power plant systems. By eliminating the need for dropping off certain
states or merging a few of them for computational ease, the UGF method manages
to modularize the entire system in to a set of semi-Markov models. This method
requires that subsystems be identified and represented in a polynomial form. How-







Within the framework of multi-state system reliability for nuclear power systems,
the current research focused on the following major topics:
1. The applicability of Markov process model for relatively medium scale systems
with finite number of states in continuous time.
2. Improving the existing Markov models in the nuclear industry to accommo-
date non-exponential failure time distribution using semi-Markov models on
small scale systems.
3. Application of the developed methodology to nuclear plant systems such as
Nuclear Component Cooling Water (NCCW) system, nuclear piping system,
tail-gas system, Pressurized Heat Transport System (PHTS) and Digital In-
strumentation and Control (I&C) system.
Semi-Markov process model is identified as a potential tool in analyzing small
to medium sized reliability block diagrams or system degradation problems. The
results of the analysis mainly are the system failure probability and system hazard
rate. These results can be incorporated in to a larger fault tree model as part of
a probabilistic safety assessment project. Semi-Markov process model is preferable
when at least one of the components of a system is non-repairable leading to an
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analysis of first failure of the system. In case of a degradation problem, the gradual
degradation usually leads to an irrecoverable system failure. These two categories
were explored in the present study. In the Nuclear Component Cooling Water
(NCCW) system, the heat exchanger was a non-repairable component. A Monte
Carlo simulation of this system validated the results of the semi-Markov process
model. A second case study considered was the degradation of the nuclear piping
system. In an attempt, a hypothetical system was considered with two redundant
subsystems assuming all the components were repairable. The semi-Markov for-
mulation of this problem with individual model for each subsystem failed to yield
known standard results and the reason was found to be a limitation of the model to
take in to consideration non-regenerative points in the presence of non-exponential
failure time distribution. Moreover, mainstream asset failure analysis profession-
als in the industry today view semi-Markov process model as either useful, but
too complex or as a tool that cannot handle complexities such as spares, inspec-
tions, repair crews etc. or as a tool that is too complex for practical requirements.
With practical applications and illustrative examples, this thesis hopes to bring the
audience at ease with the more sophisticated semi-Markov process model.
7.2 Research Contributions
The key contribution of the thesis is to explore and formulate various applications
of the semi-Markov process model for the multi-state reliability analysis of nuclear
power plant systems. Most applications are semi-Markov extensions of existing
Markov models. A brief technique to reduce the number of states in a semi-Markov
model leading to closed form solutions under competing risk conditions avoiding
intensive computations was described in Veeramany and Pandey (2011b).
The following practical applications were considered during the course of the
research:
1. Reliability analysis of nuclear piping system (Veeramany and Pandey, 2011c).
2. Reliability analysis of nuclear component cooling water system(Veeramany
and Pandey, 2011b).
3. Reliability analysis of digital instrumentation and control systems(Veeramany
and Pandey, 2011a).
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4. Quantifying the effects of maintenance on unavailability of systems (Submit-
ted to Nuclear Engineering and Design on January 25, 2012).
5. Semi-Markov model of fire growth (Submitted to Fire Technology on June 1,
2012).
6. Availability analysis of practical systems (Veeramany and Pandey, 2010a).
7. Availability Analysis of Systems with Multi-State Components (Veeramany
and Pandey, 2010b).
8. Substation reliability and cost analysis.
9. Availability analysis of heat transport system.
In summary, the semi-Markov process model provides a framework for analyzing
reliability block diagrams and degradation characteristics of multi-state systems. It
can be considered as an alternative to Monte Carlo simulations and Markov models
for better accuracy in reliability predictions.
7.3 Recommendations for future research
1. Imperfect repair, common cause failure and ageing
All throughout the thesis, it has been assumed that at the conclusion of
a repair, the component is returned to an ‘as good as new condition’. This
means that the age of the component is returned to time equals zero. However,
this may not always be the case. In fact, the age of the component after the
repair may be a percentage of its age at the time when the repair took place.
This kind of a repair is called an imperfect repair. A provision to incorporate
this imperfection in the models is recommended.
Yet another feature that accelerates system failures is the common cause
failure (CCF) and is considered significant in real world situations. There are
a few CCF models already available in the literature. One or more of these
can be adapted to be included in a semi-Markov model of redundant systems.
The above two features at large determine how distinctly ageing characteris-
tics are observed in a system that has been put in to service for a long time.
For systems with rare events and slow ageing, it is desirable to use truncated
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statistical distributions to shift the view toward particular period of time in
the system’s life rather than observing it from the time of installation.
2. Risk analysis
Reliability analysis is of no use to a decision or policy maker if the risk compo-
nent is missing in the analysis of a system. Risk analysis for a Markov model
can be achieved using the Markov reward model. An extension of this model
is the semi-Markov reward model. Hence, future research on risk analysis of
nuclear power plant systems could focus on cost models based on the concept
of rewards in conjunction with non-exponential failure time distributions as
holding times in a semi-Markov analysis.
3. Fault Tree Analysis
Static fault trees have been extensively used in the industry for over half a
century. The recent years have witnessed an increasing interest in dynamic
fault tree (DFT) and dynamic reliability block diagram (DRBD). These rep-
resentations have introduced new symbols to consider interaction between
subsystems. Developing semi-Markov models equivalent to these advanced
representations is possibly yet another area of exclusive focus.
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Appendix A
An algorithm to solve
Markov-Renewal Equation
In this appendix, an algorithm derived by Nunn and Desiderio(1977) based on
the trapezoidal rule for solving the Markov-renewal Equation 3.9 by numerical
integration is listed.
Equation 3.9 is solved by finding φ(t) on a set of equally spaced points in time.
The time points are denoted t0,t1 , ..., tm . The step size, i.e., the interval between
the time points, is denoted ∆t. The time points can be represented as: tn = ∆t∗n,
0 ≤ n ≤ m. With φij(0) = δij the solution for tn, n > 0, is now desired.
For convenience, Equation 3.9 is rewritten in matrix notation as:
φ(tn) = W (tn) +
tn∫
0




and W (tn) is the diagonal matrix with elements Wi(t) down the diagonal and zeros
elsewhere. It is observed that when τ = 0, the argument of φ in the integrand is
the same as that of φ on the left of the equation. To capitalize on this, Equation
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A.1 is rewritten as follows:
φ(tn) = W (tn) +
t1∫
0
H(τ)φ(tn − τ)dτ +
tn∫
t1
H(τ)φ(tn − τ)dτ (A.-1)









f ′′(ξ), (x1 < ξ < x2) (A.0)
where x1 and x2 are separated by an interval ∆x, f(.) is the function to be inte-
grated, and the last term on the right is the error term. Applying equation A.0
without the error term produces:
φ(tn) = W (tn) +
∆t
2







[H(t1)φ(tn − t1) +H(tn)φ(0)] (A.-1)
where H(0) = H(t0) has been used. Solving for φ(tn) produces:
φ(tn) = [I −
∆t
2







This equation is the basic recursive scheme used numerically to produce the
solution of Equation 3.9 on the points tn , 1 ≤ n ≤ m. The solution is started with
φ(0) = W(0) = I, and the solution for φ(t) is gotten by applying equation (A-5), etc.
In this way, the solution of Equation A.0 for any finite tn is produced. The matrix
[I−∆t
2
H(0)] in Equation A.0 need be inverted only once at the start of the numerical
scheme. If the transition matrix H(t) contains only density functions that are zero
at time zero, no inversion is required. The transition matrix should contain only
density functions that are continuous in the time interval of interest. Discontinuous
density functions may cause large numerical inaccuracies in the numerical scheme.
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At each step, the solution of Equation A.0 must satisfy the following condition:
N∑
j=1
φij(tn) ≈ 1 1 ≤ i ≤ N. (A.1)
This condition serves to check on both the numerical accuracy and stability of
the solution. The relative numerical accuracy of the iterative scheme is one order
of magnitude less than the numerical accuracy of the trapezoidal integration rule.
This occurs because of the compounding of numerical errors in the iterative scheme.





where f(.) is the function being integrated.
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Appendix B
COV vs. Weibull Shape
Parameter Mapping
The expression for cov of the Weibull distribution can be given solely in terms of












By systematically varying γ values, a mapping between cov and the shape param-
eter can be generated as shown in the Table below.
Table B.1: Relation between cov and Weibull shape parameter
cov Shape (γ) cov Shape (γ) cov Shape (γ)
0.2 5.797715 0.65 1.57291 1.1 0.910337
0.25 4.542412 0.7 1.451286 1.15 0.872159
0.3 3.713909 0.75 1.34757 1.2 0.837618
0.35 3.128894 0.8 1.258265 1.25 0.806239
0.4 2.695696 0.85 1.18071 1.3 0.777624
0.45 2.363383 0.9 1.11284 1.35 0.751436
0.5 2.101395 0.95 1.053036 1.4 0.727389
0.55 1.8903 1 1 1.45 0.705239
0.6 1.717114 1.05 0.952724
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Appendix C
Fault Trees and Reliability Block
diagrams
C.1 Introduction
A system is a complex of subsystems (components) and when these subsystems are
put together to form an overall system, failure modes may appear that are not at
all obvious when viewed from the standpoint of the separate components.
In system reliability analysis, a fault tree is a graphical representation of the
logic that relates certain specific events or primary failures to an ultimate undesired
event through a deductive failure analysis. This undesired event constitutes the top
event in a fault tree diagram, for example, a switch fails to make contact. A fault
tree does not model all possible system failures. It is tailored to design the top
event and hence includes only those faults that contribute to the top event.
A fault tree analysis is an analytical technique where an undesirable state of
the system is specified and then analyzed to find all ways in which the undesired
event can occur. The initiating fault events that lead to the top event are called
basic events. Logic gates like AND-gate and OR-gate are used to bind these basic
events needed for the occurrence of the output events. The basic initiating events
are called “failures” and the events resulting from the inter-relationship of the basic
events are called “faults”. The OR-gate is used to show that the occurrence of one
or more of the basic basic events leads to the output event. Inputs to an OR-gate
are identical to the output but are more specifically defined to a cause. The AND-
gate is used when output fault occurs only if all the input faults occur. Both these
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(a) OR Gate (b) AND Gate
Figure C.1: Gates used in a fault tree (a) OR Gate(b) AND Gate
gates can take any number of input faults. There are a few other gates available
for fault tree modelling which are basically special cases of these two basic types.
Consider two components A and B in series such that the failure of either of
these results in an output fault. Given the probabilities of failures of each of these
components, the probability of the fault output is given by the addition rule:
P (A or B) = P (A) + P (B)− P (A and B)
Usually, the possibility of the simultaneous occurrence of any two events is ignored.
Such a situation is called a ‘rare event occurrence’. Hence the addition rule reduces
to
P (A or B) = P (A) + P (B)
This union rule can be extended to more than two events and is associated with
the OR-gate in a fault tree.
If two components are connected in parallel and isolated from one another,
the failure of one does not affect the failure of the other. The failures of these
components are assumed to be independent events. For two independent events
A and B, the probability that both the events A and B occur is given by the
multiplication rule:
P (A and B both occur) = P (A)P (B)
C.2 Common Cause Failures (CCF)
Failure of multiple components due to a common cause called the common cause
failure represents one of the most important issues in evaluation of system reliability
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or unavailability. The frequency of such events has relatively low expectancy, when
compared to random failures, which affect individual components. However, in
many cases the consequence is a direct loss of safety system or mitigative safety
function. The basic events caused due to a common cause are called common-
mode events of the cause. For example, lightning could be a common cause and the
failure of redundant valves in a cooling system could be common-mode event. Other
examples of common cause are impact, stress, vibration, temperature, manufacturer
etc. In a fault tree, a common cause failure can be represented by mirroring a
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CCF group increases, the complexity of a fault tree model expands exponentially. The 
example for a CCF group with three components (A, B and C) is shown in Figure 3. 
In order to prevent fault trees from getting too complex and to reduce the modeling 
effort, a simplified approach was taken toward modeling of CCF for groups of more than two 
components. In this approach all contributions from various CCF groups within particular 
system were captured by a single basic event attached to system-level top logic in the fault 
tree structure. The method involves an evalua ion of the fault tree cutsets by CCF analys , an 
identification of which cutsets may be susceptible to dependent failures, a calculation of 
common cause contributions and adding representative basic event directly into the fault tree 
model. 
 
SY STEM  FAILS
Train A fails Train B fails
Component A fails Component B fails
Individual (random)
failures of component A
Individual (random)
failures of component B
Component A & B fail
due to common cause
Component A & B fail
due to common cause
A CCF B CCF  
Figure 1: Fault Tree Model of CCF for Two-Component Group 
 
As already mentioned, all CCF groups with 3 or more components were identified 
during the system fault tree analyses. System fault trees were then developed with no account 
for common cause failures of 3 or more components in an explicit manner. Once a fault tree 
for a particular system was developed, its minimal cutsets were generated and evaluated as a 
part of consistency checking. They contained basic events representing CCFs of two-
component groups, since these were included in the fault tree during its development, as 
described above. 
Generated system-level cutsets were then subjected to a screening process, performed 
by the CCF analyst, in order to identify those cutsets that are to be “marked” as susceptible to 
CCF of more than two components. Similar cutsets from one system fault tree were grouped 
together. The process is illustrated by a simple system of three redundant components A, B 
and C with its fault tree representation conceptually shown in Figure 2. The post processing 
for this simplified example is illustrated by Table 1. 
A “marked” cutset generally contains a product of an independent individual failure(s) 
of components that are not members of CCF group and at least two independent individual 
failures of components that are part of the same CCF group. For instance, minimal cutset “j2” 
in Table 1 is a product of basic events representing individual random failures of components 
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Figure C.2: Cut set example
basic event for all the components failing due to a common cause. For example,
Figure C.2 shows a two component redundant syst m susceptible to a common
cause (Vrbanić et al., 2003).
A dependent event is an event whose probability in a group of events cannot be
expressed as simple product of unconditional probability of failure. Recall that if
any two events A and B are independent then,
P (A|B) = P (A)
where as if A is indeed dependent on B, then
P (A|B) = P (A ∩B)
P (B)
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Common cause failures can be categorized under the general class of dependent
events and show up in the design of redundant systems. These lead to outage of
multiple components caused by a single undesired event, for example, outage of all
components due to a common electrical supply failure. Cascade failures are another
class of dependent events that do not affect redundant components. Failure of one
component leads to the failure of another and the chain of failures continues like a
cascading waterfall.
C.2.1 β − factor model
The β − factor model (Fleming, 1974) expresses the correlation between the in-
dependent random component failures and common cause failures in a redundant
system. Let λ be the failure rate of the component such that
λ = λi + λCCF
where λi is the independent failure rate and λCCF is the failure rate due to common







λi = λ− λCCF
= λ(1− β)
i.e., both the independent failure rate and the common cause failure rate are
expressed as a function of the component’s failure rate. β lies between 0 and 1. In
the field of power transmission it is found that the β value averages between 0 and
25% (Borcsok and Holub, 2008).
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C.3 Cut sets
A cut set of a system is defined as a set of system components, which when failed,
causes failure of the system (Billinton and Allan, 1992). In other words, a cut set is
collection of basic events; if all these basic events occur, the top event is guaranteed
to occur (Henley and Kumamoto, 1980).
A cut set of size n has n basic events in it and is called an n − event cut set.
Cut sets with a single event significantly contribute to the top-event. The only
exception is when this one-event has a very small probability of occurrence.
C.3.1 Example

























Figure C.3: Cut set example
and G. The top event A occurs if both D and E occur and one of F and G occur.
Hence the cut sets are
{D,E, F}, {D,E,G}, {D,E, F,G}
A minimal cut set of a system is also a cut set such that removal of any event
from it does not cause the system to fail.
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In this example removing either of event F orG from the cut set {D,E, F,G}still
leads to system failure. Hence it is not a minimal one. Also note that this cut set
is a superset of the other two cut sets. However, the other two cut sets are minimal
since removal of any of F,G does not lead to the top event.
C.3.2 Computer codes
If the occurrence of one event prevents another event from occurring, then these
events are called mutually exclusive events. In the absence of such events, a com-
puter program called MOCUS (Fussel et al., 1974) was developed to obtain minimal
cut sets from fault trees. It was based on the fact that OR gates increase the number
of cut sets and AND gates increase the size of the cut set.
The common cause failure cut sets can be derived from the set of minimal cut
sets of a fault tree. Minimal cut sets may contain events from components sharing
a common location or a common link. Components share a common location if
no barrier insulates any one of them from the common cause. A common link is
a dependency among components which cannot be removed by a physical barrier
(e.g., a common energy source or common maintenance instructions). Presence of
duplicate minimal cut sets identifies a common cause failure. The COMCAN fault
tree analysis codes (Burdick et al., 1976) were designed to analyze complex systems,
such as nuclear plants for common causes of failure.
The CAFTA software owned by Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), USA
is used widely by US and international nuclear power plants. It is an integrated
tool part of the EPRI risk and reliability suite of products providing four main
programs - fault tree editor, a reliability database editor, a cutset editor and an
event tree editor.
C.4 Reliability Block Diagrams
A reliability block diagram is a success-oriented network describing the function
of the system. It is suitable for systems of non-repairable components and where
the order in which failures occur does not matter. Each element of the system is
represented by a block and a label identifies it. Given a vector x consisting of the
state of each of the elements, the state of the system is obtained by evaluating the
structure function φ(x):
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1. Series Structure A system functions if and only if all of its n elements are
functional.




2. Parallel Structure A system functions if at least one of its elements is
functional.























Let RA(t) and RB(t) be the reliability of the components A and B respectively.
Then the unreliability of a series system Qs(t) is the unreliability of at least one of
the components:
Qs(t) = 1−RA(t)RB(t)
Let QA(t) and QB(t) be the unreliability of the components A and B respec-
tively. Then the unreliability of a parallel system Qp(t) is the unreliability of both
the components:
Qp(t) = QA(t)QB(t)





The models in this thesis have been developed using the ‘Semi-Markov Modeller’
software. The tool has been developed as an integrated modelling environment
(IME) to build, manage, execute and visualize Markov and semi-Markov models.
The models are saved with an extension of .smp and displayed as acrobat reader
files (pdf) using the GraphViz graph visualization software. State and transition
labels can be enclosed in ‘$’ to display mathematical symbols supported by the
MiKTeX pdfTeX system. The high quality pdf output can either be embedded as
is in a technical report or can be further customized using freely available GraphViz
dot language editors. The state probabilities are saved as tab delimited plain text
files and can be opened in Matlab for customized plotting though the software itself
provides basic plotting of the results. The tool supports a number of commonly used
statistical distributions in engineering including exponential, Weibull and lognormal
distributions. Figure D.1 shows a snapshot of the software package while the piping
system model was under development.
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GetStateProbabilities(int initState) : vector<vector<double>>
GetStateProbability(int initState, int targetState) : vector<double>
GetTimeVector() : vector<double>
IntegralSystemEquations(string filepath) : void
KernelElement(double t, int r, int c) : double
KernelMatrix(double t, matrix<double>& C) : void
KernelRow(double t, int r) : vector<double>
NoWaitingPolyWbl(double t, matrix<double>& W) : void
NoWaitingTedious(int t, vector<matrix<double>>& W, const vector<vector<double>>& w) : void
PathExists(int fromState, int toState) : bool
RegisterHandlers(function<matrix<double>> kernelHandler, function<vector<double>> waitingHandler) : void
SampleTimeSpent(int inState, int toState, double p) : double
SemiMarkovModel()
SemiMarkovModel(JaggedMatrix* model)
SetModelInput(double mission, int steps) : void
SetupMatrices() : void
StateWaitingTime(int t, int state) : double
Trapz2Points(int t, const vector<vector<double>>& f) : vector<double>
WaitingTimeMatrix(double t, matrix<double>& C, vector<double>& v) : void













AddDistribution() : void (+ 3 overloads)
BuildModel() : void









JaggedMatrix() (+ 3 overloads)
PathExists() : bool
pdf() : matrix<double> (+ 2 overloads)































Absorbing state An absorbing state is a state from which there is a zero
probability of exiting. An absorbing Markov system is a Markov system that con-
tains at least one absorbing state.
Ageing system If the failure rate function λ(t) increases with age, we have
an ageing system (component) that deteriorates (fails more often) with age. If the
failure rate is constant in time, we have a non-ageing system.
Availability Availability represents the probability that the system is capable
of conducting its required function when it is called upon given that it is not failed
or undergoing a repair action.
Common Cause Failure A common cause failure is a single, shared event
that adversely affects two or more components at the same time. When the conse-
quences of the event include the occurrence of an accident sequence initiating event,
the event is called a common cause initiating event.
Competing risk Given the current state, if a process has to choose from more
than one state for the next transition, then the process is said to be in a competing
risk situation.
Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) The CDF FX(x) of a random
variable X represents the probability that X takes on a value less than or equal to
x.
Extended RBD For multi-state components which have to be connected in
a particular order, an extended RBD embeds a Markov or a semi-Markov space
diagram with in it.
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Failure rate function The failure rate of a component is the conditional
probability of failure given that it has not already failed. λ(t) = f(t)
R(t)
Fault tree In reliability and systems analysis, a fault tree is a graphical
representation of the logic that relates certain specific events or primary failures to
an ultimate undesired event through a deductive failure analysis.
Fault Tree Top Event A fault tree top event is the event at the very top
of the fault tree, sometimes referred to as the undesired event, for which the fault
tree determines the causes.
Heat Transport System The heat transport system (HTS) circulates pres-
surized D20 coolant through the fuel channels to remove the heat produced by
fission in the nuclear fuel. The coolant transports the heat to steam generators,
where it is transferred to light water to produce steam to drive the turbine.
Holding time (semi-Markov) Let the process be in state i. After the
successor state j has been selected and before making a transition from i to j,the
process holds for a time tij in state i. tij is a random variable called the holding
time.
Homogeneous Markov model Given the past state of the process, the
probability of entering the present state is the same no matter at what time the
arrival in to the present state occurs.
Pr(Xn+1 = x|Xn = y) = Pr(Xn = x|Xn−1 = y)
Initiating event frequency An event that creates a disturbance in the plant
having the potential to lead to core damage, depending on the successful operation
of required mitigating systems in the plant is called an initiating event. The number
of such events occurring in a unit time is called the initiating event frequency.
Markov process A Markov process or Markov chain is a system that can
be in one of several states, and can pass from one state to another each time step
according to fixed probabilities satisfying the Markov property.
Markov property Given the present state, the future and past states are
independent.
Pr(Xn+1 = x|Xn = xn, ..., X1 = x1)= Pr(Xn+1 = x|Xn = xn) The description of
the present state fully captures all the information that could influence the future
evolution of the process. Future states will be reached through a probabilistic
process instead of a deterministic one.
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Mission Time The mission time is the time that a system or component is
required to operate in order to successfully perform its function.
NCCW system In nuclear power plants, Nuclear Component Cooling Water
(NCCW) systems are typically used for removing heat (cooling) systems containing
potentially radioactive fluids. These systems are, in turn, then cooled by the ulti-
mate cooling system - river, lake, sea, or ocean water.The NCCW system consists
of two parallel pump trains connected in series with a heat exchanger train.
NDE Non-destructive examination is an industrial technique to collect charac-
teristics of a system without subjecting it to permanent damage.
Probability Density Function (PDF) The PDF fX(x) of a random variable
X represents the probability that X takes on a value equal to x.
Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) PSA is a quantitative assessment
of the risk associated with plant operation and maintenance. The risk is measured
in terms of the frequency of occurrence of different events, including severe core
damage.
Reliability Reliability represents the probability of components, parts and
systems to perform their required functions for a desired period of time without
failure in specified environments with a desired confidence.
Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) A reliability block diagram is a success-
oriented network diagram describing the function of the system. It is suitable for
systems of non-repairable components and where the order in which failures occur
does not matter.
Semi-Markov kernel The matrix H = {pijhij(t)} is called the kernel or
core of the semi-Markov process. Here, pij are the transition probabilities and hij
are the time spent in state j given that the process initially started in state i.
If the transition probabilities are not known, they are replaced by an equivalent
competing risk formulation. The kernel totally characterizes the statistical time
behavior of the semi-Markov process.
Semi-Markov process Like a Markov process, a semi-Markov process (SMP)
also has a set of states and the transitions between them are governed by a transition
probability matrix. However, in a semi-Markov process, the time spent in any state
after entering it is a random variable which can be described by a non-exponential
distribution as well.
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State transition diagram A Markov process can be illustrated by means of
a state transition diagram, which is a diagram showing all the states and transition
rates.
Static and dynamic fault tree A fault tree in which the system failure is
insensitive to the order of occurrence of component fault events is called a static
fault tree. Dynamic fault trees are a superset of traditional (static) fault trees in
that additional gates are used to model sequential behavior.
u-function A u-function is essentially a polynomial in random variable z and
it relates possible values of z with the corresponding probabilities. Each element j
with kj states is represented as a u-function.The coefficients of z are time-dependent
conditional state probabilities of the element j obtained by modeling the element
as a semi-Markov process. The exponent of z can be any arbitrary mathematical
object representing the performance or state in which the element is currently in.
Waiting time (semi-Markov) A waiting time ti in a state i is a holding
time where the successor of the state i is not known i.e. an unconditional holding
time is called a waiting time.
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P. Lévy. Systems semi-markoviens ayant au plus une inifinite denombrable d’etats
possibles. Proc. Intern. Congr. Math., Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2:294, 1954.
34
232
A. Lisnianski. Extended block diagram method for a multi-state system reliability
assessment. Reliability Engineering and System Safety,, 92(12):1601–1607, 12
2007. 35
A. Lisnianski and G. Levitin. Multi-state System Reliability: Assessment, Opti-
mization and Applications. World Scientific, Singapore, 2003. 18, 20, 34, 42, 43,
78, 79, 89, 101, 147, 183
C.J. Lu and W.Q. Meeker. Using degradation measures to estimate a time-to-failure
distribution. Technometrics, pages 161–174, 1993. 155
D. J. Lunn, A. Thomas, N. Best, and D. Spiegelhalter. Winbugs – a bayesian mod-
elling framework: Concepts, structure, and extensibility. Statistics and Comput-
ing, 10(4):325–337, 2000. 17
K. B. Marais and J. H. Saleh. Beyond its cost, the value of maintenance: An
analytical framework for capturing its net present value. Reliability Engineering
and System Safety, 94(2):644 – 657, 2009. 104
M. Marseguerra, E. Zio, and L. Podofillini. Multiobjective spare part allocation by
means of genetic algorithms and monte carlo simulation. Reliability Engineering
& System Safety, 87(3):325 – 335, 2005. 113
M. Matsumoto and T. Nishimura. Mersenne twister: a 623-dimensionally equidis-
tributed uniform pseudo-random number generator. ACM Trans. Model. Com-
put. Simul., 8(1):3–30, 1998. 169
K. McGrattan. Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS). National Institute of Standards
and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, USA, 2004. 126
William Q. Meeker and Luis A. Escobar. Statistical Methods for Reliability Data
(Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics). Wiley-Interscience, 1998. ISBN
0471143286. 155
M. Modarres, M. Kaminskiy, and V. Krivtsov. Reliability Engineering and Risk
Analysis: A Practical Guide. CRC Press, FL, USA, 1999. 19, 42
G. S. Mokaddis and M. L. Tawfek. Stochastic analysis of a two-dissimilar unit warm
standby redundant system with two types of repair facilities. Microelectronics
and Reliability, 35(12):1467 – 1472, 1995. 77
233
Y. Morishita. A stochastic model of fire spread. Fire Science and Technology, 5(1):
1–10, 1985. 124, 127
A. Naess, B.J. Leira, and O. Batsevych. System reliability analysis by enhanced
monte carlo simulation. Structural Safety, 31(5):349 – 355, 2009. 167
T. Nakagawa and S. Osaki. Stochastic behaviour of a two-unit priority standby
redundant system with repair. Microelectronics Reliability, 14(3):309–313, 1975a.
7
T. Nakagawa and S. Osaki. The discrete weibull distribution. IEEE Transactions
on Reliability, 24:300–301, 1975b. 71
T. Nakagawa and S. Osaki. Markov renewal processes with some non-regeneration
points and their applications to reliability theory. Microelectronics Reliability, 15
(6):633–636, 1976. 6
W. R. Nunn and A. M. Desiderio. Semi-markov processes: An introduction. Center
for Naval Analyses, pages 1–30, 1977. xvi, 36, 40
Shunji Osaki and T. Nakagawa. On a two-unit standby redundant system with
standby failure. Operations Research, 19(2):510–523, 1971. 77
B. Ouhbi and N. Limnios. The rate of occurrence of failures for semi-markov
processes and estimation. Statistics and Probability Letters, 59(3):245 – 255,
2002. 34
B. Ouhbi and N. Limnios. Nonparametric reliability estimation of semi-markov
processes. Journal of Statistical Planning and Inference,, 109(1-2):155–165, 1/1
2003. 34
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